{"paper_id":"2501.16488","title":"Solvability of the Gaussian Kyle model with imperfect information and risk aversion","authors":["Reda Chhaibi","Ibrahim Ekren","Eunjung Noh"],"paper_date":"2025-01-27","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.16488v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/solvability-of-the-gaussian-kyle-model-with-imperfect-inform/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":1.5,"math_complexity":9.2,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes that an equilibrium exists in a Gaussian Kyle model with a risk‑averse informed trader who has imperfect information, constructing it via an optimal‑transport problem under a martingale measure and a filtering problem under the historical measure.","quote":"We investigate a Kyle model under Gaussian assumptions where a risk-averse informed trader has imperfect information on the fundamental price of an asset. In this paper, we show that an equilibrium exists in the Kyle model with a risk-averse informed trader that has partial information on the terminal price.","summary":"We investigate a Kyle model under Gaussian assumptions where a risk-averse informed trader has imperfect information on the fundamental price of an asset. We show that an equilibrium can be constructed by considering an optimal transport problem that is solved under a measure that renders the…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The informed trader is risk‑averse.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We investigate a Kyle model under Gaussian assumptions where a risk-averse informed trader has imperfect information on the fundamental price of an asset. The informed trader being a single agent, it is crucial to allow the risk aversion.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The informed trader has imperfect (partial) information on the terminal price.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We investigate a Kyle model under Gaussian assumptions where a risk-averse informed trader has imperfect information on the fundamental price of an asset. They all assume that the informed trader has perfect information on the ﬁnal price.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The terminal price is Gaussian.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We make the as-sumption that the terminal price is Gaussian and show that there is an equilibrium in which the informed trader controls both an endogenously determined process introduced in [Cho03, BE23, BE24] and the conditional distribution of the price given the information of the market maker.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The market consists of a single‑period Kyle setting with an informed trader, noise traders and a market maker.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"In this model, there are three types of trading groups, namely an informed trader, noise traders, and a market maker. A risky asset is traded over a single period, where the informed trader has private information from the beginning on the normally-distributed terminal price.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The equilibrium satisfies the inconspicuous‑trading property (the informed trader’s strategy is undetected).","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"Indeed, in order to construct the equilibrium, we ﬁrst postulate that it satisﬁes the inconspicuous trading property (3.10).","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Utility of the informed trader can be made a martingale under a change of measure.","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"We show that an equilibrium can be constructed by considering an optimal transport problem that is solved under a measure that renders the utility of the informed trader martingale and a filtering problem under the historical measure. However, unlike [CENV22] where the relevant state process to construct the equilibrium is the total demand, in this paper we construct this state process via the methodology of [Cho03,","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Theorem 3.4 establishes the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium solving a system of forward stochastic differential equations.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Theorem 3.4 (Existence of Equilibrium). There exists a unique solution (χ∗, ZQ) to the system of forward stochastic diﬀerential equations χ∗ t = Z t 0 [γσ2(psχ∗ s + qs) + σ2 (rs −e1)⊤Σ−1 s ((ZQ s −β, Ξ)⊤−µP s)]ds + Zt , (3.7) ZQ t = Z t 0 γσ2(psχ∗ s + qs)ds + Zt , where µP is given by µP t = at + rtχ∗ t + γσ2 Z t 0 (psχ∗ s + qs)Φ (e1 −rs) ds .","support":"full"},{"finding":"When the informed trader becomes more informed (variance of the price difference tends to zero), the equilibrium converges to prior models and both Kyle’s Lambda and price volatility increase.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We show that when the informed trader is more informed about the terminal price (meaning the variance of diﬀerence between the terminal price and the observed price decreases to 0), the equilibrium converges to its counterpart in [Cho03, BE23] and both Kyle’s Lambda and price volatility increase to their values in [Cho03, BE23].","support":"full"},{"finding":"Higher uncertainty of the informed trader reduces market volatility and makes the market maker less reactive to demand changes.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Thus, a higher uncertainty of the informed trader in the terminal price makes the market less volatile and the market maker less reactive to changes in demand.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The expected profit of the market maker under the equilibrium is negative, implying the market maker must be compensated.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Given this deﬁnition of the terminal price, we compute the expected proﬁt of the market maker, which turns out to be negative. Thus, the market maker has to be compensated for fulﬁlling this role.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The monotonicity in risk‑aversion parameter γ shows that less risk‑averse informed traders lead the market maker to adjust prices more aggressively.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"(3.14) Remark 3.7. i) The monotonicity in γ means that when the informed trader is less risk-averse, the market maker adjusts the prices more aggressively with the arrival of new orders. This aligns with [Cho03, BE23], which noted that this eﬀect arises because a more risk-averse informed trader, due to her accumulated position, is less likely to fully exploit her private information.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":26,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:52:41Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. 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They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}