{"paper_id":"2403.03367","title":"am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker","authors":["Austin Adams","Ciamac C. Moallemi","Sara Reynolds","Dan Robinson"],"paper_date":"2024-03-05","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2403.03367v4","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/am-amm-an-auction-managed-automated-market-maker/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":7.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes the auction-managed AMM (am‑AMM), a constant‑product AMM that uses an on‑chain Harberger‑lease auction to let the winning manager set dynamic swap fees and capture arbitrage profits, aiming to reduce informed order‑flow losses and maximize revenue from uninformed flow.","quote":"This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue from uninformed orderflow. In this paper, we propose the auction-managed AMM (am-AMM), a new AMM design that targets both LVR reduction and fee optimization with one mechanism.","summary":"Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The AMM is a constant‑product market maker with invariant √xy = L and a proportional trading fee f ∈ [0, fmax].","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We will restrict to the case of a constant product market maker,1 with invariant √xy = L, where we denote the reserve quantities by (x, y) and the pool liquidity level by L. If the price of the risky asset is given by P, the value of the the pool reserves is given by V (L) ≜2 √ PL, as a function of the available liquidity L. We assume the pool charges a proportional trading fee f ∈[0, fmax].","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Traders can only trade on the pool at discrete block generation times.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"As in Milionis et al. (2023), we assume that traders can only trade on the pool at discrete block generation times.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Arbitrageurs are competitive, deep, and have infinite capital, so arbitrage profit scales linearly with pool value: ARB_PROFIT(f, L) = AP0(f)·V(L) with AP0 decreasing in f.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume there is a competitive and deep market of arbitrageurs monitoring prices in the AMM and exploiting price diﬀerences between the AMM and the fundamental price. For L > 0, we assume that ARB_PROFIT(f, L) = AP0(f)V (L), where AP0(·) is a continuous, decreasing function.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Noise‑trader demand is sub‑linear in pool value (satiated) and can be represented by H(f, L) = c0 L^α exp(−c1 f) with α∈(0,1).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Part 2 implies that the noise trader is sub-linear in pool value or liquidity, i.e., noise trader demand is satiated. Example 1. Consider H(f, L) ≜c0Lα exp(−c1f), where c0, c1 > 0 and α ∈(0, 1) are parame-ters that could be estimated from transaction data, and may be time varying or may depend on 1The key property of the constant product market maker we use is that the arbitrage proﬁts and arbitrage excess scale","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The auction uses a delay parameter K so that rent and manager for block N are locked in as of block N‑K (Harberger lease).","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"The auction uses a delay parameter K. The rules of the auction are designed so that both the rent and the pool manager for block N are locked in as of block N −K. Harberger lease. The right to be the manager of a pool is set in a special onchain auction we call a “Harberger lease” (named after the “Harberger taxes” popularized by Posner and Weyl (2018)).","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R1","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"unclear","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Under certain assumptions, the am‑AMM should have higher liquidity in equilibrium than any standard fixed‑fee AMM.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We prove that under certain assumptions, this AMM should have higher liquidity in equilibrium than any standard, fixed-fee AMM.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The am‑AMM is a provably incentive‑compatible dynamic‑fee design that should always attract more liquidity than any fixed‑fee AMM.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The am-AMM is a ﬁrst attempt at a provably incentive-compatible dynamic fee, where the fee is set by the market in a way that should always attract more liquidity than any ﬁxed-fee AMM. 2.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":5,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":11,"by_independent_authors":10,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":1,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":1,"mentions":5,"unclassified":4},"independent_papers":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2610.21510","title":"How Much Screening Buys a Second? Speed, Selection, and the Maker's Spread","paper_date":"2026-10-15","authors":["Aleksei Adadurov","Eduard Airapetian","Anton Chtepine","Antero Eloranta","Boris Pletenev","Andrei Sebyakin"],"empirical_rigor":8,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/how-much-screening-buys-a-second-speed-selection-and-the-makers-spread/"},"how":"used_as_baseline","quote":null},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2404.13291","title":"Optimal Design of Automated Market Makers on Decentralized Exchanges","paper_date":"2024-04-20","authors":["Xue Dong He","Chen Yang","Yutian Zhou"],"empirical_rigor":2.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/optimal-design-of-automated-market-makers-on-decentralized-exchanges/"},"how":"discusses_findings","quote":"The authors show that under certain assumptions, this AMM has higher liquidity in equilibrium than the standard AMM."}],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:58:33Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}