{"paper_id":"2512.20515","title":"Modeling Bank Systemic Risk of Emerging Markets under Geopolitical Shocks: Empirical Evidence from BRICS Countries","authors":["Haibo Wang"],"paper_date":"2025-12-23","paper_type":"empirical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.20515v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/modeling-bank-systemic-risk-of-emerging-markets-under-geopol/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":8.5,"math_complexity":7.5,"quadrant":"Holy Grail"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes the BRIDGES framework (Bank Risk Interlinkage with Dynamic Graph and Event Simulations), which combines Dynamic Time Warping, trend analysis, a Temporal Graph Neural Network, and Agent‑Based Model simulations to assess systemic risk in BRICS banks.","quote":"In this study, we introduce an analytics framework, the Bank Risk Interlinkage with Dynamic Graph and Event Simulations (BRIDGES), to capture the systemic risks associated with the growing economic influence of the BRICS nations. This framework includes a Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) method to construct a dynamic network of 551 BRICS banks with their annual balance sheet data from 2008 to 2024; a trend analysis in","summary":"The growing economic influence of the BRICS nations requires risk models that capture complex, long-term dynamics. This paper introduces the Bank Risk Interlinkage with Dynamic Graph and Event Simulations (BRIDGES) framework, which analyzes systemic risk based on the level of information complexity…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Systemic risk can be measured using a balance‑sheet‑based capital shortfall (CS) as the baseline metric SRISK_CS for each bank.","type":"data","stated":"explicit","quote":"For each BRICS bank, we use a balance-sheet-based capital shortfall (CS) to calculate a baseline for systemic risk (SRISK_CS).","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Annual balance‑sheet data are sufficient to construct dynamic inter‑bank relationships via DTW distance metrics.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"First, we choose the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance metrics to measure the structural relationships between banks over time.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The ABM can capture both structural contagion and behavioral panic effects despite the lack of high‑frequency market data.","type":"model","stated":"implied","quote":"Thus, in this research, we develop an Agent-Based Model (ABM) to examine both channels with forward-looking analysis despite the lack of high-frequency market data for many BRICS banks. We chose this method because it effectively handles node heterogeneity and complex network feedback loops.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"available","items":[{"name":"BankFocus BRICS banks dataset","provider":"BankFocus","kind":"fundamentals","access":"commercial","period":"2008-2024","universe":"551 BRICS commercial banks","quote":"Data Source and Variable Selection In this study, we select 22 financial and 3 descriptive variables from BankFocus for BRICS commercial banks for the period 2008 to 2024. Our final sample of 551 banks is smaller than the thousands of microbanks operating in the BRICS nations and also smaller than the 734 registered banks with under 10% missing values across 25 variables in the database.","support":"full"}],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"weekly-monthly"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"The failure of the largest BRICS banks causes more systemic damage than failures of financially vulnerable or anomalous banks due to panic effects.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The failure of the largest BRICS banks can cause more systemic damage than that of financially vulnerable or anomalous banks due to the panic effects.","support":"full"},{"finding":"A correlated, country‑wide geopolitical shock can cause more systemic damage than the failure of the largest BRICS banks, potentially leading to near‑total systemic collapse.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Moreover, compared to the failure of the largest BRICS banks, a geopolitical shock with correlated country-wide propagation can cause more systemic damage, resulting in a near-total systemic collapse. The simulation of several geopolitical scenarios demonstrates that a correlated, country-wide geopolitical shock is more destructive than any internal financial insolvency.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Banks with the highest SRISK_CS cause less systemic damage than banks with the largest assets under geopolitical shocks, indicating panic rather than financial insolvency drives collapse.","kind":"statistical","quote":"The simulation results show that banks with the highest SRISK_CS cause less systemic damage than banks with the largest assets under geopolitical shocks, suggesting that systemic collapse in BRICS might be driven by panic rather than individual banks’ financial insolvency.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The failure of very large banks (G‑SIBs) acts as a public signal that triggers panic and systemic collapse.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The failure of very large banks (G-SIBs) acts as a public signal of the panic that triggers the systemic collapse.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Simulation resolves the “Russian paradox”: Russian banks with low SRISK_CS but frequent state recapitalizations are associated with high network instability.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The simulation results also resolve the “Russian paradox,” showing that Russian banks with low SRISK_CS, resulting from frequent state-led recapitalizations, are in fact associated with high network instability.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"unclear","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2305.17830","title":"Large Banks and Systemic Risk: Insights from a Mean-Field Game Model","paper_date":"2023-05-28","authors":["Yuanyuan Chang","Dena Firoozi","David Benatia"],"empirical_rigor":3.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/large-banks-and-systemic-risk-insights-from-a-mean-field-game-model/"},"question":"How does the failure of the largest bank increase systemic risk?","this_paper_finding":"The failure of the largest BRICS banks causes more systemic damage than failures of financially vulnerable or anomalous banks due to panic effects.","other_paper_finding":"A large major bank can generate negative spillover effects, increasing systemic risk, especially when it defaults.","other_paper_quote":"However, there is also the potential for negative spillover effects in the event of default, leading to an increase in systemic risk. In our setting, the net impact is negative as soon as the large bank represents more than 10% of the interbank market.","note":"Both find that the biggest bank’s default raises systemic risk—A cites negative spillovers, B cites panic effects in BRICS markets.","confidence":0.908},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2305.17830","title":"Large Banks and Systemic Risk: Insights from a Mean-Field Game Model","paper_date":"2023-05-28","authors":["Yuanyuan Chang","Dena Firoozi","David Benatia"],"empirical_rigor":3.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/large-banks-and-systemic-risk-insights-from-a-mean-field-game-model/"},"question":"Does the failure of very large banks serve as a public signal that amplifies systemic risk?","this_paper_finding":"The failure of very large banks (G‑SIBs) acts as a public signal that triggers panic and systemic collapse.","other_paper_finding":"A large major bank can generate negative spillover effects, increasing systemic risk, especially when it defaults.","other_paper_quote":"However, there is also the potential for negative spillover effects in the event of default, leading to an increase in systemic risk. In our setting, the net impact is negative as soon as the large bank represents more than 10% of the interbank market.","note":"Both findings show that a large major bank or G‑SIB failure acts as a public signal triggering panic and increasing systemic risk; B empirically supports A.","confidence":0.906},{"paper":{"paper_id":"2305.17830","title":"Large Banks and Systemic Risk: Insights from a Mean-Field Game Model","paper_date":"2023-05-28","authors":["Yuanyuan Chang","Dena Firoozi","David Benatia"],"empirical_rigor":3.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/large-banks-and-systemic-risk-insights-from-a-mean-field-game-model/"},"question":"How does the size of the largest bank affect systemic risk?","this_paper_finding":"The failure of the largest BRICS banks causes more systemic damage than failures of financially vulnerable or anomalous banks due to panic effects.","other_paper_finding":"The impact of the major bank on systemic risk depends on its size and trading rate.","other_paper_quote":"The magnitude of this impact is further influenced by the size and trading rate of the major bank.","note":"Both findings show that a larger (or more active) biggest bank amplifies systemic risk; the BRICS evidence (B) supports the mean‑field model result (A).","confidence":0.581}],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":14,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:44:53Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. 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