{"paper_id":"2409.16589","title":"The Impact of Designated Market Makers on Market Liquidity and Competition: A Simulation Approach","authors":["Cong Zhou"],"paper_date":"2024-09-25","paper_type":"empirical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2409.16589v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/the-impact-of-designated-market-makers-on-market-liquidity-a/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":8,"math_complexity":6,"quadrant":"Holy Grail"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes developing an agent‑based simulation platform for a limit order book market with configurable market‑maker strategies and adjustable market structures.","quote":"Therefore, I propose developing an agent-based simulation platform for a limit order book market, featuring configurable strategies for market maker agents and adjustable market structures.","summary":"This paper conducts an empirical investigation into the effects of Designated Market Makers (DMMs) on key market quality indicators, such as liquidity, bid-ask spreads, and order fulfillment ratios. Through agent-based simulations, this study explores the impact of varying competition levels and…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The simulated market is a limit order book with designated market makers that can be assigned rebate rates.","type":"model","stated":"implied","quote":"ere are three main outputs from the simulation: ⚫ The cash and inventory report of all participants ⚫ The realized trades across all periods ⚫ All trades status at the end of each timestamp 13 Zhou Simulation Result We will generate various market scenarios to assess market liquidity. The simulation will vary the number of designated market makers from 1 to 5, along with a rebate rate ranging from 16 bps to 26 bps,","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Rebate rates for DMMs are exogenously set between 16 bps and 26 bps.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The simulation will vary the number of designated market makers from 1 to 5, along with a rebate rate ranging from 16 bps to 26 bps, allowing us to explore the relationship between the number of market makers, rebate rate, and market liquidity.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Each simulation scenario is run for 1,000 timestamps and repeated 30 times to obtain average results.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"For each scenario, we will conduct 30 trials, with each trial running through 1,000 timestamps.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The number of DMMs varies from 1 to 5 (or up to 15 in extended tests) to assess competition effects.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The simulation will vary the number of designated market makers from 1 to 5, along with a rebate rate ranging from 16 bps to 26 bps, allowing us to explore the relationship between the number of market makers, rebate rate, and market liquidity. Additionally, we will iterate scenarios with 1 to 15 designated market makers at a fixed rebate rate of 20 bps to analyze price efficiency variations with different numbers","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Statistical significance is evaluated using ANOVA tests with a 5 % significance level.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"Statistical analysis using an ANOVA test (figure 5) confirms this observation, with an F-statistic of 2.68 and a P-value of 0.03388, which is significant at the alpha level of 0.05. The significance of these differences is also supported by the ANOVA test (figure 6), indicating changes in market depth as the number of DMMs varies.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"available","items":[{"name":"Synthetic simulation data","provider":null,"kind":"synthetic","access":"public","period":null,"universe":null,"quote":"ere are three main outputs from the simulation: ⚫ The cash and inventory report of all participants ⚫ The realized trades across all periods ⚫ All trades status at the end of each timestamp 13 Zhou Simulation Result We will generate various market scenarios to assess market liquidity. All data is generated through simulation.","support":"full"}],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"synthetic"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R4a","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Rebate rates for DMMs are set between 16 bps and 26 bps in the simulations.","card_quote":"The simulation will vary the number of designated market makers from 1 to 5, along with a rebate rate ranging from 16 bps to 26 bps, allowing us to explore the relationship between the number of market makers, rebate rate, and market liquidity. Panel A features a box plot of the EP_ratio, showing an increasing trend as rebate rate increases.","meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Increasing the number of DMMs from 1 to 5 reduces quoted spreads, indicating improved market liquidity.","kind":"statistical","quote":"Panel A presents a box plot that visualizes the quoted spreads across the five scenarios, showing a decreasing trend as the number of DMMs increases. As the number of DMMs increases, the quote spread decreases, indicating better market liquidity due to heightened competition among DMMs.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Adding more DMMs raises depth at the best quote, enhancing the market’s capacity to absorb larger orders.","kind":"statistical","quote":"Panel B charts the depth at the Best Quote (DB), indicating an increase in depth as more DMMs are added. Additionally, market depth increases with more DMMs, enhancing the market's capacity to absorb larger orders without substantial price shifts.","support":"full"},{"finding":"There is an optimal level of competition among DMMs that maximizes liquidity benefits while minimizing negative impacts on price discovery.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The result also suggests that an optimal level of competition among DMMs can maximize liquidity benefits while minimizing negative impacts on price discovery.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The liquidity benefits of additional DMMs diminish beyond a certain threshold, suggesting excessive incentives do not further improve market quality.","kind":"negative","quote":"Additionally, the research indicates that the benefits of increased number of DMMs diminish beyond a certain threshold, implying that excessive incentives may not further improve market quality metrics.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Higher rebate rates increase the Execution‑to‑Pending ratio but are associated with wider quoted spreads, a counter‑intuitive effect.","kind":"statistical","quote":"Notably, as the rebate rate increases, the Execution to Pending Ratio (EP_ratio) also increases, suggesting that higher rebates may motivate DMMs to enhance their execution rates, potentially by tightening their quote spreads or being more aggressive in order fulfillment. Despite higher rebates intended to reduce quoted spreads, the significant results with a p-value below the 0.05 threshold indicate a contrary","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":26,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:55:06Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}