{"paper_id":"2610.01562","title":"Social welfare and price discovery in double auction markets","authors":["Teemu Pennanen"],"paper_date":"2026-10-01","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.01562","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/social-welfare-and-price-discovery-in-double-auction-markets/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":2,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a dynamic double auction model in a pure exchange economy where agents bid their indifference prices, and shows that Walras equilibria are the fixed points of the double auction and that repeated auctions generate bounded sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points ar","quote":"This paper studies dynamic double auctions in a pure exchange economy where agents bid their indifference prices implied by their current holdings and preferences. We show that Walras equilibria coincide with the fixed points of the double auction and that repeated double auctions generate bounded sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points are Walras equilibria with transfers.","summary":"The tendency of the double auction mechanism to drive prices to competitive equilibrium has been well documented in laboratory experiments, but the phenomenon has lacked a theoretical explanation. This paper studies dynamic double auctions in a pure exchange economy where agents bid their…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Agents bid their indifference prices (truthful bidding).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Truthful bidding thus isolates the role of the market mechanism itself, and even in this setting a theoretical explanation of price discovery in double auctions has been missing.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"A strictly preferred numeraire asset exists (Assumption 1).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"Assumption 1 on a strictly preferred numeraire asset allows us to get away with Assumptions 3 and 2 below.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Zero belongs to the interior of the sum of domains of the agents' demand functions (Assumption 2).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"0 ∈int X i∈I dom Di(¯xi; ·).","support":"full"},{"assumption":"If a portfolio is not worst, the agent can give away a small amount of the numeraire and remain feasible (Assumption 3).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The following was introduced in [21, Section 5]. Assumption 3.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Utility functions are concave (not required to be monotone or positive‑orthant).","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"All our results apply to general concave utility functions without requiring monotonicity nor that their domains are contained in the positive orthant.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The economy is a finite pure‑exchange economy with given initial endowments and concave preferences.","type":"market","stated":"explicit","quote":"9 Conclusions This paper analyzed the double auction mechanism in a pure exchange economy consisting of a finite set of agents with given initial endowments and preferences described by concave utility functions.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R3","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"n/a","evidence_card_quoted":false},"meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Walras equilibria coincide with the fixed points of the double auction mechanism.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We show that Walras equilibria coincide with the fixed points of the double auction and that repeated double auctions generate bounded sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points are Walras equilibria with transfers.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Repeated double auctions generate bounded sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points are Walras equilibria with transfers.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The main results, Theorems 8, 12 and 16, show that, under general conditions on the utility functions, repeated double auctions generate sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points are Walras equilibria with transfers.","support":"full"},{"finding":"This work provides the first theoretical explanation of the price convergence observed in laboratory double‑auction experiments.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"To our knowledge, this is the first theoretical explanation of the price convergence observed in laboratory experiments with double auctions.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The authors note that while experiments suggest actual convergence, their theorem only guarantees that all cluster points are equilibria.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"First, both laboratory experiments and the computational results suggest that the alloca-tions and prices generated by double auctions actually converge while Theo-rem 16 only asserts that all the cluster points are equilibria.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":12,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":2,"extracted_at":"2026-11-14T19:39:11Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. 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