{"paper_id":"2408.11255","title":"MEV Capture and Decentralization in Execution Tickets","authors":["Jonah Burian","Davide Crapis","Fahad Saleh"],"paper_date":"2024-08-21","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.11255v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/mev-capture-and-decentralization-in-execution-tickets/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":7,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes an economic equilibrium model of Execution Tickets to analyze how the Ethereum protocol can capture Maximal Extractable Value (MEV).","quote":"We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction.","summary":"We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk neutral and face no capital costs. We also show that MEV…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"All Execution Ticket buyers are homogeneous, risk‑neutral, and face no capital costs.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk neutral and face no capital costs.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Buyers may be risk‑averse and incur a positive cost of capital, which reduces their valuation of ETs.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We also show that MEV capture decreases with risk aversion and capital costs.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"MEV extraction for each builder is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across time.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"This latter point follows from {kb}b∈B being time-invariant and MEV extraction across buyers being i.i.d. Assumption For simplicity, we assumed that MEV extraction for each builder is i.i.d. across time and thus the endogenous stationary price of ETs is time-invariant.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"In the baseline analysis, the model abstracts from MEV‑Boost and other market frictions.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"12 In our initial results, we abstract from MEV-Boost and, in this case, Rb,t represents the value extracted directly by buyer b in slot t.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The number of Execution Tickets in the lottery pool is fixed at n in steady state.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"In the steady state, there are n tickets. The winning ticket is removed from the pool (burned), and a new one is sold, maintaining the invariant of there always being n tickets in the lottery pool.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Buyers’ ex‑ante valuations drive purchase decisions; ex‑post performance does not affect primary market outcomes.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"That is, even if a second buyer would be better at extracting MEV in a particular slot ex post, the sample path of events from the slot is not known when the ET is issued (or even when the ET is assigned to a slot). As a consequence, purchase decisions in the primary market are necessarily driven by ex ante valuations and thus so long as one buyer has a higher expected MEV value for a block, that buyer would","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"When buyers are homogeneous, risk‑neutral, and face no capital costs, the protocol extracts all MEV and ET holdings are decentralized.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk neutral and face no capital costs.","support":"full"},{"finding":"MEV capture decreases as buyers become risk‑averse or incur positive capital costs; the protocol no longer captures all MEV.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We also show that MEV capture decreases with risk aversion and capital costs. ial: χ < 1 Nonetheless, in this case, there exists an equilibrium with full decentralization of ET holdings: ∀b ∈B : kb = N B Proposition 3 arises because risk-aversion and non-zero capital costs imply that buyers do not value ETs as equivalent to the MEV value of a single block.","support":"full"},{"finding":"With heterogeneous buyers, overall MEV capture can be low and a single dominant buyer can acquire most ETs, extracting a large share of MEV.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Moreover, when buyers are heterogeneous, MEV capture can be especially low and a single dominant buyer can extract much of the MEV. In turn, the best buyer purchases all ETs.","support":"full"},{"finding":"A Proposer‑Builder Separation (PBS) mechanism partially mitigates low capture, but centralization vectors persist, with ETs concentrating among buyers with the highest ex‑ante MEV ability and lowest capital costs.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"This adverse effect can be partially mitigated by the presence of a Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) mechanism, which gives ET buyers access to a market of specialized builders, but in practice centralization vectors still persist. With PBS, ETs are concentrated among those with the highest ex-ante MEV extraction ability and lowest cost of capital.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Large investors with systematically lower capital costs can dominate the ET market even if they are not builders.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We show how it is possible that large investors that are not builders but have substantial advantage in capital cost can come to dominate the ET market. In Proposition 7, we further formalize that large investors with systematically better capital costs might come to dominate the ET buying market.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":20,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":2,"by_independent_authors":2,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":1,"mentions":1,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2508.04003","title":"The Marginal Effects of Ethereum Network MEV Transaction Re-Ordering","paper_date":"2025-08-06","authors":["Bruce Mizrach","Nathaniel Yoshida"],"empirical_rigor":7,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/the-marginal-effects-of-ethereum-network-mev-transaction-re/"},"how":"discusses_findings","quote":"... they note that when buyers are heterogeneous, execution tickets should become concentrated among buyers with low capital costs and high MEV extraction capability."}],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:55:54Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}