{"paper_id":"2503.08287","title":"Liquidity Competition Between Brokers and an Informed Trader","authors":["Ryan Donnelly","Zi Li"],"paper_date":"2025-03-11","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.08287v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/liquidity-competition-between-brokers-and-an-informed-trader/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":8,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a multi‑agent Stackelberg‑type model of brokers transacting with an informed trader, derives closed‑form informed‑trader strategies, formulates a system of equilibrium equations for broker strategies, and provides a numerical example showing the resulting equilibrium is not Pareto","quote":"We solve in closed form for the trading strategy that the informed trader uses with each broker and propose a system of equations which classify the equilibrium strategies of the brokers. By solving these equations numerically we may study the resulting strategies in equilibrium.","summary":"We study a multi-agent setting in which brokers transact with an informed trader. Through a sequential Stackelberg-type game, brokers manage trading costs and adverse selection with an informed trader. In particular, supplying liquidity to the informed traders allows the brokers to speculate based…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The identity of each trader is known to the brokers and quotes are customized accordingly.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume that the identity of each trader is known to the brokers and a customized quote is made correspondingly.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Brokers know the informed trader’s model, parameter values and initial inventory.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We assume that the brokers know the informed trader’s model and the value of the model parameters, and the initial inventory of the informed trader3.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Brokers observe the lit‑market mid‑price process but do not directly observe the alpha component.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The brokers observes the mid-price process (Sν t )t∈T of the LOB in the lit market, but do not directly observe the alpha component (2).","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The alpha process is mean‑reverting with dynamics dαt = −θ αt dt + η dWαt.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"This additional infor-mation is generally known as ‘alpha’ and we assume that it is mean-reverting with dynamics given by equation (2).","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Temporary price impact is linear in the broker’s trading speed with positive coefficient kj.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"Specifically, the transaction price achieved by broker j is ˆSj t = Sν t + kj νj t , j ∈{1, . . . , N} , where kj > 0 is the temporary price impact parameter.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Liquidity cost parameters κj and cj are positive and known to the informed trader.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"The quotes (i.e., execution prices if there is a trade) for the informed and uninformed traders are ˆSI,j t = Sν t + κj ωj t and ˆSU,j t = Sν t + cj uj t , j ∈{1, . . . , N} , (3) respectively, where the liquidity cost parameters κj > 0 are known by the informed trader and cj > 0 a","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"synthetic"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"yes","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":"Temporary price impact kj νj t and linear liquidity costs κj ωj t (informed) and cj uj t (uninformed) are incorporated in the price equations.","quote":"Specifically, the transaction price achieved by broker j is ˆSj t = Sν t + kj νj t , j ∈{1, . . . , N} , where kj > 0 is the temporary price impact parameter. The quotes (i.e., execution prices if there is a trade) for the informed and uninformed traders are ˆSI,j t = Sν t + κj ωj t and ˆSU,j t = Sν t + cj uj t , j ∈{1, . . . , N} , (3) respectively, where the liquidity cost parameters κj > 0 are known by the","source":"evidence_card","rule":"R2","candidates":{"front_matter":"unclear","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Temporary price impact kj νj t and linear liquidity costs κj ωj t (informed) and cj uj t (uninformed) are incorporated in the price equations.","card_quote":"Specifically, the transaction price achieved by broker j is ˆSj t = Sν t + kj νj t , j ∈{1, . . . , N} , where kj > 0 is the temporary price impact parameter. The quotes (i.e., execution prices if there is a trade) for the informed and uninformed traders are ˆSI,j t = Sν t + κj ωj t and ˆSU,j t = Sν t + cj uj t , j ∈{1, . . . , N} , (3) respectively, where the liquidity cost parameters κj > 0 are known by the","meaning":"costs are part of the reported headline results"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"The computed liquidity‑price Nash equilibrium for two brokers is not Pareto efficient.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Finally, we formulate a competitive game between brokers in order to determine the liquidity prices subject to precommitment supplied to the informed trader and provide a numerical example in which the resulting equilibrium is not Pareto efficient.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Numerical experiments are performed for N=2 brokers, solving the equilibrium via an iterative algorithm.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"For reasons related to computational complexity and presentability of the results, we only consider the situation of N = 2 brokers.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Broker 1’s initial value function V1(κ1,κ2) is concave in κ1 for any fixed κ2.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We can observe that for fixed κ2, initial value function V 1 is concave with respect to κ1.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Increasing the running inventory penalty ϕ1 reduces broker 1’s speculative trading volume and average inventory level.","kind":"performance","quote":"We see that the average inventory level of broker 1 decreases from 0.17 to 0.02, which indicates broker 1’s trading behavior is indeed suppressed due to the higher running inventory penalty. These observations rationalize the decreasing tendency of κ1∗with respect to ϕ1 in Figure 5: broker 1 reduces her trading activities to avoid a higher running inventory penalty, and she prefers to decrease her speculative","support":"full"},{"finding":"The equilibrium liquidity price κ*1 responds differently to terminal inventory penalty a1 depending on the level of running inventory penalty ϕ1.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"On the left panel of Figure 9, we can see that the optimal liquidity price κ∗ 1 set by broker 1 increases for higher terminal penalty a1, at high running inventory penalty ϕ1. However, on the right panel, for low running inventory penalty ϕ1, the optimal cost κ∗ 1 is decreasing in terminal inventory penalty a1.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":29,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":3,"by_independent_authors":3,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":1,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":2,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2412.20847","title":"Strategic Learning and Trading in Broker-Mediated Markets","paper_date":"2024-12-30","authors":["Alif Aqsha","Fayçal Drissi","Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt"],"empirical_rigor":2,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/strategic-learning-and-trading-in-broker-mediated-markets/"},"how":"uses_method_or_data","quote":null}],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:51:46Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}