{"paper_id":"2401.01427","title":"Nash Equilibria in Greenhouse Gas Offset Credit Markets","authors":["Liam Welsh","Sebastian Jaimungal"],"paper_date":"2024-01-02","paper_type":"empirical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.01427v3","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/nash-equilibria-in-greenhouse-gas-offset-credit-markets/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":7,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Holy Grail"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a novel greenhouse gas offset credit market framework that characterises optimal behaviour of participants using stochastic control and game theory, and provides numerical solutions for single‑player and two‑player settings.","quote":"In this work, we present a novel market framework and characterise the optimal behaviour of GHG offset credit (OC) market participants in both single-player and two-player settings. Here, we develop a novel framework that characterises player behaviour in a multi-player GHG OC market in the form of a bi-matrix game.","summary":"One approach to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is to incentivize carbon capturing and carbon reducing projects while simultaneously penalising excess GHG output. In this work, we present a novel market framework and characterise the optimal behaviour of GHG offset credit (OC) market…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Regulated firms must hold a deterministic OC requirement R at the end of the compliance period.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"In our setting, we assume that a regulated firm has an emission limit in units of MtCO2e at the end of a regulatory period at time T. Excess emissions over this limit, denoted by R, must be covered using OCs. We assume R to be deterministic and exogenously determined.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The penalty for shortfall is linear and given by G(x)=−p(R−x)+.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The penalty structure implemented in Canada is linear and the penalty value per emission excess is growing each year (Sadikman et al., 2022). Thus, we impose a penalty structure at the end of a compliance period of G(x) := −p (R −x)+ , (1) where y+ := max(y, 0) and x represents a firm’s OC inventory.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The OC spot price follows a Brownian bridge that converges to the penalty value p at the terminal time.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"In particular, we choose to model the price as a Brownian bridge, such that at T the spot price equals the marginal price of an OC induced by the penalty given in (1). The choice of dynamics for the OC price forces the value of the OC spot price at time t = T to be equal to the penalty value p and the OC price also converges to the penalty value p as t →T, thus avoiding any potential arbitrage opportunity that firms","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Trading incurs a quadratic stylised transaction cost κ/2∫ν_t^2 dt.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We further apply a trading friction in the form of a stylised transaction cost of κ 2 R T 0 ν2 t dt. This results in firms mitigating the speed at which they trade, and it may represent a combination of real and fictitious costs.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"No trading or generation can occur at the terminal time T.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume that no trading or generating can take place at the terminal time t = T, hence any OCs that are to be used for regulatory purposes must be procured prior to the regulatory date.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Firms have a fixed generation capacity ξ and incur a constant cost c per generation event.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume that a firm has a fixed generation capacity of ξ, such that if a firm chooses to generate at time τ ∈[0, T], their inventory jumps by ξ, so that Xτ = Xτ −+ ξ, where Xt−:= lims↑t Xs. The cost of generating these OCs is denoted c.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"available","items":[{"name":"Synthetic OC price and inventory simulation","provider":null,"kind":"synthetic","access":"unknown","period":null,"universe":null,"quote":"Specifically, in this single-10 player environment we take ξ = 0.1 OCs, c = $0.25, R = 5, and the penalty p = $2.50 per OC below the requirement R. The model parameters are provided in Table 1. We use 100 time steps between the initial time t = 0 and the terminal time t = T and set the compliance period to be one month, T = 1/12 years.","support":"full"}],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"synthetic"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"yes","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":"Quadratic transaction cost of κ/2∫ν_t^2 dt with κ=0.03 (see Table 1).","quote":"We further apply a trading friction in the form of a stylised transaction cost of κ 2 R T 0 ν2 t dt. T (years) σ κ η ξ c S0 R Penalty 1/12 0.5 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.25 2.5 5 2.5 Table 1: Simulation parameters for single-player market.","source":"evidence_card","rule":"R2","candidates":{"front_matter":"unclear","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Quadratic transaction cost of κ/2∫ν_t^2 dt with κ=0.03 (see Table 1).","card_quote":"We further apply a trading friction in the form of a stylised transaction cost of κ 2 R T 0 ν2 t dt. T (years) σ κ η ξ c S0 R Penalty 1/12 0.5 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.25 2.5 5 2.5 Table 1: Simulation parameters for single-player market.","meaning":"costs are part of the reported headline results"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Market participants benefit from optimal OC trading and generation, achieving better terminal PnL than incurring the full penalty.","kind":"performance","quote":"We demonstrate the importance of acting optimally using numerical solutions and Monte Carlo simulations and explore the differences between the homogeneous and heterogeneous players. For both players, the terminal PnL is always better than incurring the full penalty and their downside risk is completely eliminated.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Players interacting with heterogeneous counterparts (different generation capacities) achieve higher mean PnL and lower downside risk than homogeneous counterparts.","kind":"performance","quote":"Player one achieves slightly better terminal statistics than player two, which we attribute to their lower costs to generate OCs. Both players achieve superior terminal statistics than their homogeneous counterparts however, demonstrating the mutual benefits of interacting with players with larger generation capacity.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The scale of a player’s OC generating projects critically determines their optimal strategy and influences the Nash equilibria in the two‑player game.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We found the scale of a player’s OC generating projects plays a vital role in determining their behaviour and heavily influences the Nash equilibria of the two-player game. In the instances of the two-player game we analysed, players had well defined decision boundaries between trading OCs and generating OC.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Investing in GHG‑reducing and capturing projects completely mitigates downside risk even when marginal generation cost equals the penalty value.","kind":"performance","quote":"All simulations we performed demonstrated the importance of investing in GHG reducing and capturing projects from a financial perspective by completely mitigating downside risk, even under the strict choice that the marginal cost to generate one OC is equal to the penalty value.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The explicit‑implicit finite‑difference scheme successfully computes value functions and Nash equilibria without numerical instability caused by the OC price dynamics.","kind":"other","quote":"The explicit-implicit FD scheme constructed for the numerical implementation allowed us to estimate the players’ value functions and Nash equilibria avoiding numerical instabilities that would have been caused by the OC price’s dynamics in an entirely explicit scheme. This choice of OC price dynamics allowed for a more realistic and arbitrage-free market model due to the convergence to the penalty value at the end","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":21,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:59:26Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}