{"paper_id":"2503.20340","title":"Relative portfolio optimization via a value at risk based constraint","authors":["Nicole Bäuerle","Tamara Göll"],"paper_date":"2025-03-26","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.20340v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/relative-portfolio-optimization-via-a-value-at-risk-based-co/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":9,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a relative portfolio optimization framework where agents maximize expected utility subject to a stochastic value‑at‑risk (VaR) probability constraint, and studies the resulting Nash equilibria.","quote":"In this paper, we consider $n$ agents who invest in a general financial market that is free of arbitrage and complete. Third, this can equivalently be considered as a portfolio optimization problem with a stochastic value-at-risk constraint, i.e. a value-at-risk constraint where the risk level is stochastic.","summary":"In this paper, we consider n agents who invest in a general financial market that is free of arbitrage and complete. The aim of each investor is to maximize her expected utility while ensuring, with a specified probability, that her terminal wealth exceeds a benchmark defined by her competitors’…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The financial market is arbitrage‑free and complete.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"In this paper, we consider $n$ agents who invest in a general financial market that is free of arbitrage and complete.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Agents have CRRA utility for the two‑agent case and logarithmic utility for the multi‑agent case.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"In the case of two agents and CRRA utility, we are able to derive all Nash equilibria in terms of terminal wealth. For $n>2$ agents and logarithmic utility we distinguish two cases.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Each agent must satisfy a probability constraint that her terminal wealth exceeds a benchmark defined by competitors’ performance.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"The aim of each investor is to maximize her expected utility while ensuring, with a specified probability, that her terminal wealth exceeds a benchmark defined by her competitors' performance. Third, this can equivalently be considered as a portfolio optimization problem with a stochastic value-at-risk constraint, i.e. a value-at-risk constraint where the risk level is stochastic.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Initial capitals are ordered non‑increasingly (x1⁰ ≥ … ≥ xn⁰).","type":"other","stated":"explicit","quote":"Further, we assume w.l.o.g. that the initial capitals of the agents are ordered by x1 0 ≥. . . ≥xn 0.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The sum of the probability levels αi is ≤ 1 so that constraints can be satisfied on disjoint sets.","type":"statistical","stated":"explicit","quote":"Assume that the sum of the alphas is less or equal to 1. In this case, the probability constraints of the agents can (and will) be satisfied on disjoint sets. Theorem 4.2.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Self‑financing condition E[ZT X] = xi⁰ holds for each agent’s terminal wealth.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"6 N. B¨AUERLE AND T. G¨OLL Distinguishing the different cases where the maxima are attained and respecting the self-financing conditions E[X∗ 1ZT ] = x1 0, E[X∗ 2ZT ] = x2 0, we can see that we obtain a solution only in the case of x2 0 ≥β1x1 0 and the unique Nash equilibrium (here and elsewhere uniqueness is always up to sets of probability zero) is given by X∗ 1 = x1 0 ZT and X∗ 2 = x2 0 ZT . We also have to","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"unclear"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"For two agents with CRRA utility, all Nash equilibria can be derived explicitly in terms of terminal wealth.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In the case of two agents and CRRA utility, we are able to derive all Nash equilibria in terms of terminal wealth.","support":"full"},{"finding":"For n > 2 agents with logarithmic utility and small probability levels, all Nash equilibria are characterized.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In the first case, the probabilities in the constraint are small and we can characterize all Nash equilibria.","support":"full"},{"finding":"When the probability levels are larger, Nash equilibria exist only in a restricted set of parameter configurations.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In the second case, the probabilities are larger and we look for Nash equilibria in a certain set.","support":"full"},{"finding":"If x2⁰ < α2 β1 x1⁰, no Nash equilibrium exists for the logarithmic‑utility case.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"If x2 0 < α2β1x1 0, there is no Nash equilibrium.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Numerical examples illustrate that wealthy investors are only marginally affected by competition, while poorer agents may deviate dramatically, leading to volatile and risky investments.","kind":"performance","quote":"We also discuss the impact of the competition using some numerical examples. It turns out that wealthy investors are not or only marginally affected by the competition, whereas poorer agents deviate dramatically from their benchmark optimal strategy, leading to very volatile and risky investments at least in some scenarios.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2311.04841","title":"Predictable Relative Forward Performance Processes: Multi-Agent and Mean Field Games for Portfolio Management","paper_date":"2023-11-08","authors":["Gechun Liang","Moris S. Strub","Yuwei Wang"],"empirical_rigor":2.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/predictable-relative-forward-performance-processes-multi-agent-and-mean-field/"},"question":"How does competition influence agents' risky investment behavior?","this_paper_finding":"Numerical examples illustrate that wealthy investors are only marginally affected by competition, while poorer agents may deviate dramatically, leading to volatile and risky investments.","other_paper_finding":"The competition‑induced component of the strategy is always positive, implying that relative performance concerns encourage higher risky investment among CARA agents.","other_paper_quote":"Moreover, the competition-induced component is always positive, implying that relative performance concerns encourage higher risky investment among agents with CARA preferences, in line with the findings of [53].","note":"Both find competition raises risky investment; A says the effect is always positive for CARA agents, B shows it is marginal for wealthy investors but dramatic for poorer agents.","confidence":0.569}],"compared_with":17,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:51:09Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. 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They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}