{"paper_id":"2310.07865","title":"The Specter (and Spectra) of Miner Extractable Value","authors":["Guillermo Angeris","Tarun Chitra","Theo Diamandis","Kshitij Kulkarni"],"paper_date":"2023-10-11","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.07865v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/the-specter-and-spectra-of-miner-extractable-value/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":7.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper formally defines the ‘cost of MEV’ as the excess profit a profit‑maximizing validator can earn from reordering a set of transactions relative to a random ordering.","quote":"In this paper, we formally deﬁne the ‘cost of MEV’ which quantiﬁes the excess amount that a proﬁt maximizing validator can earn from reordering a set of transactions, relative to a random ordering.","summary":"Miner extractable value (MEV) refers to any excess value that a transaction validator can realize by manipulating the ordering of transactions. In this work, we introduce a simple theoretical definition of the ‘cost of MEV’, prove some basic properties, and show that the definition is useful via a…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"There exists a subset B of transactions that is closed under all permutations (πB = B for all π in the symmetric group).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We will assume that there is a subset B ⊆An closed under permutations, i.e., πB = B for all π ∈S and that f : B →R. If B can be endowed with a metric d : B × B →R+ that is permutation independent, that is, if, for any π ∈S, we have d(π(x), π(y)) = d(x, y), then there are useful sm","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The value function f on B is permutation‑independent and satisfies a Lipschitz‑like condition |f(x)−f(y)| ≤ L d(x,y) for some metric d that is permutation independent.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We will assume that there is a subset B ⊆An closed under permutations, i.e., πB = B for all π ∈S and that f : B →R. If B can be endowed with a metric d : B × B →R+ that is permutation independent, that is, if, for any π ∈S, we have d(π(x), π(y)) = d(x, y), then there are useful sm","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The market is modeled as a two‑asset fee‑free constant function market maker with a non‑decreasing concave function G (G(0)=0).","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume that the market acts like a two-asset fee-free constant function market maker [AAE+22], which we deﬁne as a nondecreasing concave function G : R+ →R+ with G(0) = 0.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Validators have temporary monopoly over transaction inclusion and ordering in a block.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"In most consensus protocols, a validator has a temporary monopoly over both what transactions are included in a block and the order in which those transactions are executed.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The set of possible actions for frontrunning and sandwiching is defined as described (e.g., A = (R+×{0})∪({0}×R) for actions).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Action space. The set of possible actions in this setting takes the form A = (R+ × {0}) ∪({0} × R) Similar to the previous example, a tuple (x, y) ∈A is an action where x is a trade made by a trader, which is nonzero only when y (the trade made by the adversary) is zero.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"If the value function f is smooth and the transaction set B has diameter at most t, the global upper bound on the maximum cost of MEV is C_s(f) ≤ 2 L t + inf_{x∈B} C(f,x).","kind":"theoretical","quote":"2.1.1 Global upper bounds If we know the function is smooth and the set of transactions B is bounded with diameter at most t, i.e., t ≥sup x,y∈B d(x, y), then we have the immediate upper bound on the maximum cost Cs(f) = sup x∈B C(f, x), given by: Cs(f) ≤2Lt + inf x∈B C(f, x).","support":"full"},{"finding":"When the smoothness bound is applied to constant‑function market makers, the bound improves known results and can be saturated (e.g., C_s(f) ≤ 2 L t).","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Additionally, if any action x ∈B has xi = xj for every i, j = 1, . . . , n, then the second term in the right-hand-side of (12) is zero, so Cs(f) ≤2Lt. The bound (12) generalizes and improves upon some known results over constant function market makers [CAE22,KDC22], and we show some explicit examples below.","support":"full"},{"finding":"As the number of transactions n grows, the cost of MEV approaches 2, saturating the bound provided by the theory.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Taking n ↑∞, we see that the cost of MEV approaches 2, which saturates the bound provided by (10) in the limit.","support":"full"},{"finding":"For a constant‑function market maker with total trade volume M, the cost of MEV is at most 8 G′(0) M.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Using the bound (12) and the ‘diameter’ bound (13), we then get that the cost of MEV is at most Cs(f) ≤8G′(0)M, where we used the fact that infx∈B C(f, x) = 0 by setting all traders’ trades to be zero.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":13,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":1,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":1,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":true,"code_url":"https://github.com/bcc-research/spectrum-calculations","note":null},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T20:00:53Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}