{"paper_id":"2405.09764","title":"Clearing time randomization and transaction fees for auction market design","authors":["Thibaut Mastrolia","Tianrui Xu"],"paper_date":"2024-05-16","paper_type":"empirical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.09764v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/clearing-time-randomization-and-transaction-fees-for-auction/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":6,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Holy Grail"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes two regulatory remedies for periodic auctions: randomizing the auction’s closing time and introducing a transaction‑fee schedule that increases with the trader’s arrival time.","quote":"We thus propose and quantify the effect of two remedies to mitigate these flaws: randomizing the auction's closing time and optimally designing a transaction fees policy for both the strategic traders and other market participants. First, we introduce a randomization design of the auction’s closing time.","summary":"Flaws of a continuous limit order book mechanism raise the question of whether a continuous trading session and a periodic auction session would bring better efficiency. This paper wants to go further in designing a periodic auction when both a continuous market and a periodic auction market are…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Limit order prices are independent normally distributed variables with mean µmm and standard deviation σmm.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"Note that linear supply functions are also considered in [Du and Zhu (2017), Fricke and Gerig (2018), Jusselin et al. (2021)] We assume that (Pi)i≥1 is a family of independent normally distributed 6 random variables with mean µmm and standard deviation σmm.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The efficient price of the asset is a normal random variable with mean µ* and standard deviation σ*.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume that the efficient price of the risky asset denoted by P ∗is a normal random variable with mean µ∗and standard deviation σ∗.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Each limit order’s supply function is linear: Qi = K(PclT – Pi) with K>0 fixed.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The parameter K > 0 is the slope of the supply function assumed to be fixed for each limit order.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Limit orders arrive according to a Poisson process with intensity λ·t.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We model the arrival of these limit orders by a Poisson process M with intensity λmm t = λ × t where λ is a positive constant.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The strategic seller chooses a deterministic arrival time τ∈[0,T] and a price P to sell.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"We consider a strategic seller joining the auction at a deterministic time τ between 0 and T aiming at optimally liquidating her position in the risky asset.2 The strategic seller controls the exact time τ she arrives in the auction together with the price P at which she is willing to sell the asset, and the direction of the trade (which is selling).","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The auction mechanism follows the basic rule of maximizing the number of matched orders (no priority rules, no additional matching constraints).","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"5 Additionally, we would like to remind that our model of a periodic auction adopts the most basic set of rules.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"available","items":[{"name":"Apple and Alphabet stock daily prices","provider":"YahooFinance","kind":"market-prices","access":"public","period":"2023-10-02 to 2023-12-29","universe":"Apple (AAPL) and Alphabet (GOOG) stocks","quote":"We use trading data extracted from YahooFinance for Apple and Alphabet (Google) stock on period Oct-2-2023 to Dec-29-2023 to calibrate the parameters µmm and σ. We get Apple’s µmm = 184.39 and Alphabet’s µmm = 134.24.","support":"full","known_id":"yahoo-finance"}],"known":[{"id":"yahoo-finance","name":"Yahoo Finance","provider":"Yahoo","kind":"market-prices","access":"public","quote":"We use trading data extracted from YahooFinance for Apple and Alphabet (Google) stock on period Oct-2-2023 to Dec-29-2023 to calibrate the parameters µmm and σ.","mentions":1,"used_in":1}],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"daily"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"yes","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":"A transaction fee indexed on arrival time is introduced (linear fee ξℓ(t)=a·t or square fee ξs(t)=a·t²) to incentivize earlier arrival.","quote":"Second, we introduce a transaction fee indexed on the arrival time of every market participant in the auction, i.e., the later a trader arrives, the higher they pay. We assume that the exchange proposes two type of exchange fees: either a linear fee indexed on the time of arrival of the strategic trader and the efficient price ξℓ(t) = at or a square fee structure ξs(t) = at2, with randomization of closing time τ cl.","source":"evidence_card","rule":"R2","candidates":{"front_matter":"unclear","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"A transaction fee indexed on arrival time is introduced (linear fee ξℓ(t)=a·t or square fee ξs(t)=a·t²) to incentivize earlier arrival.","card_quote":"Second, we introduce a transaction fee indexed on the arrival time of every market participant in the auction, i.e., the later a trader arrives, the higher they pay. We assume that the exchange proposes two type of exchange fees: either a linear fee indexed on the time of arrival of the strategic trader and the efficient price ξℓ(t) = at or a square fee structure ξs(t) = at2, with randomization of closing time τ cl.","meaning":"costs are part of the reported headline results"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"unclear","findings":[{"finding":"Without regulation, a strategic trader optimally arrives at the last moment (τ = T) to maximize price impact, which can move the clearing price away from the efficient price.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In a periodic auction, we discover that a strategic trader could take advantage of the accumulated information available along the auction duration by arriving at the latest moment before the auction closes, increasing the price impact on the market. Such price impact moves the clearing price away from the efficient price and may disturb the efficiency of a periodic auction market.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Randomizing the closing time with optimal probability p≈0.08 (≈8% chance of ending at T‑1) shifts the strategic trader’s optimal arrival to τ=9 and improves market quality (e.g., Apple MQ from 3.6659 to 3.6365).","kind":"performance","quote":"For both Apple and Alphabet, we observe in Table 3 that the optimal ˆp is around 0.08. With randomization set at ˆp = 0.08, the stock exchange successfully encourages a strategic trader to arrive earlier.","support":"partial"},{"finding":"Introducing time‑dependent transaction fees (linear or square) yields lower exchange objective values (Λ0) than the no‑fee case, indicating improved market quality and earlier trader arrival.","kind":"performance","quote":"From the last two columns of the table, we could see that our transaction fee model improves market quality since Λ0 is always smaller that the market quality when ξ = 0. From the strategic trader’s perspective, they now have the incentive to arrive earlier as their optimal arriving time ˆτ is less than 10 for several of the cases shown here.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":8,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":3,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":3},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:57:24Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}