{"paper_id":"2410.13583","title":"Competitive equilibria in trading","authors":["Neil A. Chriss"],"paper_date":"2024-10-17","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2410.13583v3","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/competitive-equilibria-in-trading/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper provides a complete solution for equilibrium trading strategies in competition and analyzes the value of trade centralization, showing that naive centralization can be detrimental while strategic centralization can yield benefits.","quote":"The current paper returns to the unconstrained case and provides a complete solution to finding equilibrium strategies in competition and handles completely arbitrary situations. As a result we present a detailed analysis of the value (or not) of trade centralization and we show that firms who naively centralize trades do not generally benefit and sometimes, in fact, lose.","summary":"This is the third paper in a series concerning the game-theoretic aspects of position-building while in competition. The first paper set forth foundations and laid out the essential goal, which is to minimize implementation costs in light of how other traders are likely to trade. The majority of…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"There is a small number of informed traders competing to buy a stock.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"2.4 Market impact and implementation cost Here and throughout, we assume as usual that there is a small number of informed traders competing to buy a stock.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Each trader acts independently with no communication or coordination with others.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We can model this situation without regard to the firm itself, that is, we can treat each trader as independent and detached from the others.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Temporary and permanent market impact are modeled as linear functions of the net trading rate and cumulative quantity.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Trading strategies, derivatives and the market strategy We use the same temporary and permanent impact models as in [AC97], [AC01] and [Chr24a]. In brief, temporary market impact is the immediate and incremental cost of trading due to transient, liquidity driven effects.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Implementation cost equals the sum of temporary and permanent impact components.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Since our concern is always to minimize the total cost of trading, we focus on the sum of the temporary and permanent components of market impact.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Cost-minimizing strategies are obtained via the Euler‑Lagrange equation from the calculus of variations.","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"Specifically the tool we use to find cost-minimizing strategies is the Euler-Lagrange equation.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"All traders start simultaneously at time t = 0 and target quantities sum to the total quantity.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"2.2 Trading strategies We study an idealized situation and assume there are n traders seeking to buy the same stock starting simultaneously at a time designated as time t = 0. The traders are referenced by the indexes i = 1, . . . , n.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R4a","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Cost is modeled as the integral of (˙m + κ m) ˙m, combining temporary impact (proportional to net rate) and permanent impact (proportional to cumulative quantity).","card_quote":"ry impact cost (trader i, time t) ∼˙m(t) λi ˙ai(t) (2.3) We model the cost of trading to trader i due to persistent demand for the stock in a similar way: Permanent impact cost (trader i, time t) ∼m(t) λi ˙ai(t) (2.4) In Eq. (2.4) we are expressing that the cost of trading due to permanent impact is proportional to the product of the rate of trading and the cumulative quantity acquired by all traders. Since our","meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Firms that naively centralize trades do not generally benefit and can lose.","kind":"negative","quote":"As a result we present a detailed analysis of the value (or not) of trade centralization and we show that firms who naively centralize trades do not generally benefit and sometimes, in fact, lose.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Firms that strategically centralize trades can obtain cost savings.","kind":"performance","quote":"On the other hand, firms that strategically centralize their trades generally will be able to benefit.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The market‑wide central trading desk that minimizes aggregate costs follows the risk‑neutral strategy m(t)=t, yielding an implementation cost of 1 + κ/2.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"If a \"market-wide\" central trading desk minimizes aggregate costs, it will trade the risk-neutral strategy m(t) = t and the implementation cost (the aggregate cost) will be the integral of ( ˙m + κm) ˙m and since ˙m = 1 we have Cost (market-wide strategy) = Z 1 0 1 + κt dt = 1 + κ 2 (3.4) As this represents the implementation cost to a kind-of benevolent market-wide central trading desk,","support":"full"},{"finding":"Equilibrium trading strategies are given by ai(t)=Bi(e^{κt}−1)+Di(1−e^{−αt}) with explicit constants, and these strategies simultaneously minimize total implementation cost.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"elow represent an equilibrium with respect to the cost functions C1, . . . , Cn defined in Eq. (2.5): ai(t) = Bi(eκt −1) + Di(1 −e−αt) (5.1) with the constants Bi, Di and α as follows: Bi = λin −1 λin(eκ −1), Di = 1 λin(1 −e−α), α = κn −1 n + 1 (5.2) and further the resultant market strategy m(t) = Pn i=1 λiai(t) derived by summing the ai in Eq. (5.1) again yields the eager strategy given in Proposition 4.1.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Increasing alpha‑decay leads lower‑quantity traders to adopt a “bucket” strategy, acquiring more than their target early and then selling later to exploit permanent impact.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We see that as the level of alpha-decay increases from 1 on the left to 20 on the right, strategy 1 with 20% of the total quantity evolves toward a \"bucket\" strategy, acquiring more than 100% of its target quantity in 20% of the 13 A PREPRINT - OCTOBER 29, 2024 time and then selling (at a profit) toward the end to take advantage of the permanent impact due to the other two traders.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":14,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:54:33Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}