{"paper_id":"2311.01086","title":"Non-linear non-zero-sum Dynkin games with Bermudan strategies","authors":["Miryana Grigorova","Marie-Claire Quenez","Yuan Peng"],"paper_date":"2023-11-02","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.01086v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/non-linear-non-zero-sum-dynkin-games-with-bermudan-strategie/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":1,"math_complexity":9.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a non-zero-sum Dynkin game with two players using Bermudan stopping strategies and shows that, under general non‑linear assessment functionals, the game admits a Nash equilibrium point.","quote":"In this paper, we study a non-zero-sum game with two players, where each of the players plays what we call Bermudan strategies and optimizes a general non-linear assessment functional of the pay-off. In Section 3, we present our main results and show that the non-linear non-zero-sum game with Bermudan strategies has a Nash equilibrium point.","summary":"In this paper, we study a non-zero-sum game with two players, where each of the players plays what we call Bermudan strategies and optimizes a general non-linear assessment functional of the pay-off. By using a recursive construction, we show that the game has a Nash equilibrium point.","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"A fixed finite terminal horizon T > 0 is given.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"2 The framework Let T ą 0 be a ﬁxed ﬁnite terminal horizon.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The evaluation operators ρ1 and ρ2 satisfy properties (i)–(ix) (admissibility, knowledge preservation, monotonicity, consistency, generalized zero‑one law, monotone Fatou, LUSC, etc.).","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume that both ρ1 and ρ2 satisfy the properties (i) - (ix). We will investigate the problem of existence of a Nash equilibrium strategy pτ ˚ 1 , τ ˚ 2 q. Deﬁnition 2.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The probability space (Ω,ℱ,ℙ) is complete with a right‑continuous filtration.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Let pΩ, F, Pq be a (complete) probability space equipped with a right-continuous complete ﬁltration F “ tFt: t P r0, Tsu.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Under the stated assumptions, there exists a Nash equilibrium point for the non‑linear non‑zero‑sum Dynkin game with Bermudan strategies.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Under assumptions (i) - (ix) on ρ1 and ρ2, there exists a Nash equilibrium point pτ ˚ 1 , τ ˚ 2 q for the game described above.","support":"full"},{"finding":"A recursive construction yields a sequence of stopping times that converges to a Nash equilibrium.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We will construct a sequence pτ2n`1, τ2nqnPN (by induction), for which we will show that it converges to a Nash equilibrium point. We set τ1 :“ T and τ2 :“ T. We suppose that τ2n´1 P Θ and τ2n P Θ have been deﬁned.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":12,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T20:00:33Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}