{"paper_id":"2601.00738","title":"Second Thoughts: How 1-second subslots transform CEX-DEX Arbitrage on Ethereum","authors":["Aleksei Adadurov","Sergey Barseghyan","Anton Chtepine","Antero Eloranta","Andrei Sebyakin","Arsenii Valitov"],"paper_date":"2026-01-02","paper_type":"empirical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2601.00738v1","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/second-thoughts-how-1-second-subslots-transform-cex-dex-arb/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":7,"math_complexity":6.5,"quadrant":"Holy Grail"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper develops a trading model in which a CEX‑DEX arbitrageur explicitly accounts for execution risk of the DEX leg and uses this model to simulate arbitrage behavior under different block‑time regimes.","quote":"We develop a trading model where the agent's DEX transaction is not guaranteed to land, and the agent explicitly accounts for this execution risk when deciding whether to pursue arbitrage opportunities.","summary":"This paper examines the impact of reducing Ethereum slot time on decentralized exchange activity, with a focus on CEX-DEX arbitrage behavior. We develop a trading model where the agent’s DEX transaction is not guaranteed to land, and the agent explicitly accounts for this execution risk when…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"The DEX transaction is not guaranteed to land in a block and may fail due to competition or congestion.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"However, this strategy is not risk-free: while the CEX leg is executed almost instantaneously, the DEX leg must wait for block inclusion, which is not guaranteed.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Infinite liquidity and instant, guaranteed execution on Binance (CEX leg).","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"Assuming infinite liquidity and instant and guaranteed execution on Binance, the CEX leg settlement bears no risks, but the DEX leg needs to be included in a block.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"DEX prices are updated only at slot boundaries (every 12 seconds) unless subslot execution is enabled.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"If the DEX transaction fails to land, due to competition from other arbitrageurs, network congestion, among other reasons, the trader is left with unhedged exposure.","support":"partial"},{"assumption":"Zero gas fees are assumed in the baseline model.","type":"execution","stated":"explicit","quote":"Our model assumes zero gas fees, which may overstate the viability of small trades in low-fee pools.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The agent’s probability of landing a DEX trade (α) is fixed and not endogenously determined by competition.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Also, the agent’s probability of landing DEX trades is fixed rather than endogenously determined by competition; in equilibrium, faster execution might attract more arbitrageurs and compress α.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Noise trades are classified using four criteria (first in block, price discrepancy exceeds fee, price moves toward CEX, post‑trade discrepancy remains above fee).","type":"data","stated":"explicit","quote":"A trade is considered arbitrage if it satisfies all of the following four conditions: (1) it is the first transaction in a block, (2) the pre-trade CEX-DEX price discrepancy exceeds the pool fee, (3) the trade moves the DEX price toward the CEX price, and (4) the post-trade price discrepancy remains equal to or above the pool fee.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"available","items":[{"name":"Binance CEX price data","provider":"Binance","kind":"market-prices","access":"commercial","period":"July to September 2025","universe":null,"quote":"The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average. We use data from July to September 2025, including millisecond-level best bid and ask prices 4 0 12 24 P0 Slot n Slot n + 1 slot subslot Time, t (seconds) Price, P CEX mid price DEX slot price DEX subslot price Figure","support":"full","known_id":"binance"},{"name":"Uniswap v3 ETH‑USDC pool transactions","provider":"Uniswap","kind":"crypto-onchain","access":"public","period":"July to September 2025","universe":"ETH‑USDC pools","quote":"The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average. We use data from July to September 2025, including millisecond-level best bid and ask prices 4 0 12 24 P0 Slot n Slot n + 1 slot subslot Time, t (seconds) Price, P CEX mid price DEX slot price DEX subslot price Figure","support":"full"}],"known":[{"id":"binance","name":"Binance","provider":"Binance","kind":"market-prices","access":"public","quote":"The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average.","mentions":7,"used_in":1}],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"tick"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"available","modeled":"no","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":"Our model assumes zero gas fees, which may overstate the viability of small trades in low-fee pools.","source":"evidence_card","rule":"R2","candidates":{"front_matter":"unclear","evidence_card":"no","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":null,"card_quote":"Our model assumes zero gas fees, which may overstate the viability of small trades in low-fee pools.","meaning":"a trading or execution result is reported without costs"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Reducing slot time from 12 seconds to 1‑second subslots increases arbitrage transaction count by 535% on average.","kind":"performance","quote":"The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average. Under reasonable assumptions about agent risk preferences and inclusion probabilities, the shift from a 12-second to a 1-second execution environment increases the number of arbitrage transactions by 535%, with effects","support":"full"},{"finding":"The same reduction raises arbitrage trading volume by 203% on average.","kind":"performance","quote":"The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average. Under reasonable assumptions about agent risk preferences and inclusion probabilities, the shift from a 12-second to a 1-second execution environment increases the number of arbitrage transactions by 535%, with effects","support":"full"},{"finding":"In the simple model, average volume increase across three pools ranges from 148% to 211% (average 168%).","kind":"performance","quote":"When weighing the volume increases based on the arbitrage volume across different pools, the average increase in volume for the three pools varies between 148% and 211% for the simple model, with the average being 168%.","support":"full"},{"finding":"In the risk‑averse model, average volume increase across three pools is 203% (range 159%–243%).","kind":"performance","quote":"Similarly, for the risk-averse model, the overall increase varies be-tween 159% and 243%, with the average being 203%. Robustness Tests.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Faster execution reduces profit variance by compressing the window for adverse price moves during failed‑trade recovery.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"Faster execution also reduces profit variance by compressing the window for adverse price moves during failed-trade recovery.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"available","supports":[{"paper":{"paper_id":"2404.05803","title":"Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity","paper_date":"2024-04-08","authors":["Robin Fritsch","Andrea Canidio"],"empirical_rigor":8.5,"page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/measuring-arbitrage-losses-and-profitability-of-amm-liquidit/"},"question":"How does reducing block or slot time affect arbitrage activity in AMM markets?","this_paper_finding":"Reducing slot time from 12 seconds to 1‑second subslots increases arbitrage transaction count by 535% on average.","other_paper_finding":"Faster block times reduce arbitrage losses, with 100 ms blocks cutting losses by 20 % to 70 % relative to Ethereum’s 12 s blocks, depending on the pair.","other_paper_quote":"We find that losses to arbitrageurs are reduced by between 20% and 70% with 100ms block times compared to Ethereum’s current 12 seconds, depending on the trading pair.","note":"A shows 100 ms blocks cut losses 20‑70 % vs 12 s blocks; B shows 1‑s subslots raise transaction count 535 % vs 12 s slots. Samples differ (AMM pairs vs CEX‑DEX on Ethereum).","confidence":0.406}],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":20,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":1,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":1},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:44:41Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. Where an item has `support`, \"full\" means every figure in it appears in the quoted sentences and \"partial\" means a figure is stated elsewhere in the paper; items with a figure found nowhere in the paper were discarded.","datasets_known":"datasets.known lists well-known vendors and public datasets by a stable id, found by a dictionary over the full text where the sentence says the data is used; it is independent of the model and covers only names in the dictionary.","flags":"transaction_costs.modeled, results.evaluation_type and results.out_of_sample.method are platform classifications (structured-decision models); see https://thequant.space/score-guide/#penalty-flags","comparisons":"supports / contradicts / qualifies are a language model's reading of two papers' quoted findings, restricted to closely related papers that share no author. They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}