{"paper_id":"2512.19838","title":"Equilibrium Liquidity and Risk Offsetting in Decentralised Markets","authors":["Fayçal Drissi","Xuchen Wu","Sebastian Jaimungal"],"paper_date":"2025-12-22","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.19838v2","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/equilibrium-liquidity-and-risk-offsetting-in-decentralised-m/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":9,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper develops a structural model of liquidity provision in decentralized exchanges, endogenising market outcomes and characterising how liquidity depth, rewards and risks arise from risk preferences, costly risk management, price volatility, private information and strategic liquidity demand.","quote":"We develop a structural model in which DEX market outcomes are endogenised. Our analysis characterises how the size, rewards, and risks of DEX liquidity provision arise from the interplay between risk preferences, costly risk management, fundamental price volatility, access to private information, and strategic liquidity demand.","summary":"We develop an economic model of decentralised exchanges (DEXs) in which risk-averse liquidity providers (LPs) manage risk in a centralised exchange (CEX) based on preferences, information, and trading costs. Rational, risk-averse LPs anticipate the frictions associated with replication and manage…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The trading function f is three times continuously differentiable on the positive quadrant with strictly positive partial derivatives.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"(i) f ∈C3((0, ∞)2) and has strictly positive partial derivatives.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"For each y>0, f(·,y) is surjective, yielding a unique level function φ(y,κ) for each liquidity depth κ.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"(ii) For each y > 0, f(·, y) : (0, ∞) →(0, ∞) is surjective. Thus, for each κ > 0, the level set f(x, y) = κ2 admits a unique solution x = φ(y, κ) .","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The ratio R = ∂2f/∂1f satisfies R∂1R−∂2R>0 everywhere and is decreasing in κ.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"(iii) R := ∂2f ∂1f satisfies R ∂1R −∂2R > 0 everywhere, and is decreasing in κ.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The derivative of the level function φ satisfies lim_{y→0}∂1φ(y,κ)=−∞ and lim_{y→∞}∂1φ(y,κ)=0.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"(iv) ∂1φ satisfies the limits limy↓0 ∂1φ(y, κ) = −∞ and limy↑∞∂1φ(y, κ) = 0 .","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Liquidity takers pay a proportional fee π∈(0,1) on each trade in the DEX.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"8 convexity of the level function φ, liquidity takers pay a proportional fee π ∈(0, 1) when transacting in the DEX.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"A penalty parameter ϕ>0 scales the aversion to net inventory exposure, with higher ϕ implying greater risk aversion.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"This penalty is scaled by a parameter governing the degree of risk aversion of the LP. The parameter ϕ > 0 scales this penalty: larger values correspond to greater aversion to holding non-zero net exposure Qν t + Yt.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"unclear"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"yes","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":"Liquidity takers incur a proportional fee π∈(0,1) on each transaction, which determines fee revenue and trading costs.","quote":"8 convexity of the level function φ, liquidity takers pay a proportional fee π ∈(0, 1) when transacting in the DEX.","source":"evidence_card","rule":"R2","candidates":{"front_matter":"unclear","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"Liquidity takers incur a proportional fee π∈(0,1) on each transaction, which determines fee revenue and trading costs.","card_quote":"8 convexity of the level function φ, liquidity takers pay a proportional fee π ∈(0, 1) when transacting in the DEX.","meaning":"costs are part of the reported headline results"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"An equilibrium exists under general trading functions.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We establish existence of equilibrium under general trading functions.","support":"full"},{"finding":"DEX liquidity depth κ balances amplified inventory exposure and fee revenue, with the equilibrium level reflecting this trade‑off.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Thus, in stage one, the LP anticipates that liquidity depth simultaneously (i) amplifies inventory exposure, risk-offsetting costs, and adverse selection costs, and (ii) increases fee revenue. The equilibrium level of κ at this stage reflects the balance between these opposing forces.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The ratio of risk aversion to replication costs governs the aggressiveness of replication: greater relative risk aversion reduces risk but also lowers equilibrium liquidity and its mean profitability.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The ratio governs the aggressiveness of replication: greater relative risk aversion reduces risk but also lowers equilibrium liquidity and its mean profitability.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Private information has a non‑monotonic effect: moderate price movements increase liquidity via speculative benefits, while large movements reduce liquidity due to anticipated adverse selection and replication costs.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Private information has a non-monotonic effect. For moderate price movements, speculative benefits increase liquidity.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Deeper liquidity κ raises exposure to price fluctuations and expected replication costs, creating incentives to reduce liquidity provision, which are offset by fee revenue from price‑sensitive liquidity demand.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Deeper liquidity κ also increases the magnitude of reserves Yt and therefore amplifies exposure to price fluctuations dFt. When inventory risk management through dynamic trading is costly, greater exposure implies higher expected future replication costs.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2512.00830","title":"Equilibrium Investment with Random Risk Aversion: (Non-)uniqueness, Optimality, and Comparative Statics","paper_date":"2025-11-30","authors":["Weilun Cheng","Zongxia Liang","Sheng Wang","Jianming Xia"],"empirical_rigor":1.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/equilibrium-investment-with-random-risk-aversion-non-uniqueness-optimality-and/"},"question":"How does higher risk aversion affect investment risk and market liquidity?","this_paper_finding":"The ratio of risk aversion to replication costs governs the aggressiveness of replication: greater relative risk aversion reduces risk but also lowers equilibrium liquidity and its mean profitability.","other_paper_finding":"A larger risk aversion under the reverse hazard rate order always leads to less risky investment.","other_paper_quote":"We show that a larger risk aversion under a stronger stochastic order -- the reverse hazard rate order -- always leads to less risky investment.","note":"Both agree higher risk aversion reduces risk (A: less risky investment; B: lower risk). B further finds it also lowers equilibrium liquidity and mean profitability.","confidence":0.406}],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":51,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":3,"by_independent_authors":3,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":3,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:44:58Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}