{"paper_id":"2312.09654","title":"The cost of artificial latency in the PBS context","authors":["Umberto Natale","Michael Moser"],"paper_date":"2023-12-15","paper_type":"empirical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2312.09654v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/the-cost-of-artificial-latency-in-the-pbs-context/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":7.5,"math_complexity":4,"quadrant":"Street Traders"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a latency‑optimization strategy called Adagio that deliberately delays getHeader requests to capture more MEV in the MEV‑Boost auction.","quote":"Our setup strategically delays getHeader requests to maximize Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) capture; correspondingly, we’ve dubbed it Adagio.","summary":"We present a comprehensive analysis of the implications of artificial latency in the Proposer-Builder Separation framework on the Ethereum network. Focusing on the MEV-Boost auction system, we analyze how strategic latency manipulation affects Maximum Extractable Value yields and network integrity.…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Strategic latency optimization is a zero‑sum game that can compromise node‑operator independence.","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"We argue that strategic latency optimization is a zero sum game which may increasingly compromise node operator independence in favor of statistical arbitrageurs."},{"assumption":"All node operators are incentivized to compete for latency‑optimized MEV capture regardless of voting power.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"We illustrated that all node operators are incentivized to compete for latency‑optimized MEV capture, irrespective of their voting power."},{"assumption":"A static delay can be used to model eligibility‑time effects in the theoretical framework.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"In our theoretical framework, we assumed a static delay (see. Fig. 4); in practice, we observe a fluctuation in the eligibility time distribution."},{"assumption":"The increase in ETH burn directly reduces proposer revenue proportionally.","type":"execution","stated":"implied","quote":"While the base fee increases, if the opportunity for MEV extraction remains constant, builders are compelled to adjust the final portion of rewards they are willing to pay, effectively burning a part of what could have been the proposer’s income."}]},"datasets":{"status":"available","items":[{"name":"Adagio pilot","provider":"Chorus One","kind":"crypto-onchain","access":"proprietary","period":null,"universe":"Ethereum mainnet blocks","quote":"We empirically validates these insights with a pilot that Chorus One has been operating on Ethereum mainnet."}],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"unclear"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"yes","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":"A 0.5% rise in burnt ETH reduces MEV reward by about 3.9%, reflecting hidden gas‑cost externalities.","quote":"A 0.5% rise in burnt ETH translates into a tangible reduction in MEV rewards. For example, if an original MEV reward is 0.077 ETH with a burnt fee of 0.633 ETH, a 0.5% increase in burnt ETH would lower the MEV reward to approximately 0.074 ETH. This reduction represents a subtle yet impactful 3.9% decrease in the propo","source":"evidence_card","rule":"R2","candidates":{"front_matter":"unclear","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"A 0.5% rise in burnt ETH reduces MEV reward by about 3.9%, reflecting hidden gas‑cost externalities.","card_quote":"A 0.5% rise in burnt ETH translates into a tangible reduction in MEV rewards. For example, if an original MEV reward is 0.077 ETH with a burnt fee of 0.633 ETH, a 0.5% increase in burnt ETH would lower the MEV reward to approximately 0.074 ETH. This reduction represents a subtle yet impactful 3.9% decrease in the propo","meaning":"costs are part of the reported headline results"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"unclear","findings":[{"finding":"Artificial latency increases the share of ETH burned in subsequent slots, raising gas costs for later proposers.","kind":"negative","quote":"the graph explicitly demonstrates that as bids rise during the auction, so does the gas price for the next slot, leading to a larger share of burned ETH in subsequent slots."},{"finding":"A modest 0.5% increase in burnt ETH can cut MEV rewards by roughly 3.9%, highlighting a tangible revenue loss for proposers.","kind":"performance","quote":"This reduction represents a subtle yet impactful 3.9% decrease in the proposer’s revenue."},{"finding":"The empirical Adagio data shows a wider variance and higher cumulative probability of MEV increases per block compared to the theoretical model, skewing toward lower MEV gains.","kind":"statistical","quote":"The probability density function shows a wider variance with a higher cumulative probability. This indicates that while the experiment leads to a broader range of outcomes, it skews towards relatively lower MEV increases in the"},{"finding":"Latency‑optimized setups raise the base fee and create a long‑tail distribution of ETH‑burn increases, imposing hidden costs on smaller node operators.","kind":"negative","quote":"We demonstrated that artificial latency can result in a higher base fee, and that the long tail of the percentage increase in ETH burned poses a s"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":18,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":1,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":1,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T18:17:48Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}