{"paper_id":"2411.13993","title":"Market Making without Regret","authors":["Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi","Tommaso Cesari","Roberto Colomboni","Luigi Foscari","Vinayak Pathak"],"paper_date":"2024-11-21","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.13993v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/market-making-without-regret/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes an online learning algorithm for market making that posts bid and ask prices each round and achieves regret bounds by reducing the problem to repeated first‑price auctions and dynamic pricing.","quote":"Our contributions We study the question of market making in an online learning setup. We thus obtain an algorithm for market-making and we show in Theorem 1 that its regret can be upper bounded by the sum of the regrets of the two sub-algorithms for the two corresponding sub-problems.","summary":"We consider a sequential decision-making setting where, at every round t, a market maker posts a bid price B_t and an ask price A_t to an incoming trader (the taker) with a private valuation for one unit of some asset. If the trader’s valuation is lower than the bid price, or higher than the ask…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"An unknown stochastic process governs the market prices and private valuations of traders.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"Here, trading happens in discrete time steps and an unknown stochastic process governs the prices of the asset being traded as well as the private valuations assigned to the asset by market participants (see details in Section 2).","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The market maker offloads its position shortly after each transaction.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"For these reasons, we focus on a setting where the market maker offloads their positions shortly after each transaction. 1.1.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"In the i.i.d. case, market prices and takers’ valuations are independent of each other.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"T 2/3 Lower Bound (iid+lip+iv) In this section, we present the main result of this work, a lower bound showing that no algorithm can achieve a worst-case regret better than Ω(T 2/3) even when the sequence of market prices and takers’ valuations is i.i.d. with a smooth distribution, and market prices and takers’ valuations are independent of each other.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Distributions of market prices and valuations are L‑Lipschitz.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"Our main technical contribution is a lower bound for the i.i.d. case with Lipschitz distributions and independence between prices and valuations.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The bid posted in the first‑price auction must not exceed the price posted in the dynamic pricing sub‑problem.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"However, in our problem we have the further constraint that the bid we propose in the first-price auction is no greater than the price we propose in the dynamic pricing problem.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The utility of the market maker is the sum of utilities from the first‑price auction and the dynamic pricing components.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The idea of our meta-algorithm M3 (Algo-rithm 2) begins with the observation that the utility of the market maker is a sum of two terms that correspond to the utilities of the learner in first-price auctions and dynamic pricing, respectively.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R1","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"no","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"The regret of the proposed market‑making algorithm is upper‑bounded by the sum of the regrets of the two sub‑algorithms for first‑price auctions and dynamic pricing.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We thus obtain an algorithm for market-making and we show in Theorem 1 that its regret can be upper bounded by the sum of the regrets of the two sub-algorithms for the two corresponding sub-problems.","support":"full"},{"finding":"A lower bound of Ω(T^{2/3}) on regret holds for any algorithm in the i.i.d. smooth setting with independent prices and valuations.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"T 2/3 Lower Bound (iid+lip+iv) In this section, we present the main result of this work, a lower bound showing that no algorithm can achieve a worst-case regret better than Ω(T 2/3) even when the sequence of market prices and takers’ valuations is i.i.d. with a smooth distribution, and market prices and takers’ valuations are independent of each other.","support":"full"},{"finding":"All regret rates proved are optimal up to constant factors for the various problem variants.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"All the rates are optimal up to constant factors. 1.2.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The paper establishes a connection between market making, first‑price auctions, and dynamic pricing.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Our upper bound analysis unveils an intriguing connection relating market making to first-price auctions and dynamic pricing.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The work initiates the study of market making under online learning and provides tight regret bounds, highlighting the role of liquidity providers.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"6. Conclusions and Future Directions We initiated an investigation of market making under an online learning framework and provided tight bounds on the regret under various natural assumptions.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":12,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":5,"by_independent_authors":3,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":1,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":2,"unclassified":2},"independent_papers":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2410.14839","title":"Multi-Task Dynamic Pricing in Credit Market with Contextual Information","paper_date":"2024-10-18","authors":["Adel Javanmard","Jingwei Ji","Renyuan Xu"],"empirical_rigor":7,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/multi-task-dynamic-pricing-in-credit-market-with-contextual-information/"},"how":"extends","quote":null}],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:53:54Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}