Paper: arXiv 2404.03976
Authors: Abe Alexander, Lars Fritz
Abstract
In the ever evolving landscape of decentralized finance automated market makers (AMMs) play a key role: they provide a market place for trading assets in a decentralized manner. For so-called bluechip pairs, arbitrage activity provides a major part of the revenue generation of AMMs but also a major source of loss due to the so-called informed orderflow. Finding ways to minimize those losses while still keeping uninformed trading activity alive is a major problem in the field. In this paper we will investigate the mechanics of said arbitrage and try to understand how AMMs can maximize the revenue creation or in other words minimize the losses. To that end, we model the dynamics of arbitrage activity for a concrete implementation of a pool and study its sensitivity to the choice of fee aiming to maximize the value retention. We manage to map the ensuing dynamics to that of a random walk with a specific reward scheme that provides a convenient starting point for further studies.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 7.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: The paper employs advanced stochastic modeling and calculus to map AMM arbitrage dynamics to random walks, indicating high math complexity. However, it relies entirely on theoretical simulations and synthetic data without backtesting or real-world datasets, resulting in low empirical rigor.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal: Determine optimal AMM fees<br>to maximize value retention"] --> B{"Methodology"};
B --> C["Model Arbitrage Dynamics<br>for Concrete AMM Implementation"];
C --> D["Simulate Activity & Analyze<br>Sensitivity to Fee Parameter"];
D --> E["Map Dynamics to<br>Random Walk with Reward Scheme"];
E --> F["Key Finding: Fee Optimization<br>Directly Impacts Value Retention"];
F --> G["Outcome: Theoretical Framework<br>for Future AMM Design"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper models the dynamics of arbitrage activity for a concrete AMM pool and studies its sensitivity to the fee choice to maximize value retention, mapping the dynamics to a random walk with a specific reward scheme.
Source sentence
To that end, we model the dynamics of arbitrage activity for a concrete implementation of a pool and study its sensitivity to the choice of fee aiming to maximize the value retention. We manage to map the ensuing dynamics to that of a random walk with a specific reward scheme that provides a convenient starting point for further studies.
Assumes 6
- Trading is exclusively via arbitrage. model
Source sentence
For the purpose of this paper, we thus model the trading activity of an AMM based on the assumption that trading is exclusively via arbritrage.
- An infinite‑liquidity source (CEX) provides a quote at every point in time. model
Source sentence
To that end we simulate a source of infinite liquidity which provides a quote at every point in time.
- The external quote follows a Brownian motion with drift and no further assumptions. model
Source sentence
This quote follows Brownian motion with a drift, while we make not further assumptions.
- The AMM is a Uniswap v2‑style constant‑product pool (xA·xB = L²). model
Source sentence
For simplicity, we assume that the AMM is described as a Uniswap v2 type constant function pool xA ∗xB = L2 (1) where xA is the number of tokens of type A and xB the number of tokens of type B. While we choose for a v2-style pool for simplicity, the analysis applies equally to a v3 style pool.
Show 2 more
- Transaction costs are negligible (TXN = 0). execution
Source sentence
We are assuming for now that transaction costs are negligible (TXN = 0), meaning we have a condition α 1 −f 1 + piA∆FL(1 −f) −(1 + ffl) > 0 .
- The fee on the liquidity side (ffl) is set to zero. model
Source sentence
(11) In the remainder of this paper we will discuss ffl = 0 which is realistic on many platforms.
Data
- Synthetic price series (Brownian motion) for CEX synthetic unknown
Source sentence
For the purpose of our simulation, the CEX price pCEX will follow Brownian motion. To this end, we have studied the following case: we simulate an equidistant price series of 1000 points with a starting price of ps = pCEX = 1 and a volatility per time step of σ = 0.001.
Costs
Unclear - sources disagree
Source sentence (the authors' words)
We are assuming for now that transaction costs are negligible (TXN = 0), meaning we have a condition α 1 −f 1 + piA∆FL(1 −f) −(1 + ffl) > 0 .
Finds 5
- For a given price mismatch there is an optimal fee that lets the AMM retain two‑thirds of the arbitrage gains while the arbitrageur receives one‑third. theoretical
Source sentence
It turns out, that for a given price mismatch, there is an optimal fee choice which allows the AMM to retain 2/3 of the gains, while the arbitrageur has to content with 1/3.
- The arbitrage threshold gain is proportional to the square of the fee and inversely proportional to price impact. theoretical
Source sentence
Furthermore, we find that the threshold gain in arbitrage processes (threshold defined as the minimal price difference required for successful arbitrage) is proportional to the square of the fees and inversely proportional to the price impact (non-linear price).
- The threshold condition for arbitrage is α > 1 + ffl/(1‑f), which simplifies to α > 1 + f/(1‑f) when ffl = 0. theoretical
Source sentence
(10) We find that there is a threshold condition on α for a set AMM fee f which needs to be overcome defined by α > 1 + ffl 1 −f .
- Simulation shows the average return is highly sensitive to fees when fee < volatility, and levels off for fees higher than volatility. performance
Source sentence
We find that the average return for a given volatility σ as a function of the fee f is quite sensitive to fees for f < σ while it levels off for fees higher than the volatility, see Fig. 4.
- A reasonable fee choice is slightly higher than the volatility; the exact fee value is not critical as long as it is not too high. performance
Source sentence
We find that it is a reasonable choice to choose the fee according to the volatility, ideally slightly higher.
Checked by others
Supported by
- Optimal Design of Automated Market Makers on Decentralized Exchanges
Compare the findings
This paper: A reasonable fee choice is slightly higher than the volatility; the exact fee value is not critical as long as it is not too high.
That paper: The optimal unit trading fee is relatively insensitive to the mean and individual asset volatilities when the exchange‑rate volatility is held constant.
2 papers in the archive
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (35)
- Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (2022) — link
- An Economic Model of a Decentralized Exchange with Concentrated Liquidity (2023)
- Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees — → 2305.14604
- Automated Market Makers: A Practical Guide to Decentralized Exchanges and Cryptocurrency Trading (2023) — link
- Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2005)
- Decentralized exchanges (2021)
- The adoption of blockchain-based decentralized exchanges (2021) — link
- The need for fees at a dex: How increases in fees can increase dex trading volume (2022)
and 27 more
- Uniswap v1 Core (2018) — link
- Uniswap v2 Core (2020) — link
- Uniswap v3 Core (2021) — link
- Uniswap v4 Core [Draft] (2023) — link
- JOE v2.1 Liquidity Book (2022) — link
- ALGEBRA Ecosystem: Decentralized exchange (2022) — link
- Automatic market-making with dynamic peg (2021) — link
- Mooniswap by 1inch.exchange (2020) — link
- MEV capturing AMM (McAMM) (2022) — link
- Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions (2023) — link
- Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability (2020)
- The Costs of Swapping on the Uniswap Protocol — → 2309.13648
- Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules (2022) — link
- High-frequency trading on decentralized on-chain exchanges (2021)
- The centralizing effects of private order flow on proposer-builder separation (2023) — link
- Logarithmic markets coring rules for modular combinatorial information aggregation (2007)
- A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker (2013)
- Twitter thread (2023) — link
- UniswapX (2023) — link
- Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society (2018)
- Triangle Fees — → 2306.17316
- Predictable Losses of Liquidity Provision in Constant Function Markets and Concentrated Liquidity Markets (2023) — link
- Decentralised Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision — → 2309.08431
- Automated Market Makers Designs Beyond Constant Functions (2023)
- Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (2024) — link
- Optimal Dynamic Fees for Blockchain Resources (2023) — link
- Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal (2024) — link
4 of 35 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.