{"paper_id":"2404.08757","title":"Strategic Informed Trading and the Value of Private Information","authors":["Michail Anthropelos","Scott Robertson"],"paper_date":"2024-04-12","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.08757v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/strategic-informed-trading-and-the-value-of-private-informat/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper extends the single‑period CARA‑normal Grossman‑Stiglitz model by allowing the insider to internalize her linear price impact while the uninformed trader remains price‑taking, and studies the resulting linear‑impact equilibrium.","quote":"Methodology and Main Contributions. We adjust the single period CARA-normal setting of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]1 by allowing the insider to internalize her price impact, while maintaining the presence of price-taking uninformed traders and liquidity providers2.","summary":"We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider internalizes her power to impact prices, but the uninformed trader…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The market consists of risky assets traded by an informed insider, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Agents have CARA utility and the underlying payoff distribution is normal (single‑period CARA‑normal setting).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We adjust the single period CARA-normal setting of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]1 by allowing the insider to internalize her price impact, while maintaining the presence of price-taking uninformed traders and liquidity providers2.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The insider internalizes the effect of her own demand on the market price (price‑impact internalization).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We adjust the single period CARA-normal setting of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]1 by allowing the insider to internalize her price impact, while maintaining the presence of price-taking uninformed traders and liquidity providers2.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The uninformed trader treats the price as given (price‑taking).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We adjust the single period CARA-normal setting of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]1 by allowing the insider to internalize her price impact, while maintaining the presence of price-taking uninformed traders and liquidity providers2.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Price impact is linear in total order flow.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Our assumption of linear price impact is moti-vated by the price-taking case.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Precision matrices satisfy PI = pI PX and PN = pN PX⁻¹ for scalars pI, pN > 0 (Assumption A.4).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"PI = pIPX and PN = pNP −1 X for scalars pI, pN > 0.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"In equilibrium the insider strategically reveals a noisier signal, making prices less reactive to public information compared to the competitive (price‑taking) economy.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Compared to the associated competitive economy, in equilibrium the insider strategically reveals a noisier signal, and prices are less reactive to publicly available information.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Insider’s indirect utility is monotonically increasing in the precision of her private signal (Theorem 3.2).","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Our main result shows that insider ex-ante utility is monotonically increasing in the private signal precision (Theorem 3.2).","support":"full"},{"finding":"Internalizing price impact improves the uninformed trader’s utility relative to the competitive economy.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Lastly, we show that compared to the competitive economy, the insider's internalization of price impact is utility improving for the uninformed trader, but somewhat surprisingly may be utility decreasing for the insider herself.","support":"full"},{"finding":"If the insider is sufficiently risk‑averse and the signal is of low quality, internalizing price impact can reduce the insider’s utility.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"This utility reduction occurs provided the insider is sufficiently risk averse compared to the uninformed trader, and provided the signal is of sufficiently low quality.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Both insider and uninformed trader interim utilities always increase when the insider internalizes price impact (Proposition 3.6).","kind":"theoretical","quote":"As pI →0 we obtain the almost sure limits for the insider lim pI→0 CEI 0(G, ZN) = CEI nsn + λ2 2αI Z2 N, lim pI→0 CEI 0,ι(G, ZN) = CEI nsn + λ2 2(1 −λ2)αI Z2 N. Therefore, insider interim utility always increases when internalizing price impact. For the unin-formed trader we obtain almost surely lim pI→0 CEU 0 (H) = CEI nsn + αUλ2 2α2 I Z2 N, lim pI→0 CEU 0,ι(Hι) = CEI nsn + αUλ2 2α2 I(1 −λ2)2 Z2 N, and hence","support":"partial"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":14,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:58:12Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}