{"paper_id":"2408.07227","title":"Stablecoin Runs and Disclosure Policy in the Presence of Large Sales","authors":["Brian Zhu"],"paper_date":"2024-07-23","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.07227v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/stablecoin-runs-and-disclosure-policy-in-the-presence-of-lar/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":7.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a global‑game model of stablecoin runs that incorporates the effect of a large seller, dispersion of private signals, and a risk‑framework that decomposes run probability into large‑sale and collateral‑quality components.","quote":"Using a global game which addresses both concerns, we show that the selling pressure on stablecoin holders increases in the presence of a large sale. Our contribution is threefold.","summary":"Stablecoins have historically depegged due from par to large sales, possibly of speculative nature, or poor reserve asset quality. Using a global game which addresses both concerns, we show that the selling pressure on stablecoin holders increases in the presence of a large sale. While precise…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"η < 1 and (1−δ)σx < √2πσ3","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Assumption 2.1 We assume that η < 1 and (1 −δ)σx < √ 2πσ3. Proposition 2.1.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"η, the returns from holding stablecoins, and σx, the dispersion of investors’ private signals, are not too large","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"For the remainder of this paper, we also assume that η, the returns from holding stablecoins, and σx, the dispersion of investors’ private signals, are not too large.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"There exists a unique equilibrium in the global game with switching thresholds x*0 < x*1","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique equilibrium (x⋆ 0, x⋆ 1) in switching strategies of the global game in which x⋆ 0 < x⋆ 1.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"A large seller can occur, exerting selling pressure on investors","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"First, we study the effect of a large seller on selling pressure.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Public information can be represented by a precision parameter τ and private signals by τx","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"To facilitate analysis, we use precision parameters τ = σ−2 and τx = σ−2 x .","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The risk components can be decomposed into a large‑sale risk and a poor‑collateral risk","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"probability given a large sale occurring and not occurring. The former component can be interpreted as the risk from by a large sale, and the latter as the risk from poor collateral.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Selling pressure on stablecoin holders increases in the presence of a large redemption.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Using a global game which addresses both concerns, we show that the selling pressure on stablecoin holders increases in the presence of a large sale.","support":"full"},{"finding":"More precise public knowledge reduces the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong and increases it when fundamentals are weak.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"While precise public knowledge reduces (increases) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), interestingly, more precise private signals increase (reduce) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), potentially explaining the stability of opaque stablecoins. These conditional run probabilities decrease (increase) as public knowledge is more precise when fundamentals are","support":"full"},{"finding":"More precise private signals increase the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong and reduce it when fundamentals are weak.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"While precise public knowledge reduces (increases) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), interestingly, more precise private signals increase (reduce) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), potentially explaining the stability of opaque stablecoins. Con-trary to Proposition 3.2, Proposition 3.3 states that for each component, there exists a single threshold at which the","support":"full"},{"finding":"The region where the all‑hold equilibrium is unique shrinks and a region where the all‑sell equilibrium is unique appears when a large sale occurs.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In the common knowledge game, the large seller exerts selling pressure on the investors: the region for θ where the all-hold equilibrium is unique shrinks, and a region for θ where the all-sell equilibrium is unique is present (whereas such as region is not present in the absence of a large sale). θ ∈(−∞, δ] θ ∈(δ, 1 −δ] θ ∈(1","support":"full"},{"finding":"Each risk component exhibits a threshold in θ: below it, risk decreases with higher private‑signal precision, and above it, risk increases.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Con-trary to Proposition 3.2, Proposition 3.3 states that for each component, there exists a single threshold at which the risk component decreases in τx for values of θ below the threshold and increases in τx for values of θ above the thresh-old. This seemingly paradoxical implication that more uncertainty improves financial stability in good states can be explained by the connection between global games and risk","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":24,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:56:19Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. 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They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}