{"paper_id":"2311.17715","title":"Market Misconduct in Decentralized Finance (DeFi): Analysis, Regulatory Challenges and Policy Implications","authors":["Xihan Xiong","Zhipeng Wang","Tianxiang Cui","William Knottenbelt","Michael Huth"],"paper_date":"2023-11-29","paper_type":"perspective-policy","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.17715v3","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/market-misconduct-in-decentralized-finance-defi-analysis/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3.5,"math_complexity":2,"quadrant":"Philosophers"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a comprehensive definition and taxonomy of DeFi market misconduct and suggests regulatory approaches to integrate DeFi into the regulatory perimeter.","quote":"We then offer a comprehensive definition and taxonomy for understanding DeFi market misconduct. Finally, we discuss potential approaches that bring DeFi into the regulatory perimeter.","summary":"Technological advancement drives financial innovation, reshaping the traditional finance landscape and redefining user-market interactions. The rise of blockchain and Decentralized Finance (DeFi) underscores this intertwined evolution of technology and finance. While DeFi has introduced exciting…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Blockchain technology can enable novel forms of market misconduct.","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"We begin by discussing how blockchain technology can potentially enable the emergence of novel forms of market misconduct.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Miners/validators have the power to select and order pending transactions, which underlies many DeFi misconduct strategies.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"3.2.5. MEV, Gas Fee Auction and FaaS In general, miners and validators have the power to determine the inclusion of the pending transaction in the mempool, as well as their ordering in the block.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"available","items":[{"name":"Uniswap V3 transaction data","provider":null,"kind":"crypto-onchain","access":"public","period":"Jun 1, 2021 to Jan 31, 2023","universe":null,"quote":"We conduct an empirical study of sandwich attacks on Uniswap V3 from Jun 1, 2021 to Jan 31, 2023. We identify a total of 208,149 sandwich attacks, occurring at a monthly frequency of 10,407 attacks (cf. Figure 7).","support":"full"}],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R4a","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"partial","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Attackers allocate 11.5% of their attack revenues to bribe miners/validators.","card_quote":"Moreover, we discovered that attackers are open to allocating 11.5% of their attack revenues towards bribing the miners/validators.","meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"A total of 208,149 sandwich attacks were identified on Uniswap V3, generating 12,242 ETH (≈17.14 m USD) in profit, with an average profit of 0.059 ETH per attack.","kind":"performance","quote":"We identify a total of 208,149 sandwich attacks, occurring at a monthly frequency of 10,407 attacks (cf. Figure 7). These attacks collectively generate a profit of 12,242 ETH (17.14m USD), with an average profit per attack of 0.059 ETH.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Sandwich attacks require low entry capital, averaging 8.37 ETH, which is about six times lower than the typical swap volume.","kind":"statistical","quote":"We observe that sandwich attacks have relatively low entry barriers, with an average initial capital requirement of only 8.37 ETH. This amount averages 6 × higher than the swap volume, implying a relatively small investment compared to the trading activity.","support":"full"},{"finding":"JIT liquidity attacks on Uniswap V3 numbered 36,671, yielding an average ROI of 0.007% and an average profit of 0.204 ETH, indicating low profitability.","kind":"performance","quote":"Our analysis revealed a total of 36,671 JIT liquidity attacks from Jun 1, 2021 to Jan 31, 2023. In addition, our findings reveal that JIT liquidity attacks yield low returns, with an average ROI of only 0.007% and an average profit of merely 0.204 ETH.","support":"full"},{"finding":"More than $449 million USD of MEV was extracted between Sep 1 2020 and Sep 1 2022, as recorded by Flashbots.","kind":"statistical","quote":"Figure 5 shows the number of daily MEV bots and unique miners recorded by Flashbots between Sep 1, 2020 and Sep 1, 2022. More than 449m USD MEV are extracted during this period (One, 2022).","support":"full"},{"finding":"Wash‑trading activities amounting to $159 million USD were observed on two Ethereum DEXs (IDEX and Etherdelta) between Sep 2 2017 and Apr 5 2020, affecting over 30% of investigated tokens.","kind":"statistical","quote":"For instance, the findings in Victor and Weintraud (2021) reveal that wash trading activities amounting to a sum of 159m USD has been identified on two Ethereum limit order book-based DEXs, namely IDEX and Etherdelta, between Sep 2, 2017 and Apr 5, 2020. Victor 11 and Weintraud (2021) also indicates that more than 30% of the investigated tokens have been subjected to wash trading.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"not_extracted","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":0,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T20:00:07Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}