{"paper_id":"2305.18941","title":"A Game of Competition for Risk","authors":["Louis Abraham"],"paper_date":"2023-05-30","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.18941v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/a-game-of-competition-for-risk/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":6.5,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Holy Grail"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"We present models where participants strategically select their risk levels and earn corresponding rewards, and introduce regret‑minimization algorithms to solve continuous games via discretization.","quote":"In this study, we present models where participants strategically select their risk levels and earn corresponding rewards, mirroring real-world competition across various sectors. A key novelty of our work lies in using regret minimization algorithms to solve continuous games through discretization.","summary":"In this study, we present models where participants strategically select their risk levels and earn corresponding rewards, mirroring real-world competition across various sectors. Our analysis starts with a normal form game involving two players in a continuous action space, confirming the…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Penalty P is positive (P > 0).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"In our simple model, this translates into being applied a penalty, denoted as P. We assume P > 0.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Failure events are independent and each player draws a uniform random variable fp ∈ [0,1] and fails if fp < rp.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume that the failure events are independent, meaning that each player draws a uniform random variable fp from the interval [0, 1] and fails if fp < rp.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Reward scaling is fixed at R = 1 without loss of generality.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"After the failure events are determined, the players that did not fail com-pare their risk levels, and the player that played the highest risk level is rewarded with a payoff, denoted as R. Since the game is unchanged when scaling both P and R, we assume R = 1.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Action space for each player is the interval [0,1].","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"In our CfR game, the action space is [0, 1].","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Market frictions are captured by a parameter τ that affects payoffs but does not alter the game’s structure.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"Next, we examine the impact of penalties and market frictions on strategic behavior and results in our continuous model. Market fric-tions, on the other hand, lower average risk but increase total rewards.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Correlations between failure probabilities can be introduced via a Pearson correlation coefficient ρ.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"To incorporate correlation between risks, we can in-troduce joint distributions for the failure events fp, which occur according to latent variables. Here, ρ is the Pearson correla-tion coefficient between z1 and z2, which determines the correlation between f1 and f2.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R4a","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Penalties (P) and market frictions (τ) are modeled as parameters that affect average risk and total rewards.","card_quote":"Next, we examine the impact of penalties and market frictions on strategic behavior and results in our continuous model. We find that penalties reduce both the average risk taken by players and their total rewards.","meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Penalties reduce both the average risk taken by players and their total rewards.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We find that penalties reduce both the average risk taken by players and their total rewards.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Market frictions lower average risk but increase total rewards.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Market fric-tions, on the other hand, lower average risk but increase total rewards.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Market frictions have a larger impact on total rewards in high‑penalty environments.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"These frictions have a more significant effect on total rewards in high-penalty envi-ronments.","support":"full"},{"finding":"In highly inefficient markets with high frictions, raising penalties can promote cooperation and raise total rewards.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In especially inefficient markets with high market frictions, raising penalties can promote cooperation and increase total rewards.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The Nash equilibrium of the finite approximations of the CfR game can be obtained by computing a correlated Nash equilibrium, and the correlated equilibrium is either unique or its reward‑maximizing version is a Nash equilibrium.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Our experiments show that the Nash equilibrium in finite approximations of the CfR game can be obtained by computing a correlated Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we prove that either the correlated equilibrium is unique or the correlated equilibrium maximizing the total reward is a Nash equilibrium.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2510.09247","title":"Application of Deep Reinforcement Learning to At-the-Money S&P 500 Options Hedging","paper_date":"2025-10-10","authors":["Zofia Bracha","Paweł Sakowski","Jakub Michańków"],"empirical_rigor":7.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/application-of-deep-reinforcement-learning-to-at-the-money-s/"},"question":"How does increasing a risk‑penalty affect average risk taken and resulting returns?","this_paper_finding":"Penalties reduce both the average risk taken by players and their total rewards.","other_paper_finding":"Higher risk‑awareness (risk‑penalty parameter) reduces the DRL agent’s returns and performance.","other_paper_quote":"During the sensitivity analysis, we observed that the increase in risk aversion reduces returns, while shorter volatility estimation intervals make the model more responsive to jumps","note":"Both findings show that higher risk‑penalties lower the average risk and also reduce total rewards or performance.","confidence":0.499}],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":19,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":true,"code_url":"https://github.com/louisabraham/cfrgame","note":null},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T20:02:43Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}