{"paper_id":"2509.06510","title":"Optimal Exit Time for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers","authors":["Philippe Bergault","Sébastien Bieber","Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt"],"paper_date":"2025-09-08","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.06510v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/optimal-exit-time-for-liquidity-providers-in-automated-marke/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":7,"math_complexity":9,"quadrant":"Holy Grail"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper characterises the optimal exit time for a liquidity provider in a constant‑function market, proves the value function is the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton‑Jacobi‑Bellman quasi‑variational inequality, and provides two numerical solution methods (an Euler scheme with operator split","quote":"We characterise the optimal exit time of a liquidity provider from a CFM. Mathematically, we show that the value function of the corresponding optimal stopping problem is the unique viscosity solution to a Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman quasi-variational inequality (HJB QVI) that delineates the optimal exit region. 2.","summary":"We study the problem of optimal liquidity withdrawal for a representative liquidity provider (LP) in an automated market maker (AMM). LPs earn fees from trading activity but are exposed to impermanent loss (IL) due to price fluctuations. While existing work has focused on static provision and…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The external price follows a Brownian motion with volatility σ.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We introduce a probability measure ˆP such that W is a Brownian motions and ˆN a, ˆN b are Poisson processes with intensity a0 > 0.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Arbitrage and noise‑trader order arrivals are independent Poisson processes with intensities a0, a1, a2.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We introduce a probability measure ˆP such that W is a Brownian motions and ˆN a, ˆN b are Poisson processes with intensity a0 > 0. Under this probability measure, W, ˆN a and ˆN b are independent.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The AMM uses a constant‑function market with trading function f(x,y)=xy.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"We endow the space (Ω, F) with the ˆP−augmented canonical filtration F := (Ft)t∈T generated by (χt)t∈T. We study an automated market maker (AMM) for a pair of assets X and Y (e.g., USDC and ETH) with trading function f(x, y) = x y. This type of AMM is referred to as constant function market (CFM).","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Liquidity providers earn fees proportional to trading volume and incur impermanent loss due to price fluctuations.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"LPs earn fees from trading activity but are exposed to impermanent loss (IL) due to price fluctuations. However, LPs also face risks, most notably the so-called impermanent loss (IL), which arises due to price fluctuations between the pooled assets and external market prices.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Risk‑aversion can be incorporated by maximising expected utility of PnL with constant absolute risk aversion ψ.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Appendix A. Risk-averse liquidity provider Here we provide details for the problem of a risk averse LP wishing to maximise the expected utility of her PnL. More precisely, we study the problem sup τ∈T E \u0002 −exp \b −ψ \u0000P X τ + SτP Y τ + Rτ \u0001 \u0003 , (A.1) where ψ > 0 represents the absolute risk aversion of the LP.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The model parameters (e.g., fee level r, order‑flow intensities) are calibrated to Binance and Uniswap V2 data for the ETH‑USDC pair.","type":"data","stated":"explicit","quote":"We use the model parameters from Aqsha et al. (2025) who used market data from Binance and Uniswap V2 in the pair ETH-USDC between 1 January 2022 and 30 April 2022 to calibrate model parameters, that is, we take S0 = Z0 = 2820 $, σ = 0.0569 S0 $ · day−1/2, Y0 = 50, 000 ETH, and X0 = Y0 Z0 $.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"available","items":[{"name":"Binance & Uniswap V2 ETH‑USDC market data","provider":"Binance / Uniswap","kind":"crypto-onchain","access":"public","period":"2022‑01‑01 to 2022‑04‑30","universe":"ETH‑USDC pair","quote":"We use the model parameters from Aqsha et al. (2025) who used market data from Binance and Uniswap V2 in the pair ETH-USDC between 1 January 2022 and 30 April 2022 to calibrate model parameters, that is, we take S0 = Z0 = 2820 $, σ = 0.0569 S0 $ · day−1/2, Y0 = 50, 000 ETH, and X0 = Y0 Z0 $.","support":"full","known_id":"binance"},{"name":"Synthetic calibrated simulations","provider":null,"kind":"synthetic","access":"unknown","period":null,"universe":null,"quote":"Calibrated simulations highlight how the LP's optimal exit strategy depends on the oracle price volatility, fee levels, and the behaviour of arbitrageurs and noise traders. To test the Longstaff–Schwartz algorithm against a well-known Euler scheme, we employ the following model parameters: n = 1,440, m = 5,000, T = 1 day, d = 3, σ = 100 $ · day−1/2, a0 = 4 day−1, a1 = 8 day−1, a2 = 0.04 $−1 · day−1, ξ = 1, X0 =","support":"full"}],"known":[{"id":"binance","name":"Binance","provider":"Binance","kind":"market-prices","access":"public","quote":"We use the model parameters from Aqsha et al. (2025) who used market data from Binance and Uniswap V2 in the pair ETH-USDC between 1 January 2022 and 30 April 2022 to calibrate model parameters, that is, we take S0 = Z0 = 2820 $, σ = 0.0569 S0 $ · day−1/2, Y0 = 50, 000 ETH, and X0 = Y0 Z0 $.","mentions":2,"used_in":1}],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"synthetic"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"yes","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":"Fees are modelled as a parameter r; the performance criterion (fees minus impermanent loss) increases approximately linearly with r beyond a threshold.","quote":"(b) The performance criterion (defined as fees collected minus impermanent loss), which is non-negative in expectation since exiting the pool immediately is always admissible, increases approx-imately linearly with the fee level beyond a certain threshold. This is because, once fees are high enough, LPs optimally choose to remain in the pool until the terminal time.","source":"evidence_card","rule":"R2","candidates":{"front_matter":"unclear","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Fees are modelled as a parameter r; the performance criterion (fees minus impermanent loss) increases approximately linearly with r beyond a threshold.","card_quote":"(b) The performance criterion (defined as fees collected minus impermanent loss), which is non-negative in expectation since exiting the pool immediately is always admissible, increases approx-imately linearly with the fee level beyond a certain threshold. This is because, once fees are high enough, LPs optimally choose to remain in the pool until the terminal time.","meaning":"costs are part of the reported headline results"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Both average fees collected and average impermanent loss at the optimal exit time are concave functions of oracle price volatility.","kind":"performance","quote":"Our results reveal several key findings: (a) Both the average fees collected and the average impermanent loss at the optimal exit time are concave functions of the volatility of the oracle price.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The performance criterion (fees minus impermanent loss) grows approximately linearly with the fee level once fees are high enough, prompting LPs to stay in the pool until the terminal time.","kind":"performance","quote":"(b) The performance criterion (defined as fees collected minus impermanent loss), which is non-negative in expectation since exiting the pool immediately is always admissible, increases approx-imately linearly with the fee level beyond a certain threshold. This is because, once fees are high enough, LPs optimally choose to remain in the pool until the terminal time.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Higher arbitrage activity raises fee revenue but also increases realised impermanent loss up to the maximum loss implied by price volatility.","kind":"performance","quote":"(c) Higher activity by arbitrageurs and noise traders leads to higher fee revenues. However, arbi-trageurs also increase the realised impermanent loss at the exit time, up to the maximum loss implied by the oracle price volatility.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Increased noise‑trader activity raises fees while leaving average impermanent loss unchanged.","kind":"performance","quote":"In contrast, an increase in noise trader activity raises the fees collected while leaving impermanent loss unchanged on average.","support":"full"},{"finding":"LPs remain in the pool when fee income outweighs potential impermanent loss, which occurs more often under low volatility, high fees, or high trading activity.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"LPs stay in the pool when the fee income outweighs the potential impermanent loss, which occurs more frequently when volatility is low, fees are high, or trading activity is high.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2507.14810","title":"Optimal Decisions for Liquid Staking: Allocation and Exit Timing","paper_date":"2025-07-20","authors":["Ruofei Ma","Zhebiao Cai","Wenpin Tang","David Yao"],"empirical_rigor":3.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/optimal-decisions-for-liquid-staking-allocation-and-exit-timing/"},"question":"When should a liquidity provider exit a pool given fee accumulation and impermanent loss?","this_paper_finding":"The performance criterion (fees minus impermanent loss) grows approximately linearly with the fee level once fees are high enough, prompting LPs to stay in the pool until the terminal time.","other_paper_finding":"Numerical analyses show that fee accumulation can make remaining in the pool beneficial despite price declines.","other_paper_quote":"With transaction fees, we conduct numerical analyses to examine how fee accumulation influences exit strategies. The economic rationale behind this strategy is as follows: although a declining price leads to temporary losses, the longer the price remains depressed, the more fees the investor accrues.","note":"Both findings agree that high enough fees make staying in the pool optimal; B shows performance grows linearly with fee level, supporting A's claim that fee accumulation can outweigh price declines.","confidence":0.784},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2507.14810","title":"Optimal Decisions for Liquid Staking: Allocation and Exit Timing","paper_date":"2025-07-20","authors":["Ruofei Ma","Zhebiao Cai","Wenpin Tang","David Yao"],"empirical_rigor":3.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/optimal-decisions-for-liquid-staking-allocation-and-exit-timing/"},"question":"When should liquidity providers stay in a pool versus exit, given fee accumulation versus price decline?","this_paper_finding":"LPs remain in the pool when fee income outweighs potential impermanent loss, which occurs more often under low volatility, high fees, or high trading activity.","other_paper_finding":"Numerical analyses show that fee accumulation can make remaining in the pool beneficial despite price declines.","other_paper_quote":"With transaction fees, we conduct numerical analyses to examine how fee accumulation influences exit strategies. The economic rationale behind this strategy is as follows: although a declining price leads to temporary losses, the longer the price remains depressed, the more fees the investor accrues.","note":"Both find staying optimal when fee income exceeds price‑decline loss; B adds that this occurs especially under low volatility, high fees and high trading activity, confirming A’s fee‑accumulation result.","confidence":0.744},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2303.11118","title":"Model-free Hedging of Impermanent Loss in Geometric Mean Market Makers","paper_date":"2023-03-20","authors":["Masaaki Fukasawa","Basile Maire","Marcus Wunsch"],"empirical_rigor":2.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/model-free-hedging-of-impermanent-loss-in-geometric-mean-market-makers/"},"question":"How do fee levels impact impermanent loss and liquidity provider behavior in AMMs?","this_paper_finding":"LPs remain in the pool when fee income outweighs potential impermanent loss, which occurs more often under low volatility, high fees, or high trading activity.","other_paper_finding":"In simulations, higher fees lead to lower impermanent loss.","other_paper_quote":"Even though the size of τ is irrelevant to the super‑hedge in the theory, not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the IL decreases with higher fees in the simulation.","note":"Both findings agree that higher fees reduce impermanent loss; B further notes this effect is stronger with low volatility, high trading activity, or when fee income exceeds loss.","confidence":0.735},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2302.04345","title":"Inefficiency of CFMs: hedging perspective and agent-based simulations","paper_date":"2023-02-08","authors":["Samuel Cohen","Marc Sabaté Vidales","David Šiška","Łukasz Szpruch"],"empirical_rigor":6,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/inefficiency-of-cfms-hedging-perspective-and-agent-based-simulations/"},"question":"How does noise‑trader activity affect fees and loss for liquidity providers?","this_paper_finding":"Increased noise‑trader activity raises fees while leaving average impermanent loss unchanged.","other_paper_finding":"The loss magnitude is independent of the arrival rate of noise traders.","other_paper_quote":"This is regardless of the rate of noise traders arriving in the market.","note":"Both findings agree that loss magnitude (impermanent loss) stays unchanged with more noise‑trader activity; B adds that fees increase, while A notes independence from arrival rate.","confidence":0.708},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2502.01931","title":"Liquidity provision of utility indifference type in decentralized exchanges","paper_date":"2025-02-04","authors":["Masaaki Fukasawa","Basile Maire","Marcus Wunsch"],"empirical_rigor":2.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/liquidity-provision-of-utility-indifference-type-in-decentra/"},"question":"Under what conditions does fee income offset impermanent loss for liquidity providers in AMMs?","this_paper_finding":"LPs remain in the pool when fee income outweighs potential impermanent loss, which occurs more often under low volatility, high fees, or high trading activity.","other_paper_finding":"Liquidity provision suffers from impermanent loss unless a transaction fee is levied.","other_paper_quote":"Second, we show that liquidity provision suffers from impermanent loss unless a transaction fee is levied under the general framework with concentrated liquidity.","note":"Finding B confirms A's claim that a transaction fee is needed: LPs stay when fee income exceeds impermanent loss, especially with low volatility, high fees, or high trading activity.","confidence":0.676},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2502.01931","title":"Liquidity provision of utility indifference type in decentralized exchanges","paper_date":"2025-02-04","authors":["Masaaki Fukasawa","Basile Maire","Marcus Wunsch"],"empirical_rigor":2.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/liquidity-provision-of-utility-indifference-type-in-decentra/"},"question":"How does the transaction fee level influence liquidity providers' performance given impermanent loss?","this_paper_finding":"The performance criterion (fees minus impermanent loss) grows approximately linearly with the fee level once fees are high enough, prompting LPs to stay in the pool until the terminal time.","other_paper_finding":"Liquidity provision suffers from impermanent loss unless a transaction fee is levied.","other_paper_quote":"Second, we show that liquidity provision suffers from impermanent loss unless a transaction fee is levied under the general framework with concentrated liquidity.","note":"Both findings link higher fees to reduced impermanent loss; B further shows performance (fees‑IL) grows roughly linearly once fees are sufficiently high.","confidence":0.623},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2303.11118","title":"Model-free Hedging of Impermanent Loss in Geometric Mean Market Makers","paper_date":"2023-03-20","authors":["Masaaki Fukasawa","Basile Maire","Marcus Wunsch"],"empirical_rigor":2.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/model-free-hedging-of-impermanent-loss-in-geometric-mean-market-makers/"},"question":"How does the fee level affect impermanent loss and overall LP performance in AMMs?","this_paper_finding":"The performance criterion (fees minus impermanent loss) grows approximately linearly with the fee level once fees are high enough, prompting LPs to stay in the pool until the terminal time.","other_paper_finding":"In simulations, higher fees lead to lower impermanent loss.","other_paper_quote":"Even though the size of τ is irrelevant to the super‑hedge in the theory, not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the IL decreases with higher fees in the simulation.","note":"Both findings agree that higher fees reduce impermanent loss (A) and cause the net performance (fees‑IL) to increase roughly linearly once fees are sufficiently high (B).","confidence":0.567}],"contradicts":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2303.11118","title":"Model-free Hedging of Impermanent Loss in Geometric Mean Market Makers","paper_date":"2023-03-20","authors":["Masaaki Fukasawa","Basile Maire","Marcus Wunsch"],"empirical_rigor":2.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/model-free-hedging-of-impermanent-loss-in-geometric-mean-market-makers/"},"question":"How do changes in fees affect impermanent loss for liquidity providers?","this_paper_finding":"Increased noise‑trader activity raises fees while leaving average impermanent loss unchanged.","other_paper_finding":"In simulations, higher fees lead to lower impermanent loss.","other_paper_quote":"Even though the size of τ is irrelevant to the super‑hedge in the theory, not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the IL decreases with higher fees in the simulation.","note":"Finding A: higher fees → lower impermanent loss. Finding B: fees raised by noise‑trader activity → impermanent loss unchanged. The effect on IL differs.","confidence":0.491}],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":12,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":2,"by_independent_authors":1,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":1,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:48:06Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. 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