{"paper_id":"2405.02865","title":"Non cooperative Liquidity Games and their application to bond market trading","authors":["Alicia Vidler","Toby Walsh"],"paper_date":"2024-05-05","paper_type":"methodological","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.02865v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/non-cooperative-liquidity-games-and-their-application-to-bon/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":6.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a new type of game, the Liquidity Game, with endogenous utility functions based on bond holdings reduction, and applies it to UK government bond market making.","quote":"We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. 1 The Liquidity Game: An introduction We introduce a game, the Liquidity Game (LG).","summary":"We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players’ utility is directly defined by the liquidity…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The game is bilateral with two players having equal and opposite bond positions.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We show that when relaxing the concept of imperfect information, our bilateral game, of two players with equal and offsetting positions, can be shown to have a pure Nash equilibrium when Bi = 2 and Bj = -2.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Players are strictly rational and will only accept a trade that improves their welfare.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"All agents are strictly rational, and will only act if the parcel of bonds offered by the other player also improves their welfare.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"There are two types of market makers: large banks (type a) with larger holdings and small banks (type b) with smaller holdings.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"In our current framework, we assume the following payoffs based on two types of player: Large banks and small banks. The former, we term type (a) and it is char-acterised by larger holdings.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"If one player offers a bond quantity larger than the other player's holding, no trade occurs and no utility is derived.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Our payoff functions are assumed based on the concept that should one player make a bond play that is larger than the other player, no trade can occur by game rules and thus no utility is derived.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"No monetary exchanges or asset price mechanisms are included; utility is derived solely from reduction of bond holdings.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Summary of our contribution We focus on deﬁning a new type of game, where the utility structure of this game diverges from conventional paradigms and speciﬁcally money, or asset price, play no part. Monetary exchanges and asset transfers at market prices are conspicuously absent, ac-centuating the core objective of asset holding reduction as a measure of utility and thus a deﬁnition of strategic action.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Penalty functions for attempting a trade are omitted in the current framework.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Note: for the purposes of in-troducing this game, we do not consider any penalty function that might arise from the act of trying to play.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"The bilateral Liquidity Game has a pure Nash equilibrium when player holdings are Bi = 2 and Bj = -2.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We show that when relaxing the concept of imperfect information, our bilateral game, of two players with equal and offsetting positions, can be shown to have a pure Nash equilibrium when Bi = 2 and Bj = -2.","support":"full"},{"finding":"A mixed‑strategy Nash equilibrium exists when player holdings are Bi = 3 and Bj = -3.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Likewise, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is found when Bi = 3 and Bj = -3.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The authors propose a Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept for games with incomplete information.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We propose a Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept but begin our introduction to the reader by means of two trivial examples to illustrate the game dy-namics and payoffs of each player, under perfect information, but without cooperation. We extend this consideration to the practical real-world example of Bayesian Liquidity Games between two market makers, belonging to one of two types of player: a large bank or","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":10,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:57:24Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}