{"paper_id":"2503.08833","title":"Randomization in Optimal Execution Games","authors":["Steven Campbell","Marcel Nutz"],"paper_date":"2025-03-11","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.08833v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/randomization-in-optimal-execution-games/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":1,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"We study optimal execution in markets with transient price impact among N traders, allowing randomized strategies and show that any randomized strategy can be de‑randomized to a strictly lower expected cost, implying Nash equilibria cannot contain randomization and are unique.","quote":"We study optimal execution in markets with transient price impact in a competitive setting with $N$ traders. We show that given a randomized strategy, there is a non-randomized strategy with strictly lower expected execution cost, and moreover this de-randomization can be achieved by a simple averaging procedure.","summary":"We study optimal execution in markets with transient price impact in a competitive setting with N traders. Motivated by prior negative results on the existence of pure Nash equilibria, we consider randomized strategies for the traders and whether allowing such strategies can restore the existence…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The impact decay kernel G is strictly positive definite.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Both results hold in a general transaction cost model given by a strictly positive definite impact decay kernel and a convex trading cost. The proof shows that this result is driven by the strict positive deﬁniteness of the impact decay kernel.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The trading cost function C is convex.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"Our exposition allows for general convex costs C mapping admissible strategies to [0, ∞]. The uniqueness result holds in that generality.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"A Jensen‑type inequality (Assumption 4.3) holds for the cost C, i.e., E[C(X)] ≥ E[C(Ē[X])].","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"(Note that Jensen’s inequality does not always hold in inﬁnite dimensional spaces.) Assumption 4.3. If X is an admissible strategy for some trader i, then E [C(X)] ≥E h C \u0010 ˜E[X] \u0011i .","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R4a","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"General convex trading cost C (e.g., quadratic costs on trading rate, block trades, and terminal inventory).","card_quote":"Our exposition allows for general convex costs C mapping admissible strategies to [0, ∞]. Denoting by ˙Xi t the time derivative of Xi t (if it exists), let C(Xi) := ε 2 Z T 0 ( ˙Xi t)2dt + 1 2 X t∈[0,T] ϑt(∆Xi t)2 + ϕ 2 (Xi T)2, (2.4) where ε, ϑt ∈[0, ∞) and ϕ ∈[0, ∞].","meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"De‑randomizing a strictly randomized strategy by taking its conditional expectation yields a non‑randomized admissible strategy with strictly lower expected execution cost.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We show that given a randomized strategy, there is a non-randomized strategy with strictly lower expected execution cost, and moreover this de-randomization can be achieved by a simple averaging procedure. Let C satisfy Assumption 4.3 and let X = (X1, . . . , XN) be an admissible strategy proﬁle where Xi is strictly randomized.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Nash equilibrium profiles cannot contain strictly randomized strategies, so non‑existence of pure equilibria implies non‑existence of randomized equilibria.","kind":"negative","quote":"As a consequence, Nash equilibria cannot contain randomized strategies, and non-existence of pure equilibria implies non-existence of randomized equilibria. In particular, a Nash equilibrium proﬁle cannot contain strictly randomized strategies.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Under a strictly positive definite decay kernel and convex cost C, there is at most one Nash equilibrium.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Separately, we also establish uniqueness of equilibria. There is at most one Nash equilibrium.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The main results extend to singular (unbounded) impact kernels, where admissible strategies cannot have jumps.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"6 Extension to Singular Kernels In this section we extend our results to impact decay kernels with G(0+) = ∞. The integral R T 0 R T 0 G(|t−s|)d|X|sd|X|t is necessarily inﬁnite if X has a jump, as R T 0 R T 0 G(|t−s|)d|X|sd|X|t ≥G(0)|∆Xt|2 for any t and G(0) = ∞.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":13,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:51:40Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}