{"paper_id":"2509.10094","title":"Competition and Incentives in a Shared Order Book","authors":["René Aïd","Philippe Bergault","Mathieu Rosenbaum"],"paper_date":"2025-09-12","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.10094v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/competition-and-incentives-in-a-shared-order-book/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper develops a Principal‑Agent model of two exchanges sharing a single limit order book, derives the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium between exchanges, and characterises optimal incentive contracts for market makers.","quote":"We develop a Principal-Agent model where each exchange acts as the Principal of her own market maker acting as her Agent. In terms of mathematical result, we show existence and uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibrium between exchanges, give the optimal incentive contracts and provide numerical solution to the PDE satisfied by the certainty equivalent of the exchanges.","summary":"Recent regulation on intraday electricity markets has led to the development of shared order books with the intention to foster competition and increase market liquidity. In this paper, we address the question of the efficiency of such regulations by analysing the situation of two exchanges sharing…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Each exchange is associated with a dedicated market maker who does not switch between platforms.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"This observation motivates one of the core assumptions of our model: each exchange is associated with a dedicated market maker, who does not switch between platforms.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Liquidity takers interact with a specific exchange, although their orders may be executed on either venue via the shared order book.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"Similarly, liquidity takers are assumed to interact 2 with a specific exchange, although the execution of their orders may occur on either venue due to the shared order book.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"All agents (exchanges and market makers) have CARA utility functions, possibly with different risk‑aversion parameters.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Exchanges and market makers have all CARA utility functions with potentially different risk-aversion parameters.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"A risk‑constraint parameter \\(\\bar q\\) caps market‑maker inventory.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The parameter ¯q serves as a risk constraint for market makers: it caps their inventory by preventing further buying when their position is too long, and further selling when it is too short.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The two exchanges share a single limit order book, so a quote posted on one exchange can be hit by a trade arriving on the other.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"In this paper, we address the question of the efficiency of such regulations by analysing the situation of two exchanges sharing a single limit order book, i.e. a quote by a market maker can be hit by a trade arriving on the other exchange.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Providing incentives to market makers incurs a cost equal to the reservation utility of the market maker.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"But, because the provision of incentive is costly (the platform has to pay the reservation utility of the market maker), an exchange may benefit from not incentivizing her market maker and letting the other platform pay for incentive provision.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Incentive provision constitutes a public good because a competitiveness spill‑over effect makes each exchange benefit from the other’s incentives.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"From an economic standpoint, our model demonstrates that incentive provision constitutes a public good. More precisely, it highlights the presence of a competitiveness spillover effect: when one exchange optimally incentivizes its market maker, the competing exchange also reaps indirect benefits.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The strategic interaction can lead to a free‑rider problem, potentially resulting in an equilibrium where neither exchange offers incentives, reducing overall competition.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"This interdependence gives rise to a free-rider problem. Given that providing incentives entails a cost, the strategic interaction between exchanges may lead to an equilibrium in which neither platform offers incentives -- ultimately resulting in diminished overall competition.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The model yields existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium between the two exchanges.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In terms of mathematical result, we show existence and uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibrium between exchanges, give the optimal incentive contracts and provide numerical solution to the PDE satisfied by the certainty equivalent of the exchanges.","support":"full"},{"finding":"When only one exchange provides incentives, both market makers reduce their spreads around zero inventory, increasing effective liquidity.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"When only exchange E0 provides a contract, the quotes of both market makers decrease around inventory zero – the region where she spends most of her time – which significantly increases effective liquidity.","support":"full"},{"finding":"When both exchanges provide incentives, spreads are substantially reduced and quotes become more stable across inventories.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"In the two-contract case, we observe that both market makers reduce their spreads substantially. The quotes become much more stable with respect to inventory and notably lower than the benchmark case without contracts around inventory zero.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":24,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:47:46Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}