{"paper_id":"2309.14201","title":"Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value II: Uncertainty","authors":["Tarun Chitra"],"paper_date":"2023-09-25","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2309.14201v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/towards-a-theory-of-maximal-extractable-value-ii-uncertaint/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a unified framework for MEV mitigation using uncertainty principles that quantify the trade‑off between transaction reordering freedom and economic payoff complexity.","quote":"In this work, we unify these approaches via \\emph{uncertainty principles}, akin to those found in harmonic analysis and physics.","summary":"Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is value extractable by temporary monopoly power commonly found in decentralized systems. This extraction stems from a lack of user privacy upon transaction submission and the ability of a monopolist validator to reorder, add, and/or censor transactions. There are…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"There is a fixed set of transactions T1,…,Tn and a payoff function f(T1,…,Tn) that yields the validator’s payoff for a particular ordering.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume that there is a ﬁxed set of transactions T1, . . . , Tn and a payoﬀfunction f(T1, . . . , Tn) that yields the payoﬀto a validator for a particular ordering.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Validators are chosen proportionally to locked resources, giving them temporary monopoly power to include, exclude, or reorder transactions.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"Most consensus mechanisms, such as Proof of Work or Proof of Stake, have the probability of a validator Vi being chosen proportional to the amount of resource they locked. 2.2 MEV The temporary monopoly guaranteed to a single validator aﬀords them the opportunity to include, exclude, or reorder transactions to maximize a validator’s proﬁt.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The analysis treats the payoff function as a black‑box f: S_n → ℝ accessible via queries.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Our results in §3 will show that if |A| is suﬃciently ‘large’, then one can achieve non-trivial fairness guarantees whereas if |A| is too ‘small’ then one has fairness lower bounds for Λ+. Suppose that one could decompose a general payoﬀf : Sn →R into a sum of indicator functions on sets A ⊂Sn, f = P A⊂Sn ˆf(A)1A and quantify the size of the coeﬃcients | ˆf(A)|.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Neither fair‑ordering techniques nor economic mechanisms alone can mitigate MEV for arbitrary payoff functions.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Our results suggest that neither so-called fair ordering techniques nor economic mechanisms can individually mitigate MEV for arbitrary payoff functions.","support":"full"},{"finding":"If the set of allowed permutations A is sufficiently large, non‑trivial fairness guarantees can be achieved; if A is too small, fairness lower bounds hold.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Our results in §3 will show that if |A| is suﬃciently ‘large’, then one can achieve non-trivial fairness guarantees whereas if |A| is too ‘small’ then one has fairness lower bounds for Λ+. If a particular monotone function of |A| is smaller than deg(f), then we will show fairness functional lower bounds.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The boolean degree of the payoff function controls the complexity of sequencing rules needed for fairness; high‑degree functions (e.g., liquidations) require more complex rules.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Each application can be viewed as represented by a payoﬀ f : Sn →R and the boolean degree of f controls the complexity of sequence rules needed. 3.2 Implications for Fair Ordering As mentioned in §2.5, most fair ordering protocols generate t-intersecting sets of permuta-tions.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Sequencing rules that generate high intersection numbers (t = Θ(n)) are fair for most payoff functions, whereas rules with t = o(n) can cause increased unfairness for high‑degree payoffs.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Our results suggest that fair ordering protocols that only guarantee t = o(n) are likely to cause increased unfairness for payoﬀfunctions f with deg(f) = Ω(n). On the other hand, the upper bounds of Claim 2 suggest that if fair ordering protocols (or general sequencing rules, such as those of [XFP23]) are able to consistently generate high intersection numbers (e.g. t = Θ(n)), then they are fair for ‘most’","support":"full"},{"finding":"Theoretical bounds on fairness can be expressed via Fourier/representation‑theoretic analysis, linking permutation overlap to measures of unfairness.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Suppose that one could decompose a general payoﬀf : Sn →R into a sum of indicator functions on sets A ⊂Sn, f = P A⊂Sn ˆf(A)1A and quantify the size of the coeﬃcients | ˆf(A)|. The Fourier Transform over ﬁnite groups precisely characterizes how to decompose a function into a basis of indicator functions and compute these coeﬃcients.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":18,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":1,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":1,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T20:01:01Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}