{"paper_id":"2404.05803","title":"Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity","authors":["Robin Fritsch","Andrea Canidio"],"paper_date":"2024-04-08","paper_type":"empirical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.05803v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/measuring-arbitrage-losses-and-profitability-of-amm-liquidit/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":8.5,"math_complexity":6,"quadrant":"Holy Grail"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper empirically measures liquidity providers' losses to arbitrage versus fee earnings across Uniswap v2 and v3 pools and studies how block times affect these losses.","quote":"We show that those losses exceed the fees earned by liquidity providers across many of the largest AMM liquidity pools (on Uniswap).","summary":"This paper presents the results of a comprehensive empirical study of losses to arbitrageurs (following the formalization of loss-versus-rebalancing by [“Milionis et al., 2022”]) incurred by liquidity providers on automated market makers (AMMs). We show that those losses exceed the fees earned by…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Pools are consistently rebalanced to historical Binance prices.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"To simulate arbitrage losses, we assume that the pools are consistently rebalanced to historical prices on Binance, the most liquid cryptocurrency exchange."},{"assumption":"Blockchain transaction costs are ignored when determining profitable arbitrage opportunities.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"Note that we do not consider blockchain transaction costs when determining profitable arbitrage opportunities."},{"assumption":"The simulated liquidity position is small relative to the pool size and does not affect trader behavior.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume the size of the simulated position to be small compared to the pool size, in the sense that its presence does not affect the behavior of traders and other LPs."},{"assumption":"During a swap, price stays within a price range with constant liquidity.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"This method of fee computation makes an implicit assumption, namely that during a swap, the price stays within a price range with constant liquidity."},{"assumption":"Arbitrageurs can trade sufficient amounts at the best bid and ask prices on Binance.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"Instead, we implicitly assume arbitrageurs are able to buy and sell sufficient amounts at the best bid and ask prices."},{"assumption":"Block times are fixed intervals in the simulation (e.g., 100 ms to 16 s).","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"We then simulate a hypothetical AMM position in a constant‑product pool for different block times between 100ms and 15s similarly as described in the precious section."}]},"datasets":{"status":"available","items":[{"name":"Binance second‑by‑second price data","provider":"Binance","kind":"market-prices","access":"public","period":null,"universe":"All tokens traded on Binance that appear in Uniswap pools","quote":"For all Binance pairs, we retrieve second‑by‑second price data.","known_id":"binance"},{"name":"Ethereum block timestamps","provider":"Ethereum blockchain","kind":"crypto-onchain","access":"public","period":null,"universe":"Ethereum blocks during the observation period","quote":"Subsequently, at the time of each block (using the timestamps of Ethereum blocks), we consider the external price."},{"name":"Uniswap swap events","provider":"Ethereum events","kind":"crypto-onchain","access":"public","period":null,"universe":"All swaps in the selected Uniswap v2 and v3 pools","quote":"To compute historical returns from fees, we extract all swap transactions from Ethereum events."}],"known":[{"id":"binance","name":"Binance","provider":"Binance","kind":"market-prices","access":"public","quote":"For the remaining pairs, i.e. LDO-ETH, LINK-ETH, MATIC-ETH, and UNI-ETH, we derived the Binance prices by combining the prices of the two corresponding USDT pairs.","mentions":17,"used_in":2}],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"intraday-bars"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"no","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":"Note that we do not consider blockchain transaction costs when determining profitable arbitrage opportunities.","source":"evidence_card","rule":"R2","candidates":{"front_matter":"unclear","evidence_card":"no","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":null,"card_quote":"Note that we do not consider blockchain transaction costs when determining profitable arbitrage opportunities.","meaning":"a trading or execution result is reported without costs"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"unclear","findings":[{"finding":"Fees earned by liquidity providers are generally smaller than the arbitrage losses they incur, meaning LPs lose money in most large Uniswap pools.","kind":"performance","quote":"... Fees do not sufficiently compensate for arbitrage losses in most of the largest Uniswap liquidity pools, i.e. historically, returns from fees have been smaller than losses to arbitrageur."},{"finding":"Uniswap v2 pools are significantly more profitable for passive LPs than the corresponding Uniswap v3 pools for the same token pair and fee tier.","kind":"performance","quote":"... the most‑traded Uniswap v2 pools are significantly more profitable than the corresponding Uniswap v3 pools for the same pair and trading fee."},{"finding":"Faster block times reduce arbitrage losses, with 100 ms blocks cutting losses by 20 % to 70 % relative to Ethereum’s 12 s blocks, depending on the pair.","kind":"performance","quote":"We find that losses to arbitrageurs are reduced by between 20% and 70% with 100ms block times compared to Ethereum’s current 12 seconds, depending on the trading pair."},{"finding":"Empirical loss reduction with block time follows a slower decline than the theoretical square‑root model for intervals shorter than 1 s.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"While our empirical findings come close to this model for most pairs and block times larger than 1s, we observe a different regime for block times shorter than 1s. More precisely, arbitrage profits appear to decline more slowly than the theoretical model would suggest."}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2305.14604","title":"Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees","paper_date":"2023-05-24","authors":["Jason Milionis","Ciamac C. Moallemi","Tim Roughgarden"],"empirical_rigor":3,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/automated-market-making-and-arbitrage-profits-in-the-presenc/"},"question":"How does block time (or block rate) affect arbitrage profitability/losses in AMM markets?","this_paper_finding":"Faster block times reduce arbitrage losses, with 100 ms blocks cutting losses by 20 % to 70 % relative to Ethereum’s 12 s blocks, depending on the pair.","other_paper_finding":"The fraction of profitable blocks (Ptrade) decreases with higher block rates, implying faster blockchains reduce LP losses.","other_paper_quote":"This fraction decreases with an increasing block rate, hence our model yields an important practical insight: faster blockchains will result in reduced LP losses. In other words, our model yields an important practical insight: that LP losses to arbitrageurs are reduced on faster blockchains.","note":"B shows 100 ms blocks cut losses 20‑70% vs 12 s Ethereum, aligning with A’s result that higher block rates lower the fraction of profitable blocks.","confidence":0.919},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2309.08431","title":"Decentralised Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision","paper_date":"2023-09-15","authors":["Álvaro Cartea","Fayçal Drissi","Marcello Monga"],"empirical_rigor":7,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/decentralised-finance-and-automated-market-making-predictab/"},"question":"Do liquidity providers incur net losses due to arbitrage in major Uniswap pools?","this_paper_finding":"Fees earned by liquidity providers are generally smaller than the arbitrage losses they incur, meaning LPs lose money in most large Uniswap pools.","other_paper_finding":"Liquidity providers on average incur a significant loss when providing liquidity in the ETH/USDC pool.","other_paper_quote":"on average, LPs have traded at a significant loss","note":"Both findings report that LPs lose money: A finds a significant loss in the ETH/USDC pool, and B shows fees are smaller than arbitrage losses, causing losses in most large pools.","confidence":0.891},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2604.22069","title":"Liquidity provision in CLMMs: evidence from transactions data","paper_date":"2026-04-23","authors":["Andrey Urusov","Rostislav Berezovskiy","Anatoly Krestenko","Andrei Kornilov"],"empirical_rigor":6,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/liquidity-provision-in-clmms-evidence-from-transactions-data/"},"question":"Do liquidity providers earn net profit from providing liquidity in AMM/CLMM pools?","this_paper_finding":"Fees earned by liquidity providers are generally smaller than the arbitrage losses they incur, meaning LPs lose money in most large Uniswap pools.","other_paper_finding":"Standalone liquidity provision is profitable only for a minority of LPs, suggesting other motives beyond pool rewards.","other_paper_quote":"Overall, the results show that standalone liquidity provision is profitable only for a minority of LPs and leave open an important question for future research about the broader economic motives sustaining LP participation despite weak standalone profitability at the pool level.","note":"Both findings show LPs generally lose money: A reports fees earned are smaller than arbitrage losses, and B finds only a minority of LPs are profitable.","confidence":0.667},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2406.00113","title":"Loss-Versus-Fair: Efficiency of Dutch Auctions on Blockchains","paper_date":"2024-05-31","authors":["Ciamac C. Moallemi","Dan Robinson"],"empirical_rigor":2,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/loss-versus-fair-efficiency-of-dutch-auctions-on-blockchain/"},"question":"What block time is needed to limit arbitrage losses on AMM liquidity?","this_paper_finding":"Faster block times reduce arbitrage losses, with 100 ms blocks cutting losses by 20 % to 70 % relative to Ethereum’s 12 s blocks, depending on the pair.","other_paper_finding":"A rule‑of‑thumb (Equation 7) suggests that to keep losses below 2 bps for assets with 5% daily volatility, block times must be under 2.75 seconds.","other_paper_quote":"For example, the rule of thumb in Equation (7) suggests that if a platform wants to support Dutch auctions that lose less than 2 basis points for assets with daily volatility of 5%, it will need to have block times of less than 2.75 seconds.","note":"Both link shorter blocks to lower losses; A shows 100 ms cuts losses 20‑70 %, B says <2.75 s keeps losses <2 bps for 5 % daily volatility.","confidence":0.658},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2403.09494","title":"Layer 2 be or Layer not 2 be: Scaling on Uniswap v3","paper_date":"2024-03-14","authors":["Austin Adams"],"empirical_rigor":7,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/layer-2-be-or-layer-not-2-be-scaling-on-uniswap-v3/"},"question":"How does block time length impact arbitrage profitability and fee returns on AMM platforms?","this_paper_finding":"Faster block times reduce arbitrage losses, with 100 ms blocks cutting losses by 20 % to 70 % relative to Ethereum’s 12 s blocks, depending on the pair.","other_paper_finding":"Arbitrum’s 2‑second block time may still be too long for optimal fee returns, as multiple arbitrage trades occur within that window.","other_paper_quote":"Arbitrum built blocks on demand, allowing for multiple arbitrage transactions to happen in a 2 second window - possibly hinting that 2 seconds is still too large of a block time for optimal level of fee returns.","note":"Both find faster blocks improve outcomes: 2 s blocks on Arbitrum still limit fee returns, while 100 ms blocks cut arbitrage losses by 20‑70 % versus 12 s Ethereum blocks; markets differ (Arbitrum vs generic AMM pairs).","confidence":0.412},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2601.00738","title":"Second Thoughts: How 1-second subslots transform CEX-DEX Arbitrage on Ethereum","paper_date":"2026-01-02","authors":["Aleksei Adadurov","Sergey Barseghyan","Anton Chtepine","Antero Eloranta","Andrei Sebyakin","Arsenii Valitov"],"empirical_rigor":7,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/second-thoughts-how-1-second-subslots-transform-cex-dex-arb/"},"question":"How does reducing block or slot time affect arbitrage activity in AMM markets?","this_paper_finding":"Faster block times reduce arbitrage losses, with 100 ms blocks cutting losses by 20 % to 70 % relative to Ethereum’s 12 s blocks, depending on the pair.","other_paper_finding":"Reducing slot time from 12 seconds to 1‑second subslots increases arbitrage transaction count by 535% on average.","other_paper_quote":"The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average. Under reasonable assumptions about agent risk preferences and inclusion probabilities, the shift from a 12-second to a 1-second execution environment increases the number of arbitrage transactions by 535%, with effects","note":"A shows 100 ms blocks cut losses 20‑70 % vs 12 s blocks; B shows 1‑s subslots raise transaction count 535 % vs 12 s slots. Samples differ (AMM pairs vs CEX‑DEX on Ethereum).","confidence":0.406}],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2305.14604","title":"Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees","paper_date":"2023-05-24","authors":["Jason Milionis","Ciamac C. Moallemi","Tim Roughgarden"],"empirical_rigor":3,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/automated-market-making-and-arbitrage-profits-in-the-presenc/"},"question":"How does block time (or block rate) impact AMM arbitrage profitability and loss magnitude?","this_paper_finding":"Empirical loss reduction with block time follows a slower decline than the theoretical square‑root model for intervals shorter than 1 s.","other_paper_finding":"The fraction of profitable blocks (Ptrade) decreases with higher block rates, implying faster blockchains reduce LP losses.","other_paper_quote":"This fraction decreases with an increasing block rate, hence our model yields an important practical insight: faster blockchains will result in reduced LP losses. In other words, our model yields an important practical insight: that LP losses to arbitrageurs are reduced on faster blockchains.","note":"Both find profitability drops as blocks get faster; A notes a decrease in profitable‑block fraction, while B reports a slower‑than‑square‑root loss reduction for intervals under 1 s.","confidence":0.548}],"compared_with":21,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":8,"by_independent_authors":8,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":1,"mentions":5,"unclassified":2},"independent_papers":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2501.07828","title":"Automated Market Makers: Toward More Profitable Liquidity Provisioning Strategies","paper_date":"2025-01-14","authors":["Thanos Drossos","Daniel Kirste","Niclas Kannengießer","Ali Sunyaev"],"empirical_rigor":6,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/automated-market-makers-toward-more-profitable-liquidity-pr/"},"how":"discusses_findings","quote":"The study shows that the liquidity pools with function-based liquidity concentration in Uniswap v2 are more profitable than their corresponding Uniswap v3 liquidity pools."}],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":1,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T18:11:36Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. 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