{"paper_id":"2409.03586","title":"Optimal position-building strategies in competition","authors":["Neil A. Chriss"],"paper_date":"2024-09-05","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2409.03586v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/optimal-position-building-strategies-in-competition/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a game‑theoretic framework for building a stock position over a fixed horizon in competition, defining equilibrium trading‑strategy solutions and providing closed‑form expressions.","quote":"This paper develops a mathematical framework for building a position in a stock over a fixed period of time while in competition with one or more other traders doing the same thing. We develop a game-theoretic framework that takes place in the space of trading strategies where action sets are trading strategies and traders try to devise best-response strategies to their adversaries.","summary":"This paper develops a mathematical framework for building a position in a stock over a fixed period of time while in competition with one or more other traders doing the same thing. We develop a game-theoretic framework that takes place in the space of trading strategies where action sets are…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Trading costs are driven by a linear temporary market impact model.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"In this paper we will use linear models for both temporary and permanent market impact following [AC01] and define them next. Definition 4.2 (Temporary market impact).","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Trading costs also include a linear permanent market impact component.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"In some sense the polar opposite of temporary market impact is permanent market impact, defined as follows: Definition 4.3 (Permanent market impact). Is the change in the price of a stock due to persistent trading over time.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Traders are aware of other traders pursuing the same position‑building objective.","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"In such a case the trader is often aware that there are other traders looking to purchase the stock over the same period of time for the same reason.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The objective of each trader is to minimize total cost of trading relative to a counterfactual unperturbed price path.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"To begin, we note that in the context of optimal trading strategies, whether with or without competition, the objective relates to minimizing the cost of trading relative to the price that would have been in the absence of trading. In this context one has to imagine a counterfactual price path unperturbed by concerted trading (see Definition 4.1).","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The set of actions for each player consists of entire trading strategies rather than discrete trades.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"To address this challenge we develop a version of game theory where each trader’s available set of actions are trading strategies themselves.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The analysis assumes a fixed time interval [0,1] for building the position.","type":"execution","stated":"implied","quote":"In this setup there are two traders A and B in competition to buy the same stock starting at time t = 0 and completing at time t = 1. Both traders trade position-building strategies with trader A trading a unit strategy and trader B a λ-scaled strategy with λ > 1.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"yes","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":"Costs are modeled as a mixture of temporary and permanent market impact, both assumed linear.","quote":"In this setup trading is guided by a desire to minimize the total cost of trading arising from a mixture of temporary and permanent market impact caused by the aggregate level of trading including the trader and the competition. These forms of price change are respectively referred to as temporary (also referred to as transient) and permanent market impact.","source":"evidence_card","rule":"R2","candidates":{"front_matter":"unclear","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Costs are modeled as a mixture of temporary and permanent market impact, both assumed linear.","card_quote":"In this setup trading is guided by a desire to minimize the total cost of trading arising from a mixture of temporary and permanent market impact caused by the aggregate level of trading including the trader and the competition. These forms of price change are respectively referred to as temporary (also referred to as transient) and permanent market impact.","meaning":"costs are part of the reported headline results"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Equilibrium strategies exist and can be expressed in closed form for the two‑trader case.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We describe a notion of equilibrium strategies, show that they exist and provide closed-form solutions.","support":"full"},{"finding":"When permanent impact is absent, the equilibrium reduces to trivial linear strategies a(t)=t, b(t)=t.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Applying the boundary conditions for position-building strategies a(0), b(0) = 0 and a(1), b(1) = 1 the solutions are a(t) = t and b(t) = t. In other words, in the absence of permanent impact, the equilibrium competitive position building reduces to the most trivial of cases.","support":"full"},{"finding":"For n+1 symmetric traders the equilibrium strategy is a(t)=1−e^{−n·κ}·t/(1−e^{n·κ}), showing dependence on the number of traders and impact parameter κ.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"If the traders are buying, the price moves up, if they are selling, it moves down. Then for n + 1 traders we obtain: a(t) = 1 −e−n·κ n+2 ·t 1 −e n·κ n+2 (31) We call a(t) in Eq. (31) the multi-trader symmetric equilibrium strategy for n traders.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Mis‑estimating the permanent impact parameter κ can significantly alter total trading costs.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Mis-estimating κ can significantly affect the total cost of trading, as illustrated in Figure 22. We provide a numerical exposition of how variations in κ influence costs across a range of values.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Risk‑averse equilibrium with a risk‑aversion term modifies the loss function but still admits numerical solutions illustrating parameter importance.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Specifically we propose equilibrium equations analogous to those in Section 8.3 but add a risk-aversion term to the loss functions that penalizes the total volatility a trader’s position holds during the course of building the position. We proceed to study various numerical examples to gain intuition regarding the relative important of the parameters involved.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":20,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":3,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":3},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:55:36Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}