{"paper_id":"2611.21262","title":"Strategic Repayment and Latent Fragility in Financial Networks: Why Banks Withhold Payable Liquidity","authors":["Hicham El Kaissi"],"paper_date":"2026-11-16","paper_type":"theoretical","paper_url":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.21262","page_url":"https://thequant.space/flowcharts/strategic-repayment-and-latent-fragility-in-financial-networks-why-banks/","scores":{"empirical_rigor":3,"math_complexity":8.5,"quadrant":"Lab Rats"},"proposes":{"status":"available","statement":"The paper proposes a strategic‑repayment model in which banks choose a precautionary liquidity reserve that trades a positive settlement‑discipline cost against the marginal value of retained cash, and shows that the repayment rule nests the Eisenberg‑Noe maximal feasible clearing when delay discipl","quote":"We derive this result from a precautionary-liquidity choice: banks may delay otherwise feasible payments to insure an interim funding need, trading a positive settlement-discipline cost against the marginal value of retained cash. The optimal reserve is a critical quantile of future liquidity requirements, and the repayment rule nests Eisenberg-Noe maximal feasible clearing exactly.","summary":"A network in which every bank pays in full can nevertheless admit a self-fulfilling settlement freeze under the same balance-sheet fundamentals. Thus, observing full repayment does not establish the uniqueness or robustness of the payment equilibrium. We derive this result from a…","strategy":null},"assumptions":{"status":"available","items":[{"assumption":"Banks may retain cash from date‑0 to insure an interim funding need, and the retained cash must be returned before the final settlement cut‑off.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The requirement that interim cash returns before final settlement is substantive: without that ordering, the date-0 wedge need not survive.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Date‑1 recoveries from other debtors are not recycled into the same instantaneous terminal settlement budget.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"We additionally assume that date-1 recoveries from other debtors are not recycled into the same instantaneous terminal settlement budget.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The baseline theory permits the incremental later requirement per unit of missing current inflow η_i ≥ 0, with an illustrative calibration restriction η_i ≤ 1.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"(6) The baseline theory permits 𝜂𝑖≥0; the illustrative persistence discipline 𝜂𝑖≤1 is an additional, contestable calibration restriction, not a universal banking law.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The settlement window permits deferral at a strictly positive continuation‑value cost δ_i, which does not constitute a payment into the interbank settlement pool.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"The settlement window permits deferral at a strictly positive continuation-value cost 𝛿𝑖, which does not constitute a payment into the interbank settlement pool.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"Each monetary unit of interim need not covered by retained resources entails an incremental real funding cost χ_i > 0.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"C. Economic discipline and precautionary liquidity valuation Each monetary unit of interim need not covered by retained resources entails an incremental real funding cost 𝜒𝑖> 0.","support":"full"},{"assumption":"The law of X_i ≥ 0 is exogenous to the bank’s own date‑0 action, conditional on counterparties’ profile, and does not deteriorate merely because the bank elects to delay a payment.","type":"model","stated":"explicit","quote":"For the tractable baseline, the law of 𝑋𝑖≥0 is exogenous to the bank’s own date-0 action, conditional on its counterparties’ profile, and does not deteriorate merely because the bank elects to delay a payment.","support":"full"}]},"datasets":{"status":"none_found","items":[],"known":[],"sample":{"start":null,"end":null,"market":null,"asset_class":null,"frequency":null},"data_resolution":"none"},"transaction_costs":{"status":"not_applicable","modeled":"n/a","headline_net_of_costs":null,"detail":null,"quote":null,"source":"front_matter","rule":"R4a","candidates":{"front_matter":"n/a","evidence_card":"yes","evidence_card_quoted":true},"card_detail":"A positive continuation‑value cost δ_i for deferring payment and a real funding cost χ_i > 0 for any interim cash shortfall are incorporated into the bank's objective.","card_quote":"C. Economic discipline and precautionary liquidity valuation Each monetary unit of interim need not covered by retained resources entails an incremental real funding cost 𝜒𝑖> 0. The settlement window permits deferral at a strictly positive continuation-value cost 𝛿𝑖, which does not constitute a payment into the interbank settlement pool.","meaning":"the paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter"},"results":{"status":"available","evaluation_type":"none","findings":[{"finding":"Even when every bank can pay in full, the network can admit a self‑fulfilling settlement freeze under the same balance‑sheet fundamentals.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"A network in which every bank pays in full can nevertheless admit a self-fulfilling settlement freeze under the same balance-sheet fundamentals.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The optimal liquidity reserve is a critical quantile of future liquidity requirements, and the repayment rule exactly nests the Eisenberg‑Noe maximal feasible clearing when delay discipline is sufficiently strong.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"The optimal reserve is a critical quantile of future liquidity requirements, and the repayment rule nests Eisenberg-Noe maximal feasible clearing exactly.","support":"full"},{"finding":"Network amplification and coexistence of full repayment and freeze are characterised, with a homogeneous two‑bank GPD frontier expressed through a single dimensionless index.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"We characterise network amplification and the conditions for coexistence, including a homogeneous two-bank GPD frontier in which interbank exposure and maximum funding pass-through enter through one dimensionless index.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The strategic repayment game exhibits strategic complementarities: a missing interbank payment reduces a bank’s date‑0 payment by 1 + ν_i units, amplifying the effect of counterparty actions.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"A one-unit missing interbank payment therefore reduces an interior bank’s date-0 payment by 1 + 𝜈𝑖units: one through immediate resources and 𝜈𝑖through additional desired retention.","support":"full"},{"finding":"The terminal settlement rule is timing‑neutral: for any feasible date‑0 action, aggregate final principal paid and terminal default are unchanged, isolating the early‑payment freeze from ultimate default.","kind":"theoretical","quote":"(12) Conditional on 𝑠−𝑖, the bank’s own date-0 choice changes the timing of settlement but neither aggregate final principal paid nor terminal default under this convention.","support":"full"}],"reported_performance":null,"out_of_sample":{"method":"none","headline_out_of_sample":null}},"independent_evidence":{"status":"none_found","supports":[],"contradicts":[],"qualifies":[],"compared_with":16,"citations":{"cited_by_in_corpus":0,"by_independent_authors":0,"how_cited":{"used_as_baseline":0,"uses_method_or_data":0,"extends":0,"discusses_findings":0,"mentions":0,"unclassified":0},"independent_papers":[],"scope":"Citations between papers in this corpus only; citations from outside it are not counted."}},"implementation":{"status":"available","public":false,"code_url":null,"note":"No repository presented by the authors as their own was found in the paper. Absence here is not proof that no code exists."},"replication":{"status":"none_found","card":null,"note":"No replication of this paper has been run by thequant.space yet."},"extraction":{"text_source":"fulltext","model":"openai/gpt-oss-120b","version":3,"extracted_at":"2026-11-17T15:29:17Z"},"provenance":{"claims":"Everything here is what the authors state in the paper. Nothing was re-run or reproduced by the platform.","quotes":"Assumptions, datasets, cost detail and findings were extracted by a language model. Every quote is verbatim paper text. 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They are pointers to read, not verified replications, and coverage is partial.","implementation":"code_url is a repository the paper itself presents as its own (rule-scored, ambiguous cases judged by a model), checked for liveness when it was recorded."},"docs":"https://thequant.space/agents/"}