{"paper_id":"2401.08302","title":"Do backrun auctions protect traders?","authors":["Andrew W. Macpherson"],"paper_date":"2024-01-16","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.08302v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/do-backrun-auctions-protect-traders/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":7.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a laminated queueing model for batched trading venues and introduces a price manipulation coefficient to bound deviations from global equilibrium, with an exponential approximation for its value.","quote":"We study a new \"laminated\" queueing model for orders on batched trading venues such as decentralised exchanges. To study how bad this manipulation can get, we introduce and bound a price manipulation coefficient that measures the deviation from global equilibrium of local pricing quoted by a rational arbitrageur.","summary":"We study a new “laminated” queueing model for orders on batched trading venues such as decentralised exchanges. The model aims to capture and generalise transaction queueing infrastructure that has arisen to organise MEV activity on public blockchains such as Ethereum, providing convenient channels…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"All markets are frictionless, i.e., without transaction fees.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"I(ri) := price impact of trade sell(ri). • All markets are frictionless, that is, without transaction fees. • Arbitrageurs can trade instantly on a reference market O with zero price impact. • The target venue M as a whole is a price taker from O. That is, M is sufﬁciently small compared to O that order ﬂow on M does not inﬂuence the reference price pO ←O. • Batches are committed instantaneously from the perspective","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Arbitrageurs can trade instantly on a reference market with zero price impact.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"I(ri) := price impact of trade sell(ri). • All markets are frictionless, that is, without transaction fees. • Arbitrageurs can trade instantly on a reference market O with zero price impact. • The target venue M as a whole is a price taker from O. That is, M is sufﬁciently small compared to O that order ﬂow on M does not inﬂuence the reference price pO ←O. • Batches are committed instantaneously from the perspective","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The target venue is a price taker from the reference market, so its order flow does not influence the reference price.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"I(ri) := price impact of trade sell(ri). • All markets are frictionless, that is, without transaction fees. • Arbitrageurs can trade instantly on a reference market O with zero price impact. • The target venue M as a whole is a price taker from O. That is, M is sufﬁciently small compared to O that order ﬂow on M does not inﬂuence the reference price pO ←O. • Batches are committed instantaneously from the perspective","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Batches are committed instantaneously from the perspective of the reference market, keeping the global equilibrium price constant during a batch.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"so the global equilbrium price pO during the execution of a single batch is constant.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Arbitrageurs are myopic, treating each arbitrage opportunity in isolation with a one‑trade time horizon.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Passthrough arbitrage Suppose that each arbitrageur is myopic, so that they treat each ar-bitrage opportunity in complete isolation — that is, they have a strategy time horizon of just one trade. This models an idealised situation in which arbitrage is so competitive that each agent treats as negligible their chances of being able to land multiple spots.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Sizes are normalised so that equilibrium liquidity depth is unity (xO = 1).","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"We also assume in this section that sizes are normalised so that equilibrium liquidity depth is unity xO = 1.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"unclear","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"conflict","rule":"R4b","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"no","evidence_card_quoted":true},"conflict_kind":"applicability","card_detail":null,"card_quote":"I(ri) := price impact of trade sell(ri). • All markets are frictionless, that is, without transaction fees. • Arbitrageurs can trade instantly on a reference market O with zero price impact. • The target venue M as a whole is a price taker from O. That is, M is sufﬁciently small compared to O that order ﬂow on M does not inﬂuence the reference price pO ←O. • Batches are committed instantaneously from the perspective","meaning":"the platform classifier and the paper-text extraction disagree, so no value is asserted"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"When arbitrageurs are myopic, the dominant strategy is passthrough pricing, i.e., setting prices to the reference price pO, which yields global price equilibrium for each liquidity order.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"1.4 Corollary (Myopic arbitrageurs provide passthrough pricing, 2.18). Then the dominant strategy for each arbitrageur is to set prices to pO.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The price manipulation coefficient can be bounded and is well approximated by a zeta‑type value with empirically measurable parameters.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"To study how bad this manipulation can get, we introduce and bound a price manipulation coefficient that measures the deviation from global equilibrium of local pricing quoted by a rational arbitrageur. We exhibit cases in which this coefficient is well approximated by a \"zeta value' with interpretable and empirically measurable parameters.","support":"full"},{"finding":"An exponential approximation of price impact yields a very small error in practice and leads to a closed‑form expression for the manipulation factor.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Instead, we proceed under an exponential approximation that turns out to have very small error in practice. Then setting RHS of equation (15) splits the product E( ¯φ(s+ r)) = ¯φ(s)·E( ¯φ(xO + r)) of the manipulation factor by the expected price impact factor at equilibrium of the order ﬂow r.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Sufficient privacy in order flow reduces the effectiveness of targeted sandwiching strategies.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"As we conﬁrm in §3.1, sufﬁcient privacy does indeed hobble some of the most pow-erful targeted value extraction strategies.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":10,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":true,"code_url":"https://github.com/flashbots/mev-research","note":null},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:59:13Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}