{"paper_id":"2503.02722","title":"N-player and mean field games among fund managers considering excess logarithmic returns","authors":["Guohui Guan","Jiaqi Hu","Zongxia Liang"],"paper_date":"2025-03-04","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.02722v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/n-player-and-mean-field-games-among-fund-managers-considerin/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":9,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper constructs both an n‑player game and a mean‑field game for fund managers competing on excess logarithmic returns and provides explicit equilibrium solutions for exponential utility and mean‑variance criteria.","quote":"We construct both an $n$-player game and a mean field game (MFG) to address the competition problem under these two criteria. We explicitly define and rigorously solve the equilibrium and mean field equilibrium (MFE) for each criteria.","summary":"This paper studies the competition among multiple fund managers with relative performance over the excess logarithmic return. Fund managers compete with each other and have expected utility or mean-variance criteria for excess logarithmic return. Each fund manager possesses a unique risky asset…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"There is only one public risky asset available for investment.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"For simplicity, we assume there is only one public risk asset, S∗.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The risk‑free asset has a constant positive return rate κ > 0.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"The risk-free asset S0 has a return rate κ > 0.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Public and private risky assets have higher expected returns than the risk‑free asset (µ > 0, µk > 0).","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"Risky assets S∗and Sk are assumed to have higher expected returns than S0 (i.e., µ > 0 and µk > 0), making them attractive to risk-averse investors despite their volatility.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"All market parameters (κ, µ, µk, σ, νk, σk) are constant over time.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"Thus, the k-th fund manager can invest in S0, S∗, and Sk satisfying dS0 t S0 t = κdt, dS∗ t S∗ t = (κ + µ) dt + σdBt, dSk t Sk t = (κ + µk) dt + σkdBt + νkdW k t , k = 1, 2, · · · , n with constant market parameters κ ∈R+, µ ∈R+, µk ∈R+, σ ∈R+, νk ∈R+ and σk ∈R, k = 1, 2, · · · , n.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Fund managers evaluate performance by excess logarithmic return relative to a benchmark defined as a proportion of the average log‑return of all managers.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"For the k-th fund manager, the utility function U k(·) is based on the excess logarithmic return at the terminal time T , given by Rk,πk T −ϑ, where ϑ represents a benchmark logarithmic return. Speciﬁcally, ϑ = θkRT , RT := 1 n n X i=1 Ri,πi T , 0 ≤θk ≤1.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Utility for the exponential‑utility criterion depends only on the excess logarithmic return at the terminal time.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"For the k-th fund manager, the utility function U k(·) is based on the excess logarithmic return at the terminal time T , given by Rk,πk T −ϑ, where ϑ represents a benchmark logarithmic return.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"In all four models, using excess logarithmic return as the evaluation criterion leads to constant allocation fractions for each manager.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In the four models, the excess logarithmic return as the evaluation criterion of the fund leads to the { allocation fractions} being constant. Whether considering fund managers with exponential utility or those with a mean-variance criterion, and whether analyzing the n-player game or the MFG, the introduction of excess logarithmic returns results in a constant investment ratio.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The mean‑field equilibrium (MFE) coincides with the limit of the n‑player game equilibrium as the number of managers n → ∞.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We demonstrate that the MFE of the MFG represents the limit of the $n$-player game's equilibrium as the competitive scale $n$ approaches infinity. The MFE of the MFG aligns with the equilibrium limit in the n-player game as n approaches inﬁnity.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Competition primarily influences investment in the public risky asset, while allocation to private risky assets remains unaffected by other managers' parameters.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The introduction of the public risky asset yields different outcomes, with competition primarily affecting the investment in public assets, particularly evident in the MFG. The inclusion of public risk assets signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the outcomes, with the impact of competition mainly reﬂected in the investment in public risk assets.","support":"full"},{"finding":"When the competition weight parameter θi increases (or risk aversion of others decreases), a manager’s allocation to the public risk asset S* rises.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"An increase in the competition weight parameter θi or a decrease in the risk aversion parameter γi of any other fund manager i will lead to an increase in the allocation fraction of the k-th fund manager’s investment in the public risk asset S∗. 4.2.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The allocation fraction in the public risky asset can be decomposed into a component that ignores competition and a component that hedges competitive risk.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The allocation fraction in public risky assets can be divided into two components: one that ignores competition and one that hedges competitive risk.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2311.04841","title":"Predictable Relative Forward Performance Processes: Multi-Agent and Mean Field Games for Portfolio Management","paper_date":"2023-11-08","authors":["Gechun Liang","Moris S. Strub","Yuwei Wang"],"empirical_rigor":2.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/predictable-relative-forward-performance-processes-multi-agent-and-mean-field/"},"question":"How does competition intensity affect managers' allocation to the risky public asset?","this_paper_finding":"When the competition weight parameter θi increases (or risk aversion of others decreases), a manager’s allocation to the public risk asset S* rises.","other_paper_finding":"The competition‑induced component of the strategy is always positive, implying that relative performance concerns encourage higher risky investment among CARA agents.","other_paper_quote":"Moreover, the competition-induced component is always positive, implying that relative performance concerns encourage higher risky investment among agents with CARA preferences, in line with the findings of [53].","note":"Both find a positive effect: A shows competition‑induced term always >0, B shows allocation rises as θi increases.","confidence":0.932}],"contradicts":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2505.01858","title":"Mean Field Game of Optimal Tracking Portfolio","paper_date":"2025-05-03","authors":["Lijun Bo","Yijie Huang","Xiang Yu"],"empirical_rigor":2.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/mean-field-game-of-optimal-tracking-portfolio/"},"question":"How does the competition weight parameter influence a manager's portfolio allocation and associated risk outcomes?","this_paper_finding":"When the competition weight parameter θi increases (or risk aversion of others decreases), a manager’s allocation to the public risk asset S* rises.","other_paper_finding":"Numerical sensitivity analysis shows that a higher competition weight λ reduces the expected largest shortfall and leads to more conservative portfolio allocations, while higher market‑index volatility σZ reduces the expected largest shortfall and induces non‑","other_paper_quote":"Consistent with the outperforming case, the portfolio feedback function is decreasing in λ. In parallel, Figure 6 shows that a smaller competition weight induces the manager to incur a larger expected largest shortfall relative to the benchmark;; as λ rises, the ex-pected largest shortfall decline.","note":"A: higher θi raises allocation to risky asset S*; B: higher λ lowers expected shortfall and makes allocations more conservative. The direction of effect differs despite both studying competition weight.","confidence":0.743}],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":17,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:51:54Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. 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They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}