{"paper_id":"2307.15805","title":"Equilibria and incentives for illiquid auction markets","authors":["Joffrey Derchu","Dimitrios Kavvathas","Thibaut Mastrolia","Mathieu Rosenbaum"],"paper_date":"2023-07-28","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.15805v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/equilibria-and-incentives-for-illiquid-auction-markets/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":8,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes quadratic fees indexed on each player's half‑spread to generate liquidity and derives a quantitative optimal fee value for the exchange.","quote":"We however prove that quadratic fees indexed on each players half spread leads to a transaction and we propose a quantitative value for the optimal fees that the exchange has to propose in this model to generate liquidity.","summary":"We study a toy two-player game for periodic double auction markets to generate liquidity. The game has imperfect information, which allows us to link market spreads with signal strength. We characterize Nash equilibria in cases with or without incentives from the exchange. This enables us to derive…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The market is illiquid, with low trading frequency, small volumes, limited data and scarce information.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"By illiquid we mean a market where trading frequency is low, volumes are small, market data is limited and information is scarce.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The analysis uses a one‑period framework with exactly two participants (one buyer and one seller) taking part in an auction.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We model this market by a very simplified one period framework with two participants, one buyer and one seller, taking part to an auction organized by an exchange.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The increment between the fair price and the last traded price is a centered Gaussian variable with variance v².","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"At the time of the auction, we assume that the increment between the fair price, denoted by P∞and the last traded price is given by a centered Gaussian variable with variance v2.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Each participant has a proxy of the fair price (P∞|a for the seller, P∞|b for the buyer) with error standard deviations σa and σb drawn from independent random variables.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume both participants have access to a proxy of the fair price at the beginning of the auction, denoted by P∞|a for the seller and P∞|b for the buyer. The standard deviations of the error of this proxy are drawn from independent random variables, denoted by σa and σb.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Both participants use the same pricing rule, i.e., the deviation function δ does not depend on the agent (symmetric case).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"More precisely, we are interested in the symmetric case where market participants have the same pricing rule and consequently the function δi does actually not depend on i.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Agents are risk‑neutral and choose limit order prices to maximize the expected difference between the mid‑price and the fair price, accounting for the probability of no trade.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"So, for a given function δ, each (risk neutral) agent optimizes simultaneously the price of its limit order by maximizing or minimizing the expected value of the difference between the obtained midprice and the fair price, taking into account the probability that no trade happens.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R4a","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Quadratic transaction fees are imposed on each player's half‑spread (parameter γ) to induce trade.","card_quote":"7 3.2 Quadratic fees in the players’ half-spread: liquidity generation Assume now that P∞|i is known by the exchange. 3.3 Optimal transaction fees: the exchange’s perspective We now consider that the exchange receives quadratic fees in the players’ half-spread as presented in Section 3.2.","meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Without any incentives, the market is inefficient and no trade occurs between participants.","kind":"negative","quote":"We show in particular that without any incentives, the market is inefficient and does not lead to any trade between market participants.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Introducing quadratic fees indexed on each player's half‑spread generates a transaction and creates liquidity.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We however prove that quadratic fees indexed on each players half spread leads to a transaction and we propose a quantitative value for the optimal fees that the exchange has to propose in this model to generate liquidity.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The optimal fee γ* is uniquely determined and given by γ* = Φ′(y*) / (2√2 σ+), where y* solves 1−Φ(y*)−y*Φ′(y*) = 0.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"It is given by γ∗= Φ′(y∗) 2 √ 2σ+ where y∗is the unique solution to 1 −Φ(y∗) −y∗Φ′(y∗) = 0.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":10,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":3,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":3},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T20:01:46Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}