{"paper_id":"2312.00904","title":"Insider trading in discrete time Kyle games","authors":["Christoph Kühn","Christopher Lorenz"],"paper_date":"2023-12-01","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2312.00904v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/insider-trading-in-discrete-time-kyle-games/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a new discrete‑time version of Kyle’s classic insider‑trading model formulated as a generalized extensive‑form game.","quote":"We present a new discrete time version of Kyle's (1985) classic model of insider trading, formulated as a generalised extensive form game. The model has three kinds of traders: an insider, random noise traders, and a market maker.","summary":"We present a new discrete time version of Kyle’s (1985) classic model of insider trading, formulated as a generalised extensive form game. The model has three kinds of traders: an insider, random noise traders, and a market maker. The insider aims to exploit her informational advantage and maximise…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The insider and the market maker are risk‑neutral.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"In the present paper, we specify the discrete time Kyle model with a risk-neutral insider 2 and market maker as a generalised extensive form game.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Noise‑trader demand and the true asset value have probability distributions with finite support.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"This works for any probability distribution with finite support of the noise trader's demand and the true value, and for any finite information flow of the insider. Rather, our approach works for any probability distribution with ﬁnite support of the noise trader’s demand and the true value, and for any ﬁnite information ﬂow of the insider.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The insider receives a finite amount of private information (finite information flow).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"This works for any probability distribution with finite support of the noise trader's demand and the true value, and for any finite information flow of the insider. Rather, our approach works for any probability distribution with ﬁnite support of the noise trader’s demand and the true value, and for any ﬁnite information ﬂow of the insider.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Time is discrete and the game has finitely many periods.","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"We present a new discrete time version of Kyle's (1985) classic model of insider trading, formulated as a generalised extensive form game. First, we show how the multi-period model with finitely many pure strategies can be reduced to a (static) social system in the sense of Debreu (1952) and prove the existence of a sequential Kyle equilibrium, following Kreps and Wilson (1982).","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"A sequential Kyle equilibrium exists for every discrete‑time Kyle game.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The main result of this section is the following. Theorem 2.16. Every Kyle game has a sequential Kyle equilibrium.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Equilibria generally exist only in mixed strategies and not in pure strategies.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In contrast to Kyle (1985) with normal distributions, equilibria exist in general only in mixed strategies and not in pure strategies.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Bounds for the insider’s equilibrium strategy are established in the single‑period model.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In the single-period model we establish bounds for the insider's strategy in equilibrium.","support":"full"},{"finding":"An equilibrium is proved for the game with a continuum of actions via an approximating sequence of finite‑action games.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Finally, we prove the existence of an equilibrium for the game with a continuum of actions, by considering an approximating sequence of games with finitely many actions.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":16,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:59:57Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}