{"paper_id":"2501.09638","title":"Optimal Execution among $N$ Traders with Transient Price Impact","authors":["Steven Campbell","Marcel Nutz"],"paper_date":"2025-01-16","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.09638v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/optimal-execution-among-n-traders-with-transient-price-imp/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":1,"math_complexity":9,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper studies N‑player optimal execution games in an Obizhaeva–Wang model of transient price impact, derives a unique closed‑form equilibrium when the game is regularized by an instantaneous trading‑rate cost, and shows that equilibrium exists without regularization only if a specific time‑depen","quote":"We study $N$-player optimal execution games in an Obizhaeva--Wang model of transient price impact. When the game is regularized by an instantaneous cost on the trading rate, a unique equilibrium exists and we derive its closed form.","summary":"We study N-player optimal execution games in an Obizhaeva–Wang model of transient price impact. When the game is regularized by an instantaneous cost on the trading rate, a unique equilibrium exists and we derive its closed form. Whereas without regularization, there is no equilibrium. We prove…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Price impact follows the Obizhaeva–Wang transient impact model with exponential decay of price dislocation.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The most tractable model capturing this transient price impact is the Obizhaeva–Wang model [28]; see also [13]. Here each buy pushes the price up proportionally to the size of the trade and the dislocation reverts back exponentially over time.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Trading strategies are of bounded variation and may include absolutely continuous (fast) trading and/or singular block trades.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"Cost A. In our first problem formulation, indexed by the symbol A, we penalize fast (absolutely continuous) trading with an “instantaneous cost” and levy a terminal inventory penalty. The induced cost is CA(Xi) := ε 2 Z T 0 ( ˙Xi t)2dt + χ{dXi≪dt}c + φ 2 (Xi T)2, (2.3) where ε, φ > 0 and ˙Xi t is the derivative2 of t 7→Xi t.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"An instantaneous quadratic cost ε/2∫(Ẋ_t)^2 dt is imposed on the trading rate in the regularized game.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The instantaneous impact amounts to a quadratic cost ε R T 0 v2 t dt on the trading rate vt, where ε > 0. The induced cost is CA(Xi) := ε 2 Z T 0 ( ˙Xi t)2dt + χ{dXi≪dt}c + φ 2 (Xi T)2, (2.3) where ε, φ > 0 and ˙Xi t is the derivative2 of t 7→Xi t.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"A deterministic, possibly time‑dependent cost ϑ_t/2 is charged on block trades in the unregularized variant.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We charge a (deterministic but possibly time-dependent) cost ϑt/2 > 0 on block trades and enforce inventory liquidation, CB(Xi) := 1 2 X t∈[0,T] ϑt(∆Xi t)2 + χ{Xi T̸ =0}.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Terminal inventory is forced to zero (full liquidation) in the cost‑B formulation.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"We charge a (deterministic but possibly time-dependent) cost ϑt/2 > 0 on block trades and enforce inventory liquidation, CB(Xi) := 1 2 X t∈[0,T] ϑt(∆Xi t)2 + χ{Xi T̸ =0}. 3.2 Liquidation Constraint To find the unique equilibrium associated with the cost JA′ enforcing full liquidation at T, we argue that it coincides with the limit of the equilibrium in Theorem 3.2 as the penalty on terminal inventory tends to","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The total variation of each inventory process is a.s. bounded.","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"Using our assumption that the total variation of Xi is P-a.s. bounded, we conclude that Xi is bounded and E \u0014Z T 0 Xi t−dPt \u0015 = E \u0002 [Xi, P]T \u0003 = 0.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R4a","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Instantaneous quadratic cost ε/2∫(Ẋ_t)^2 dt and deterministic block‑trade cost ϑ_t/2 (ΔX_t)^2 are incorporated into the objective functions.","card_quote":"The induced cost is CA(Xi) := ε 2 Z T 0 ( ˙Xi t)2dt + χ{dXi≪dt}c + φ 2 (Xi T)2, (2.3) where ε, φ > 0 and ˙Xi t is the derivative2 of t 7→Xi t. We charge a (deterministic but possibly time-dependent) cost ϑt/2 > 0 on block trades and enforce inventory liquidation, CB(Xi) := 1 2 X t∈[0,T] ϑt(∆Xi t)2 + χ{Xi T̸ =0}.","meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"When the game is regularized by an instantaneous cost, a unique Nash equilibrium exists and can be expressed in closed form.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"When the game is regularized by an instantaneous cost on the trading rate, a unique equilibrium exists and we derive its closed form.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Without regularization, no Nash equilibrium exists.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Whereas without regularization, there is no equilibrium.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Adding a particular time‑dependent block‑trade cost restores existence of equilibrium in the unregularized model.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We prove that existence is restored if (and only if) a very particular, time-dependent cost on block trades is added to the model.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The equilibrium of the regularized game converges to the tractable equilibrium of the unregularized model as ε→0.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We show that this equilibrium is the limit of the regularized equilibria as the instantaneous cost parameter $\\varepsilon$ tends to zero.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The cost of anarchy increases with the number of traders N but converges to a finite limit βT^2/(βT+1)^2, and is maximized at an intermediate resilience parameter β.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The cost of anarchy increases as N increases, but has a finite limit, lim N↑∞CoAN = βT 2(βT + 1)2. Interestingly, as illustrated in Figure 3, the cost of anarchy is maximized at an intermediate value of β.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":19,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":2,"by_independent_authors":1,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":1,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:53:00Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}