5 papers in the archive (2023–2026), average empirical rigor 3/10, average math complexity 8.2/10. Quadrant mix: Holy Grail ×1, Lab Rats ×4.
Works mostly in Market Microstructure, Stochastic Control & Optimal Stopping, Insurance & Actuarial Risk, Fixed Income & Interest Rates.
Frequent co-authors: Kim Weston (2), Heeyoung Kwon (1), Seongjin Kim (1), Tae Ung Gang (1), Jetlir Duraj (1).
Scores are our LLM-assisted heuristics (methodology), not peer review or citation counts. Author pages are generated from paper metadata; name variants may split one person across pages. arXiv author page →
Ordered by a blend of empirical rigor (60%) and math complexity (40%).
We develop a multi-period Kyle-type model that incorporates both mandatory disclosure of informed trades and imperfect competition among market makers. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a linear equilibrium and show that the liquidity-enhancing effect of disclosure is fundamentally linked to
We prove the existence of a continuous-time Radner equilibrium with multiple agents and transaction costs. The agents are incentivized to trade towards a targeted number of shares throughout the trading period and seek to maximize their expected wealth minus a penalty for deviating from their target
We prove the existence of a Radner equilibrium in a model with population growth and analyze the effects on asset prices. A finite population of agents grows indefinitely at a Poisson rate, while receiving unspanned income and choosing between consumption and investing into an annuity with infinitel
This paper investigates the optimal investment problem in a market with two types of illiquidity: transaction costs and search frictions. Extending the framework established by arXiv:2101.09936, we analyze a power-utility maximization problem where an investor encounters proportional transaction cos
We study a discrete-time financial market with a single constrained trader, competitive market makers, and noise traders. Within the class of linear equilibria, the equilibrium structure is shown to be uniquely determined by two state variables: the market maker’s expectation of the trader’s remaini