{"paper_id":"2405.14418","title":"Continuous-time Equilibrium Returns in Markets with Price Impact and Transaction Costs","authors":["Michail Anthropelos","Constantinos Stefanakis"],"paper_date":"2024-05-23","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.14418v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/continuous-time-equilibrium-returns-in-markets-with-price-im/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":9,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a continuous‑time equilibrium model with endogenous asset returns, incorporating investors' price impact and quadratic transaction costs, and derives a closed‑form Nash equilibrium characterized as the unique solution of a system of FBSDEs.","quote":"Under price impact and transaction costs, we characterize the Nash equilibrium as the (unique) solution of a system of FBSDEs and derive its closed-form expression.","summary":"We consider an Ito-financial market at which the risky assets’ returns are derived endogenously through a market-clearing condition amongst heterogeneous risk-averse investors with quadratic preferences and random endowments. Investors act strategically by taking into account the impact that their…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Investors are heterogeneous risk‑averse agents with quadratic preferences over terminal wealth.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We consider an Ito-financial market at which the risky assets' returns are derived endogenously through a market-clearing condition amongst heterogeneous risk-averse investors with quadratic preferences and random endowments. We consider N investors with quadratic preferences over their wealth at time terminal time T and risk tolerance coeﬃcients denoted by δm > 0 for each m ∈I := {1, 2, ..., N}.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Investors act strategically, taking into account the impact of their orders on asset drifts.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Investors act strategically by taking into account the impact that their orders have on the assets' drift.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Risky assets follow Itô dynamics with drifts endogenously determined at equilibrium.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"More precisely, we assume that risky assets follow Itˆo dynamics, with drifts that are endogenously derived at the equilibrium.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Quadratic transaction costs are imposed on the rate of trading.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"As mentioned in the introductory section, we consider market’s transaction costs and more precisely in the form of quadratic costs on the rate of trading. In words, investors face the same costs that are proportional to the square of their trading rate.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Noise traders may be present, providing exogenous random demand.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The presence of noise traders is allowable in the model, while the main market’s participants are mean-variance investors endowed with heterogeneous random income processes.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"When all investors share a common risk aversion and no noise traders are present, transaction costs do not affect equilibrium returns.","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"We furthermore show that under common risk aversion and absence of noise traders, transaction costs do not change the equilibrium returns.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R4a","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Quadratic costs on the trading rate (cost proportional to the square of the trading speed).","card_quote":"As mentioned in the introductory section, we consider market’s transaction costs and more precisely in the form of quadratic costs on the rate of trading. In words, investors face the same costs that are proportional to the square of their trading rate.","meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Under common risk aversion and absence of noise traders, frictional and frictionless Nash equilibria coincide, implying transaction costs do not change equilibrium returns.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We furthermore show that under common risk aversion and absence of noise traders, transaction costs do not change the equilibrium returns.","support":"full"},{"finding":"When noise traders are present, transaction costs amplify their effect on equilibrium returns due to price impact.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"On the contrary, when noise traders are present, the effect of transaction costs on equilibrium returns is amplified due to price impact.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The Nash equilibrium with price impact and quadratic transaction costs is uniquely characterized by a system of forward‑backward SDEs and admits a closed‑form expression.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Under price impact and transaction costs, we characterize the Nash equilibrium as the (unique) solution of a system of FBSDEs and derive its closed-form expression. Under price impact and transaction costs, we characterize the Nash equilibrium through the (unique) solution of a system of FBSDEs and derive its closed-form expression.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Investors' price impact increases the component of equilibrium return that stems from transaction costs when more than two strategic investors participate.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"On the other hand, we show that investors’ price impact increases the part of the equilibrium return that stems from transaction costs (when more than two investors participate in the market).","support":"full"},{"finding":"In the special case of only two strategic investors, the effect of transaction costs on equilibrium returns is the same under competitive and non‑competitive market structures.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In the special case of only two strategic investors, the eﬀect of transaction costs on equilibrium returns is equal between competi-tive and non-competitive market’s structure.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2502.10666","title":"Heterogenous Macro-Finance Model: A Mean-field Game Approach","paper_date":"2025-02-15","authors":["Hoang Vu","Tomoyuki Ichiba"],"empirical_rigor":2.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/heterogenous-macro-finance-model-a-mean-field-game-approach/"},"question":"How does common market noise combined with financial friction amplify equilibrium returns or mean‑field outcomes?","this_paper_finding":"When noise traders are present, transaction costs amplify their effect on equilibrium returns due to price impact.","other_paper_finding":"When common market noise is present, financial friction amplifies the mean‑field effect, causing capital fire‑sales by experts.","other_paper_quote":"When common noises from the market are involved, financial friction amplifies the mean-field effect and leads to capital fire sales by experts.","note":"Both findings report that financial friction (transaction costs in A, frictions in B) amplifies the effect of common market noise—A on returns, B on mean‑field leading to fire‑sales.","confidence":0.554}],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":16,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:57:09Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}