{"paper_id":"2510.15995","title":"The Invisible Handshake: Tacit Collusion between Adaptive Market Agents","authors":["Luigi Foscari","Emanuele Guidotti","Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi","Tatjana Chavdarova","Alfio Ferrara"],"paper_date":"2025-10-14","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.15995v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/the-invisible-handshake-tacit-collusion-between-adaptive-ma/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":7,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"We introduce a repeated stochastic game between a market maker and a market taker with endogenous price impact and cash‑inventory constraints to study persistent overpricing.","quote":"To do so, we introduce a repeated stochastic game between two representative agents: a market maker and a market taker. Both agents hold cash and inventory and trade to maximize the value of their own portfolios, subject to constraints that rule out short and leveraged positions.","summary":"We study the emergence of tacit collusion between adaptive trading agents in a stochastic market with endogenous price formation. Using a two-player repeated game between a market maker and a market taker, we characterize feasible and collusive strategy profiles that raise prices beyond competitive…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Exogenous shocks are i.i.d. with finite variance and mean one.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We make the common assumption that the shocks are independent and identically distributed with finite variance, and normalize their mean to one. Assumption 1. (εt)t is an i.i.d. stochastic process such that εt > 0 has finite variance and E[εt] = 1.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Price impact follows a square‑root functional form in trade size.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We adopt a square-root specification, following a large empirical literature on market impact that finds a square-root dependence on trade size (Lillo et al., 2003; Tóth et al., 2011; Mastromatteo et al., 2014; Tóth et al., 2016; Bouchaud et al., 2018). Assumption 2. Let Qt be the quantity traded at time t.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Agents hold non‑negative aggregate cash and inventory (no short or leveraged positions).","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"Hence the representative maker and taker hold nonnegative aggregate cash and inventory positions.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"synthetic"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Feasible overpricing profiles are characterized via a low‑dimensional parameterization of strategies, identifying the region that generates persistent overpricing.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Our contributions are threefold. • We characterize feasible overpricing profiles: we introduce a repeated game with endogenous price impact and cash-inventory constraints, derive a low-dimensional parameterization of strategies, and identify the region of the parameter space that generates persistent overpricing (section 2). • Through a strategic decomposition of the stage game,","support":"full"},{"finding":"Decentralized learning reaches the overpricing region in finite time for adaptive updates satisfying a stochastic progress condition, verified for projected stochastic gradient ascent.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We provide a sufficient condition for decentralized learning to reach the overpricing region in finite time, and we show that this condition is satisfied, in particular, by projected stochastic gradient ascent. We then prove that decentralized learning reaches the overpricing region in finite time for adaptive updates satisfying a stochastic progress condition, and verify this condition for projected stochastic","support":"full"},{"finding":"The same overpricing incentives arise for agents optimizing infinite‑horizon wealth, showing the phenomenon is not purely myopic.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We then prove that decentralized learning reaches the overpricing region in finite time for adaptive updates satisfying a stochastic progress condition, and verify this condition for projected stochastic gradient ascent (section 3). • We show that this phenomenon is not purely myopic: agents optimizing infinite-horizon wealth face the same overpricing incentives as greedy myopic agents and reach the same overpricing","support":"full"},{"finding":"A strategic decomposition reveals a competitive component favoring zero price impact and a collaborative component that makes overpricing jointly profitable when aggregate inventory is positive.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"A key step in the analysis is a decomposition of the game into a competitive component, which favors zero price impact, and a collaborative component, which makes overpricing jointly profitable when aggregate inventory is positive.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Simulations of projected stochastic gradient ascent illustrate learning trajectories that converge to the overpricing region.","kind":"performance","quote":"훼(푣훼) (a) Ask parameters 0.0 0.5 1.0 푘훽 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 푣훽 Feasible region 푓훽(푣훽) (b) Bid parameters 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 푘훼푣훼 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 푘훽푣훽 Overpricing region 휇휋= 0 (c) Joint parameter space Figure 1: Plots a and b show a simulation of the learning trajectories of PSGA across the feasible space of parameters with φ = 1/2. The dark line shows the learning trajectory obtained by noisy gradients, in cyan","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":14,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:47:05Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}