{"paper_id":"2310.19023","title":"Optimal fees in hedge funds with first-loss compensation","authors":["Marcos Escobar-Anel","Yevhen Havrylenko","Rudi Zagst"],"paper_date":"2023-10-29","paper_type":"perspective-policy","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.19023v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/optimal-fees-in-hedge-funds-with-first-loss-compensation/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper solves the manager’s non‑concave utility maximization, derives Pareto‑optimal first‑loss fee structures and selects a single mutually preferred scheme by maximizing a decision criterion on this set.","quote":"For that, we solve the manager's non-concave utility maximization problem, calculate Pareto optimal first-loss schemes and maximize a decision criterion on this set. The traditional 2% management and 20% performance fees are found to be not Pareto optimal, neither are common first-loss fee arrangements.","summary":"Hedge fund managers with the first-loss scheme charge a management fee, a performance fee and guarantee to cover a certain amount of investors’ potential losses. We study how parties can choose a mutually preferred first-loss scheme in a hedge fund with the manager’s first-loss deposit and…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Investor assets and manager’s deposit account are segregated.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We study how parties can choose a mutually preferred first-loss scheme in a hedge fund with the manager's first-loss deposit and investors' assets segregated.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"A single payment is made at the end of a fixed term T and fees are not invested.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume a single payment at the end of a fixed term T, which also implies that the fees are not invested.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The risky asset follows a geometric Brownian motion.","type":"market","stated":"implied","quote":"Clearly, our model setting simplifies the real world, e.g. the price process follows a geometric Brownian motion, no transaction costs, etc.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"No transaction costs are incurred.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"Clearly, our model setting simplifies the real world, e.g. the price process follows a geometric Brownian motion, no transaction costs, etc.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Both parties have constant relative risk aversion; two levels are considered (b=0.65 and b=2.5).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Here we consider decision makers with the same level of risk aversion and consider two cases: bM = bI = 0.65 < 1 and bM = bI = 2.5 > 1.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The manager’s utility function is non‑concave and is handled via concavification.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"Therefore, we use the concavification technique (Carpenter (2000), Reichlin (2013), He and Kou (2018)).","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"unclear"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"no","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":"Clearly, our model setting simplifies the real world, e.g. the price process follows a geometric Brownian motion, no transaction costs, etc.","source":"evidence_card","rule":"R2","candidates":{"front_matter":"unclear","evidence_card":"no","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":null,"card_quote":"Clearly, our model setting simplifies the real world, e.g. the price process follows a geometric Brownian motion, no transaction costs, etc.","meaning":"a trading or execution result is reported without costs"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"The traditional 2% management and 20% performance fee scheme is not Pareto optimal, nor are common first‑loss arrangements.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The traditional 2% management and 20% performance fees are found to be not Pareto optimal, neither are common first-loss fee arrangements.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Preferred fee schemes significantly decrease the fund’s volatility.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The preferred fee schemes significantly decrease the fund's volatility.","support":"full"},{"finding":"For the calibrated model the preferred fee structure is approximately 5% management fee, 48% performance fee and 24% first‑loss coverage guarantee.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We get under this condition that the preferred management fee is 5%, performance fee is about 48%, and first-loss coverage guarantee is around 24%.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Preferred management fee tends to increase with the interest rate, while preferred first‑loss coverage guarantee shows a decreasing trend.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We observe that the preferred management fee tends to increase with the interest rate. The preferred first-loss coverage guarantee exhibits a decreasing trend.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Preferred fee structures (management ~5%, performance 30‑50%, first‑loss 15‑30%) reduce hedge‑fund volatility compared with traditional schemes.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Finally, we also found that derived preferred fee structures substantially decrease hedge fund’s volatility in comparison to the traditional schemes as well as other reported first-loss fee structures. In our numerical studies, the preferred fee structures have the management fee usually close to 5%, the performance fee mainly in the range 30% −50% and the first-loss coverage in the range 15% −30%.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"not_extracted","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":0,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T20:00:41Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. 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They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}