{"paper_id":"2407.10561","title":"Nash Equilibrium between Brokers and Traders","authors":["Álvaro Cartea","Sebastian Jaimungal","Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt"],"paper_date":"2024-07-15","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.10561v3","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/nash-equilibrium-between-brokers-and-traders/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":9,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a perfect‑information Nash equilibrium model between a broker and an informed trader, characterises the equilibrium via a coupled system of forward‑backward stochastic differential equations and provides an explicit closed‑form solution.","quote":"We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs).","summary":"We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients – an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The broker trades on a lit exchange with instantaneous and transient price impact that decays exponentially.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The uninformed trader sends random buy and sell orders and is not strategic.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Trading speeds ν, η, ξ belong to the square‑integrable space H².","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"The broker trades with speed (νt)t∈T, the informed trader trades with speed (ηt)t∈T, and the uninformed trader trades with speed (ξt)t∈T. We assume that ν, η, ξ ∈H2 where H2 = n (γt)t∈T | γ is F−progressively measurable, and ∥γ∥2 := E hR T 0 (γs)2 d[MS, MS]s i < +∞ o ,","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The decay coefficient p is non‑negative and the instantaneous impact parameter h is non‑negative.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"2 We made the simplifying assumption that the signal enters the price as R t 0 αs ds as opposed to having it as a 3 p ≥0 is a decay coefficient, and h ≥0 is the parameter controlling the instantaneous effect of the broker’s trading on the transient impact.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The broker’s inventory penalty parameter φ satisfies φ ≥ 0 and a > p h T².","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We let φ = ϕ −1 2 h , (2.10) and we assume that φ ≥0 and that a > p h T 2. These are non-restrictive technical assumptions which are sufficient conditions to guarantee strict concavity of JB up to null sets, and that we also use to prove existence of a non-symmetric matrix Riccati differential equation that arises in the closed-form solution to Nash equilibrium of the problem.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The signal process α_t is square‑integrable and progressively measurable.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"(2.1) where (MS t )t∈T is a square-integrable martingale with respect to (Ft)t∈T. The midprice process is denoted by (St)t∈T and is given by St = S0 + Z t 0 αs ds | {z } signal + Yt |{z} impact +MS t , (2.2) where the broker’s price price impact (Yt)t∈T satisfies dYt = (h νt −p Yt) dt , Y0 ∈R , (2.3) and the trading signal process (αt)t∈T is square-integrable and progressively measurable.2 Here,","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"unclear"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"yes","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":"Instantaneous transaction costs a, b, c appear in the cash dynamics and inventory penalties φ, ψ, r_I, r_B are included in the performance criteria.","quote":"The inventory process QB and cash process XB of the broker satisfy the equations dQB t = (νt −ηt −ξt) dt , QB 0 = qB ∈R , (2.4) dXB t = −(St + a νt) νt dt + (St + b ηt) ηt dt + (St + c ξt) ξt dt , XB 0 = 0 , (2.5) where the positive constants a, b, c represent instantaneous transaction costs. The performance criterion of the informed trader is JI(ν, η), given by JI(ν, η) = E \u0014 XI T + QI T ST −ψ \u0000QI T \u00012 −rI Z T 0","source":"evidence_card","rule":"R2","candidates":{"front_matter":"unclear","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Instantaneous transaction costs a, b, c appear in the cash dynamics and inventory penalties φ, ψ, r_I, r_B are included in the performance criteria.","card_quote":"The inventory process QB and cash process XB of the broker satisfy the equations dQB t = (νt −ηt −ξt) dt , QB 0 = qB ∈R , (2.4) dXB t = −(St + a νt) νt dt + (St + b ηt) ηt dt + (St + c ξt) ξt dt , XB 0 = 0 , (2.5) where the positive constants a, b, c represent instantaneous transaction costs. The performance criterion of the informed trader is JI(ν, η), given by JI(ν, η) = E \u0014 XI T + QI T ST −ψ \u0000QI T \u00012 −rI Z T 0","meaning":"costs are part of the reported headline results"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"A unique solution to the Nash‑equilibrium FBSDE exists if and only if a corresponding matrix Riccati differential equation admits a solution.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We show that there is a unique solution to the FBSDE that characterises the Nash equilibrium if and only if there is a solution to a matrix Riccati differential equation.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The equilibrium strategies are strictly concave in each player’s control, guaranteeing well‑defined best responses.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We show that for a large set of admissible controls: (i) for fixed trading speed ν of the broker, the map η →JI(ν, η) is strictly concave, and (ii) for fixed trading speed η of the informed trader, the map ν →JB(ν, η) is strictly concave.","support":"full"},{"finding":"In simulations the informed trader’s mean mark‑to‑market improves by about 37 basis points while the broker’s mean mark‑to‑market falls by about 91 basis points when moving from a two‑stage optimisation to the perfect‑information Nash equilibrium.","kind":"performance","quote":"The mean mark-to-market (MtM) of the informed trader increases by roughly 37 basis points (bps) when going from the two-stage optimisation in Cartea and S´anchez-Betancourt (2022) to the Nash equilibrium, whereas the broker decreases their mean MtM by 91 bps. A t-test shows, with 90% confidence, that the average MtM of the samples generated by both the Nash and two-stage optimisation are statistically different (for","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":16,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":11,"by_independent_authors":3,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":2,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":9},"independent_papers":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2610.03598","title":"When a Correct Reward Is Not Enough: Diagnosing and Guiding PPO in an Analytically Solved Broker-Trader Game","paper_date":"2026-10-02","authors":["Siu Tung Wong","Carlo Campajola"],"empirical_rigor":7,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/when-a-correct-reward-is-not-enough-diagnosing-and-guiding-ppo-in-an/"},"how":"uses_method_or_data","quote":null},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2509.03916","title":"Regulation or Competition: Major-Minor Optimal Liquidation across Dark and Lit Pools","paper_date":"2025-09-04","authors":["Thibaut Mastrolia","Hao Wang"],"empirical_rigor":3.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/regulation-or-competition-major-minor-optimal-liquidation-across-dark-and-lit/"},"how":"uses_method_or_data","quote":null}],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:56:26Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}