Paper: arXiv 2510.06095

Authors: Althea Sterrett, Austin Adams

Abstract

The programmable and composable nature of smart contract protocols has enabled the emergence of novel market structures and asset classes that are architecturally frictional to implement in traditional financial paradigms. This fluidity has produced an understudied class of market dynamics, particularly in coupled markets where one market serves as an oracle for the other. In such market structures, purchases or liquidations through the intermediate asset create coupled price action between the intermediate and final assets; leading to basket inflation or deflation when denominated in the riskless asset. This paper examines the microstructure of this inflationary dynamic given two constant function market makers (CFMMs) as the intermediate market structures; attempting to quantify their contributions to the former relative to familiar pool metrics such as price drift, trade size, and market depth. Further, a concrete case study is developed, where both markets are constant product markets. The intention is to shed light on the market design process within such coupled environments.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 7.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper uses advanced calculus and differential equations to model price drift and marginal swap depth in coupled CFMMs, demonstrating high mathematical density. However, it is purely theoretical with no backtests, datasets, or empirical implementation details, focusing on analytical derivations rather than real-world data.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal:<br>Quantify CFMM Coupling<br>Microstructure & Inflation"] --> B["Methodology:<br>Analytical Modeling &<br>Case Study (Constant Product)"]
  B --> C["Inputs/Assumptions:<br>Two Coupled CFMMs (xy=k),<br>Trade Flows, Liquidity Pools"]
  C --> D["Computational Process:<br>Derive Price Impact &<br>Basket Inflation Mechanics"]
  D --> E["Key Outcomes:<br>1. Links Price Drift/Depth to Inflation<br>2. Confirms Architectural Friction<br>3. Informs Market Design"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes a microstructure analysis of inflationary dynamics in coupled constant function market makers, quantifying contributions of price drift, trade size, and market depth, and presents a concrete case study of two constant product markets.

Source sentence
This paper examines the microstructure of this inflationary dynamic given two constant function market makers (CFMMs) as the intermediate market structures; attempting to quantify their contributions to the former relative to familiar pool metrics such as price drift, trade size, and market depth. Further, a concrete case study is developed, where both markets are constant product markets.

Assumes 6

  • There exists an external liquid venue that provides the “true” market price for assets. model
    Source sentence
    One simplifying assumption of AMM models is that there exists an external liquid venue which functions as the “true” market price [7].
  • The AMM must remain concave, implying the marginal price after a swap tends to zero as trade size grows. model
    Source sentence
    Given that CFMMs must remain concave, the price of x after swap, P ′ x = dΛ d∆/γ, must obey the limit: lim ∆→∞ dΛ d∆/γ = 0.
  • The market under study is an “oracle market” where the price feed is solely determined by the AMM. market
    Source sentence
    We label this market as an "oracle market", as the “true” price of the asset is derived from this market, effectively making it an oracle.
  • The market lacks “noise trading”, leading to adverse selection of liquidity. market
    Source sentence
    Secondly, because of the lack of "noise trading", this market is almost exclusively being adversely selected.
Show 2 more
  • Pool fees are set to 3% for both markets in the case study. execution
    Source sentence
    So consider an auction house-like liquidity structure with the reserves x = 107, y1 = 4.5 × 108, y2 = 7.2 × 107, and z = 109, where both pool fees are set to 3%.
  • Liquidity providers are incentivized to supply long‑term liquidity because the asset issuer benefits from pricing information. other
    Source sentence
    However, the asset issuer greatly benefits from the pricing information provided by the pool, and is thus greatly incentivized to provide long-term liquidity in the market.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter.

The paper-text extraction found a cost parameter inside a model (Both pools use a 3% fee per trade, which is incorporated into the analytical results.); the classifier found no reported trading result, so costs are not applicable.

Finds 5

  • For a z‑purchase event on coupled CPMM‑CPMM markets, the basket value is always inflated relative to the decoupled scenario. theoretical
    Source sentence
    (16) Notice this is a quadratic function with respect to u = pµy + 1, with v(0) = 0, v′(0) = 0, and v′′(u) > 0 for ∀u > 0; implying the z purchase event yields always a basket with inflated value.
  • The price‑drift transmission function µz(µy) is derived analytically and illustrated for the chosen reserves and fees. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Now turning to the price drift transmission, µz(µy) = (y2xpµy + 1 + γ2y1x(pµy + 1 −1))2 x2(µy + 1)y2 2 −1. (17) For the provided reserve and fee values set at the start of the section, 2 displays this transmission function.
  • In a z‑liquidation event, the deflation effect is smaller (approximately a factor of pµy + 1) because the trade impact is confined to the y/x market. theoretical
    Source sentence
    This is why the effect is less compounded (by a factor of roughly pµy + 1) on liquidation rather than in purchases, given the fixed x denomination.
  • Coupling effects are likely to impact larger assets (e.g., ETH, SOL) due to finite market depth and substantial token issuance. other
    Source sentence
    While it is impossible to say for certain, it has likely had enormous compounding effects on assets such as ETH and SOL, which are widely used as the liquid asset for token projects.
  • The deeper a market, the less price impact the coupling has, indicating depth mitigates inflation/deflation effects. theoretical
    Source sentence
    The deeper the market, the less effect on the asset’s price.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 21 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (7)

  1. The leverage cycle (2010)
  2. Constant Function Market Makers: Multi-Asset Trades via Convex Optimization (2021) — link
  3. The economics of the Fed put (2021)
  4. Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees — → 2305.14604
  5. Decentralized exchange: The uniswap automated market maker (2025)
  6. Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (2024) — link
  7. am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker — → 2403.03367

2 of 7 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.