{"paper_id":"2305.14604","title":"Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees","authors":["Jason Milionis","Ciamac C. Moallemi","Tim Roughgarden"],"paper_date":"2023-05-24","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.14604v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/automated-market-making-and-arbitrage-profits-in-the-presenc/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper develops a tractable model for arbitrage profits in the presence of trading fees and discrete Poisson block times, providing closed‑form formulas and insights on how fees and block frequency affect LP losses.","quote":"The main contribution of the present work is to develop a tractable model for arbitrage profits in the presence of trading fees.","summary":"We consider the impact of trading fees on the profits of arbitrageurs trading against an automated market maker (AMM) or, equivalently, on the adverse selection incurred by liquidity providers (LPs) due to arbitrage. We extend the model of Milionis et al. [“2022”] for a general class of two asset…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Block generation times follow a Poisson process.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We extend the model of Milionis et al. [2022] for a general class of two asset AMMs to introduce both fees and discrete Poisson block generation times.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Trading fees are small (γ is small) in the fast block regime.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We establish that (Theorem 4), asympotitically, FEE ≈LVR × (1 −Ptrade) when the fee γ is small in the fast block regime.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Symmetric fee structure (γ+ = γ−) and driftless mispricing process.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Exact Analysis We will make the following assumption: Assumption 2 (Symmetry). µ = 1 2σ2, γ+ = γ−≜γ.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Arbitrageurs can trade instantaneously against the pool when mispricing exceeds the fee.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"bject to f(x, y) = L. (3) The pool value function yields the value of the pool, assuming that the external market price of the risky asset is given by P, and that arbitrageurs can instantaneously trade against the pool maximizing their profits (and simultaneously minimizing the value of the pool).","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Gas fees are fixed per transaction (δ) and act as a constant transaction cost.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Finally, we construct a model as above with the addition of gas fees (Section 6), i.e., fixed 4 transaction costs associated with executing any potential arbitrage transaction.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"available","items":[],"known":[{"id":"binance","name":"Binance","provider":"Binance","kind":"market-prices","access":"public","quote":"Their work tests two assumptions made in this paper: the assumption of Poisson block times (they assume deterministic block times), and the assumption that asset prices follow a diffusion process (they used historical data from the Binance exchange).","mentions":1,"used_in":1}],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R4a","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"The model includes marginal trading fees γ and fixed gas fees δ as explicit cost components.","card_quote":"Further introducing gas fees (fixed costs) in our model, we show that, in the fast block asymptotic regime, lower gas fees lead to smaller losses for LPs. Finally, we construct a model as above with the addition of gas fees (Section 6), i.e., fixed 4 transaction costs associated with executing any potential arbitrage transaction.","meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"When fees are low, fees simply scale down arbitrage profits by the fraction of blocks that present profitable opportunities (Ptrade).","kind":"theoretical","quote":"When the fees are low, in the fast block asymptotic regime, the impact of fees takes a particularly simple form: fees simply scale down arbitrage profits by the fraction of blocks which present profitable trading opportunities to arbitrageurs.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The fraction of profitable blocks (Ptrade) decreases with higher block rates, implying faster blockchains reduce LP losses.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"This fraction decreases with an increasing block rate, hence our model yields an important practical insight: faster blockchains will result in reduced LP losses. In other words, our model yields an important practical insight: that LP losses to arbitrageurs are reduced on faster blockchains.","support":"full"},{"finding":"With fees (γ>0), arbitrage profits per unit time scale as Θ(√λ⁻¹), i.e., they decay with the square root of the inter‑block time.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"On the other hand, when there are fees (γ > 0), we have that ARB = Θ( √ λ−1), arbitrage profits per unit time scale with the square root of the interblock time.","support":"full"},{"finding":"In the fast block regime, ARB + FEE ≈ LVR, meaning total arbitrage profit plus fee income approximates the frictionless LVR value.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"This implies that, assuming fee γ is small and we are in the fast block regime, ARB + FEE ≈LVR, which can be interpreted as LVR being split among fees and arbitrage profits, according to Ptrade.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Lower gas fees lead to smaller losses for liquidity providers in the fast block regime.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Our results in the fast block regime show that lower gas fees result in smaller losses to LPs.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2404.05803","title":"Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity","paper_date":"2024-04-08","authors":["Robin Fritsch","Andrea Canidio"],"empirical_rigor":8.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/measuring-arbitrage-losses-and-profitability-of-amm-liquidit/"},"question":"How does block time (or block rate) affect arbitrage profitability/losses in AMM markets?","this_paper_finding":"The fraction of profitable blocks (Ptrade) decreases with higher block rates, implying faster blockchains reduce LP losses.","other_paper_finding":"Faster block times reduce arbitrage losses, with 100 ms blocks cutting losses by 20 % to 70 % relative to Ethereum’s 12 s blocks, depending on the pair.","other_paper_quote":"We find that losses to arbitrageurs are reduced by between 20% and 70% with 100ms block times compared to Ethereum’s current 12 seconds, depending on the trading pair.","note":"B shows 100 ms blocks cut losses 20‑70% vs 12 s Ethereum, aligning with A’s result that higher block rates lower the fraction of profitable blocks.","confidence":0.919}],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2404.05803","title":"Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity","paper_date":"2024-04-08","authors":["Robin Fritsch","Andrea Canidio"],"empirical_rigor":8.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/measuring-arbitrage-losses-and-profitability-of-amm-liquidit/"},"question":"How does block time (or block rate) impact AMM arbitrage profitability and loss magnitude?","this_paper_finding":"The fraction of profitable blocks (Ptrade) decreases with higher block rates, implying faster blockchains reduce LP losses.","other_paper_finding":"Empirical loss reduction with block time follows a slower decline than the theoretical square‑root model for intervals shorter than 1 s.","other_paper_quote":"While our empirical findings come close to this model for most pairs and block times larger than 1s, we observe a different regime for block times shorter than 1s. More precisely, arbitrage profits appear to decline more slowly than the theoretical model would suggest.","note":"Both find profitability drops as blocks get faster; A notes a decrease in profitable‑block fraction, while B reports a slower‑than‑square‑root loss reduction for intervals under 1 s.","confidence":0.548}],"compared_with":26,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":33,"by_independent_authors":31,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":2,"uses_method_or_data":5,"extends":5,"discusses_findings":2,"mentions":16,"unclassified":3},"independent_papers":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2404.05803","title":"Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity","paper_date":"2024-04-08","authors":["Robin Fritsch","Andrea Canidio"],"empirical_rigor":8.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/measuring-arbitrage-losses-and-profitability-of-amm-liquidit/"},"how":"used_as_baseline","quote":null},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2403.09494","title":"Layer 2 be or Layer not 2 be: Scaling on Uniswap v3","paper_date":"2024-03-14","authors":["Austin Adams"],"empirical_rigor":7,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/layer-2-be-or-layer-not-2-be-scaling-on-uniswap-v3/"},"how":"used_as_baseline","quote":null},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2406.13794","title":"Adaptive Curves for Optimally Efficient Market Making","paper_date":"2024-06-19","authors":["Viraj Nadkarni","Sanjeev Kulkarni","Pramod Viswanath"],"empirical_rigor":6.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/adaptive-curves-for-optimally-efficient-market-making/"},"how":"discusses_findings","quote":"This observation confirms the conclusion reached in [CITED]"},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2608.13340","title":"Fee Implied Volatility on Uniswap v3: A DEX Native Proxy and Its Limits","paper_date":"2026-08-13","authors":["Amy Oumayma Khaldoun"],"empirical_rigor":5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/fee-implied-volatility-on-uniswap-v3-a-dex-native-proxy-and-its-limits/"},"how":"discusses_findings","quote":"consistent with the vanishing of arbitrage profits in the fast block limit [CITED]"},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2507.02027","title":"Arbitrage with bounded Liquidity","paper_date":"2025-07-02","authors":["Christoph Schlegel","Quintus Kilbourn"],"empirical_rigor":4,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/arbitrage-with-bounded-liquidity/"},"how":"extends","quote":null},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2507.14810","title":"Optimal Decisions for Liquid Staking: Allocation and Exit Timing","paper_date":"2025-07-20","authors":["Ruofei Ma","Zhebiao Cai","Wenpin Tang","David Yao"],"empirical_rigor":3.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/optimal-decisions-for-liquid-staking-allocation-and-exit-timing/"},"how":"extends","quote":null},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2602.09887","title":"Partially Active Automated Market Makers","paper_date":"2026-02-10","authors":["Sunghun Ko"],"empirical_rigor":3,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/partially-active-automated-market-makers/"},"how":"extends","quote":null},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2403.18177","title":"Growth rate of liquidity provider's wealth in G3Ms","paper_date":"2024-03-27","authors":["Cheuk Yin Lee","Shen-Ning Tung","Tai-Ho Wang"],"empirical_rigor":2,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/growth-rate-of-liquidity-providers-wealth-in-g3ms/"},"how":"extends","quote":null},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2412.18580","title":"A mathematical framework for modelling CLMM dynamics in continuous time","paper_date":"2024-12-24","authors":["Shen-Ning Tung","Tai-Ho Wang"],"empirical_rigor":1,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/a-mathematical-framework-for-modelling-clmm-dynamics-in-cont/"},"how":"extends","quote":null},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2401.01622","title":"Non-Atomic Arbitrage in Decentralized Finance","paper_date":"2024-01-03","authors":["Lioba Heimbach","Vabuk Pahari","Eric Schertenleib"],"empirical_rigor":8.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/non-atomic-arbitrage-in-decentralized-finance/"},"how":"uses_method_or_data","quote":null},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2610.03922","title":"Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition: Evidence from Flashblocks on Base","paper_date":"2026-10-02","authors":["Pranay Anchuri","Edward W. 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