{"paper_id":"2406.00113","title":"Loss-Versus-Fair: Efficiency of Dutch Auctions on Blockchains","authors":["Ciamac C. Moallemi","Dan Robinson"],"paper_date":"2024-05-31","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2406.00113v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/loss-versus-fair-efficiency-of-dutch-auctions-on-blockchain/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":8,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper extends the Milionis et al. model to Dutch and gradual Dutch auctions, deriving closed‑form expressions for expected loss to arbitrageurs and expected time‑to‑fill as functions of auction parameters.","quote":"We extend their model to analyze another popular mechanism in decentralized finance for onchain trading: Dutch auctions. In this paper, we apply a similar model to Dutch auctions and gradual Dutch auctions.","summary":"Milionis et al.(2023) studied the rate at which automated market makers leak value to arbitrageurs when block times are discrete and follow a Poisson process, and where the risky asset price follows a geometric Brownian motion. We extend their model to analyze another popular mechanism in…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Block generation times follow a Poisson process with mean inter‑block time Δt.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"For analytic tractability, block generation times are assumed to be from a Poisson process, an assumption we also make here. Contributions. We assume that blocks are generated according to a Poisson process5 of rate ∆t−1, where ∆t > 0 is the mean interblock time.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The underlying risky asset price follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift μ and volatility σ>0.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Following the model of Milionis et al. [2023], we assume there exists the common fundamental value or price Pt at time t that follows a geometric Brownian motion price process, dPt Pt = µ dt + σ dWt, (1) where {Wt} is a Brownian motion, and the process is parameterized by drift µ and volatility σ > 0.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The ask price decays exponentially at a constant rate λ (i.e., dA_t/A_t = -λ dt).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume At decreases exponentially according to4 dAt At = −λ dt, (2) with decay constant λ > 0.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Arbitrageurs are fully informed about the fundamental price and can only act at block generation times.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume there is a population of “arbitrageurs”, or traders informed about the fundamental price Pt, who will buy from the agent at any discount to this price. Thus, if τ is a block generation time, and6 Aτ−< Pτ−, arbs trade until there is no marginal profit, and so that the ask price updates with Aτ = Pτ and zτ = 0.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"δ ≜ λ + μ – ½σ² > 0 to ensure trade occurs with probability 1 and finite expected time‑to‑trade.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Assume that δ ≜λ + µ −1 2σ2 > 0.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Block proposers are independent short‑term profit‑maximizing agents.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume that each block proposer is independent and short-term profit-maximizing,7 and hence they would include and prioritize the top priority-fee-paying transaction in the block, allowing that buyer to win the trade.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"unclear","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"conflict","rule":"R4b","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"no","evidence_card_quoted":true},"conflict_kind":"applicability","card_detail":null,"card_quote":"This means that failed bidders typically do not need to pay transaction fees such as “gas” for their bids or leak any information about their intents.1 Similarly, the seller needs only consider the single, winning bid, resulting in a significant reduction in communication and computation complexity versus other auction formats such as first- or second-price auctions. Our focus in this paper, however, is on","meaning":"the platform classifier and the paper-text extraction disagree, so no value is asserted"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Closed‑form expressions are derived for both loss‑versus‑fair (LVF) and expected time‑to‑fill (FT) for regular Dutch auctions as functions of volatility, drift, starting price, decay rate, and mean block time.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Given certain parameters for a Dutch auction — volatility, drift, starting price, decay rate, and average block arrival times — we derive closed-form expressions for both the losses to fair value and expected time-to-fill. For regular Dutch auctions, the amount of time to fill if the starting price of the auction is higher than the current price is given by the following formula, in which z0 is the (log) difference","support":"full"},{"finding":"For a starting price 0.1% above the current price, the expected time‑to‑fill is about 23.3 seconds.","kind":"performance","quote":"For example, with the same parameters as above, and with starting price 0.1% higher than the current price, the expected time to fill is about 23.3 seconds.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Gradual Dutch auctions admit closed‑form expressions for expected loss and sales rate, showing how decay rate affects speed and loss trade‑off.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"For gradual Dutch auctions, we find a closed form expression for the rate at which the asset is sold over time. These models show how changing the decay rate of the auction affects both speed of execution and expected loss, helping inform practitioners who want to trade off between those values when choosing auction parameters such as initial price and decay rate.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Changing the decay rate shifts the efficient frontier between speed of execution and expected loss, providing guidance for parameter selection.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We use these models to explore the tradeoff between speed of execution and quality of execution, which could help inform practitioners in setting parameters for starting price and decay rate on Dutch auctions, or help platform designers determine performance parameters like block times. These models show how changing the decay rate of the auction affects both speed of execution and expected loss, helping inform","support":"full"},{"finding":"A rule‑of‑thumb (Equation 7) suggests that to keep losses below 2 bps for assets with 5% daily volatility, block times must be under 2.75 seconds.","kind":"performance","quote":"For example, the rule of thumb in Equation (7) suggests that if a platform wants to support Dutch auctions that lose less than 2 basis points for assets with daily volatility of 5%, it will need to have block times of less than 2.75 seconds.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2404.05803","title":"Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity","paper_date":"2024-04-08","authors":["Robin Fritsch","Andrea Canidio"],"empirical_rigor":8.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/measuring-arbitrage-losses-and-profitability-of-amm-liquidit/"},"question":"What block time is needed to limit arbitrage losses on AMM liquidity?","this_paper_finding":"A rule‑of‑thumb (Equation 7) suggests that to keep losses below 2 bps for assets with 5% daily volatility, block times must be under 2.75 seconds.","other_paper_finding":"Faster block times reduce arbitrage losses, with 100 ms blocks cutting losses by 20 % to 70 % relative to Ethereum’s 12 s blocks, depending on the pair.","other_paper_quote":"We find that losses to arbitrageurs are reduced by between 20% and 70% with 100ms block times compared to Ethereum’s current 12 seconds, depending on the trading pair.","note":"Both link shorter blocks to lower losses; A shows 100 ms cuts losses 20‑70 %, B says <2.75 s keeps losses <2 bps for 5 % daily volatility.","confidence":0.658}],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":16,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":1,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:57:01Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}