{"paper_id":"2411.05032","title":"Market efficiency, informational asymmetry and pseudo-collusion of adaptively learning agents","authors":["Aleksei Pastushkov"],"paper_date":"2024-11-06","paper_type":"empirical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.05032v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/market-efficiency-informational-asymmetry-and-pseudo-collus/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":7.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes an agent‑based model in which asymmetrically informed, boundedly rational traders adaptively learn optimal strategies using multi‑armed bandit (UCB) algorithms, choosing both whether to acquire a costly information signal and how aggressively to invest in the risky asset.","quote":"We examine the dynamics of informational efficiency in a market with asymmetrically informed, boundedly rational traders who adaptively learn optimal strategies using simple multiarmed bandit (MAB) algorithms. The strategies available to the traders have two dimensions: on the one hand, the traders must endogenously choose whether to acquire a costly information signal, on the other, they must determine how","summary":"We examine the dynamics of informational efficiency in a market with asymmetrically informed, boundedly rational traders who adaptively learn optimal strategies using simple multiarmed bandit (MAB) algorithms. The strategies available to the traders have two dimensions: on the one hand, the traders…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"All traders are risk‑neutral.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"As by assumption all traders are risk-neutral in our model, a trader is willing to invest in the risky 5 Which can be thought of as either a stock or a derivative contract.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Acquiring the information signal incurs a fixed cost C and perfectly reveals the next period payoff.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The first dimension is whether to become informed by acquiring a costly information signal at cost C. If the trader i becomes informed, their expectation of the next period’s payoff of the risky asset is equal to its actual value, i.e. the information signal perfectly reveals the value of the next period’s payoff: 𝐸𝑖𝑡(𝐹𝑡+1) = 𝐹𝑡+1 (2) If the trader chooses to become uninformed,","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Uninformed traders base expectations on the costlessly observable historical average return.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The first dimension is whether to become informed by acquiring a costly information signal at cost C. If the trader i becomes informed, their expectation of the next period’s payoff of the risky asset is equal to its actual value, i.e. the information signal perfectly reveals the value of the next period’s payoff: 𝐸𝑖𝑡(𝐹𝑡+1) = 𝐹𝑡+1 (2) If the trader chooses to become uninformed, their expectation of 𝐹𝑡+1 is based on","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The supply of the risky asset is fixed at N shares each period and is provided by a liquidity‑seeking representative trader.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"The individual schedules are aggregated by the market venue to an aggregate demand schedule. The supply of N shares can be 8 thought of as provided by a liquidity-seeking trader who is insensitive to the “fundamental” payoff value 𝐹𝑡.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Traders use a stateless Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) multi‑armed bandit learning algorithm with only one tunable parameter.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"In contrast, the MAB learning algorithm we employ, and particularly its Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) implementation, has only 1 parameter.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The simulation includes a moderately large number of agents (M = 100).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"An additional innovation pursued in this study is that our model includes a moderately large number of agents (100), whereas prior literature on algorithmic collusion in financial markets typically models interactions of less than 10, and in many cases only 2-4 agents.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"synthetic"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R4a","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"A costly information signal with cost C is modeled; no explicit market transaction fees are specified.","card_quote":"The first dimension is whether to become informed by acquiring a costly information signal at cost C. If the trader i becomes informed, their expectation of the next period’s payoff of the risky asset is equal to its actual value, i.e. the information signal perfectly reveals the value of the next period’s payoff: 𝐸𝑖𝑡(𝐹𝑡+1) = 𝐹𝑡+1 (2) If the trader chooses to become uninformed,","meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"For low information costs the model reproduces Kyle (1989) results: strategic trading leads to worse price efficiency than the purely competitive case.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We find that for certain market environments (with low information costs) our model reproduces the results of Kyle [1989] in that the ability of traders to trade strategically leads to worse price efficiency compared to the purely competitive case.","support":"full"},{"finding":"For high information costs the strategically acting market can be more efficient than a purely competitive one.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"For other environments (with high information costs), on the other hand, our results show that a market with strategically acting traders can be more efficient than a purely competitive one.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Independently learning traders can coordinate on pseudo‑collusive behavior, resulting in non‑competitive pricing.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Furthermore, we obtain novel results on the ability of independently learning traders to coordinate on a pseudo-collusive behavior, leading to non-competitive pricing. Contrary to some recent contributions (see e.g. [Cartea et al. 2022]), we find that the pseudo-collusive behavior in our model is robust to a large number of agents, demonstrating that even in the setting of financial markets with a large number of","support":"full"},{"finding":"Pricing is more competitive in the high informational‑cost regime, with the price line closer to the efficiency upper bound.","kind":"performance","quote":"Notably, the pricing is more competitive in the high informational cost regime (Figures 12-14), as the blue line on average is closer to the upper bound.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Non‑competitive pricing persists even with a relatively large number of UCB‑driven agents (M = 100), contrary to prior findings for smaller agent sets.","kind":"negative","quote":"In our model, non-competitive pricing persists despite there being a relatively large number of competing, UCB-driven agents 18 (M=100).","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":22,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:54:18Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}