{"paper_id":"2307.13772","title":"Fragmentation and optimal liquidity supply on decentralized exchanges","authors":["Alfred Lehar","Christine Parlour","Marius Zoican"],"paper_date":"2023-07-25","paper_type":"empirical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.13772v7","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/fragmentation-and-optimal-liquidity-supply-on-decentralized/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":8,"math_complexity":7.5,"quadrant":"Holy Grail"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a theoretical model and empirical analysis showing that fixed costs of liquidity management drive market fragmentation and create distinct clienteles of liquidity providers.","quote":"We show, both theoretically and empirically, that fixed costs of liquidity management promote market fragmentation across decentralized pools and generate clienteles of liquidity providers.","summary":"We investigate how liquidity providers (LPs) choose between high- and low-fee trading venues, in the face of a fixed common gas cost. Analyzing Uniswap data, we find that high-fee pools attract 58% of liquidity supply yet execute only 21% of volume. Large LPs dominate low-fee pools, frequently…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Innovations are sufficiently large so that there is a positive probability that liquidity providers need to re‑balance on the high‑fee pool.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Assumption 1: The size of innovations are sufficiently large so that there is a positive probability that liquidity providers need to re‑balance on the high‑fee pool."},{"assumption":"All participants pay a fixed transaction (gas) cost to access the markets.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"Importantly, all participants pay a transaction cost (called a“gas fee”) to access the markets."},{"assumption":"Liquidity providers can rebalance their position following each swap.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"First, liquidity providers can rebalance their position following each swap."},{"assumption":"Price impact generated by the bonding curve does not remunerate liquidity suppliers.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The posted liquidity is subject to a bonding curve and hence generates a price impact cost for the liquidity demanders (we emphasize that this does not remunerate the liquidity suppliers)."},{"assumption":"Liquidity suppliers have heterogeneous endowments representing different capital constraints.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Liquidity suppliers have heterogeneous endowments, interpretable as different capital constraints — low‑endowment liquidity providers are akin to retail traders, whereas high‑endowments stand in for large institutional investors or quantitative funds."}]},"datasets":{"status":"available","items":[{"name":"Uniswap V3 Subgraph hourly liquidity snapshots","provider":"Uniswap","kind":"crypto-onchain","access":"public","period":"May 4, 2021 to July 15, 2023","universe":"32 fragmented asset pairs","quote":"We obtain hourly liquidity snapshots from the Uniswap V3 Subgraph to calculate impermanent loss for a theoretical symmetric liquidity position."},{"name":"Panel data of pool‑day observations","provider":"Uniswap","kind":"crypto-onchain","access":"public","period":"May 4, 2021 to July 15, 2023","universe":"32 fragmented pairs","quote":"we build a panel data set for the 32 fragmented pairs in our sample where the unit of observation is pool‑day."},{"name":"Gas cost data for mint/burn transactions","provider":"Uniswap V3","kind":"crypto-onchain","access":"public","period":null,"universe":null,"quote":"The figure illustrates the daily average gas cost on mint/burn transactions in Uniswap v3 pools."}],"known":[{"id":"kaiko","name":"Kaiko","provider":"Kaiko","kind":"market-prices","access":"commercial","quote":"We use liquidity snapshot data from Kaiko on USDC-WETH pools to simulate the optimal routing strategy for trades of various sizes for the last block of each day in our sample.","mentions":3,"used_in":3},{"id":"binance","name":"Binance","provider":"Binance","kind":"market-prices","access":"public","quote":"For this purpose, we collect hourly price data from Binance for the largest four pairs by trading volume: WBTC-WETH, USDC-WETH, WETH-USDT, and USDT-USDC.","mentions":5,"used_in":1}],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"unclear"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"unclear","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"conflict","rule":"R4b","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"conflict_kind":"applicability","card_detail":"All traders incur a fixed execution cost Γ > 0 and variable gas price; regressions include GasPrice and its interaction with low‑fee dummy.","card_quote":"In addition, consistent with gas costs on Ethereum, all traders incur a fixed execution cost Γ di > 0 to interact with the market.","meaning":"the platform classifier and the paper-text extraction disagree, so no value is asserted"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"unclear","findings":[{"finding":"High‑fee pools attract 58% of liquidity supply but only 21% of trading volume.","kind":"statistical","quote":"high‑fee pools attract 58% of liquidity supply yet execute only 21% of volume."},{"finding":"Price‑impact measures (LVR and impermanent loss) are significantly larger in low‑fee pools, indicating higher barriers to arbitrageurs.","kind":"statistical","quote":"all price impact measures — that is, the immediate and one‑hour horizon LVR and the impermanent loss — are significantly larger in low‑fee pools."},{"finding":"Low‑fee dummy coefficient is positive and significant (e.g., dlow‑fee 6.39***), showing higher price impact in low‑fee pools.","kind":"statistical","quote":"dlow-fee 6.39*** 6.39*** 29.78*** 29.67*** 1.08*** 1.13***"},{"finding":"Two thirds of trading volume interacts with less than half of the capital locked on Uniswap V3.","kind":"statistical","quote":"Since large liquidity providers can churn their position at a faster pace, two thirds of the trading volume interacts with less than half the capital locked on Uniswap V3."},{"finding":"Fixed costs of liquidity management hinder small market makers’ participation, pushing them to high‑fee markets with lower execution probability but reduced adverse selection and gas costs.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Our findings indicate that substantial fixed costs can hinder the participation of small market makers in the forefront of liquidity provision, where active order management is crucial."}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2303.11118","title":"Model-free Hedging of Impermanent Loss in Geometric Mean Market Makers","paper_date":"2023-03-20","authors":["Masaaki Fukasawa","Basile Maire","Marcus Wunsch"],"empirical_rigor":2.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/model-free-hedging-of-impermanent-loss-in-geometric-mean-market-makers/"},"question":"How do fee levels affect impermanent loss in AMM pools?","this_paper_finding":"Price‑impact measures (LVR and impermanent loss) are significantly larger in low‑fee pools, indicating higher barriers to arbitrageurs.","other_paper_finding":"In simulations, higher fees lead to lower impermanent loss.","other_paper_quote":"Even though the size of τ is irrelevant to the super‑hedge in the theory, not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the IL decreases with higher fees in the simulation.","note":"Both findings agree: higher fees reduce impermanent loss, while low‑fee pools exhibit larger price‑impact (LVR) and impermanent loss.","confidence":0.814}],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":41,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":3,"by_independent_authors":3,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":3,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":1,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T18:24:17Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}