Paper: arXiv 2406.13794
Authors: Viraj Nadkarni, Sanjeev Kulkarni, Pramod Viswanath
Abstract
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are essential in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) as they match liquidity supply with demand. They function through liquidity providers (LPs) who deposit assets into liquidity pools. However, the asset trading prices in these pools often trail behind those in more dynamic, centralized exchanges, leading to potential arbitrage losses for LPs. This issue is tackled by adapting market maker bonding curves to trader behavior, based on the classical market microstructure model of Glosten and Milgrom. Our approach ensures a zero-profit condition for the market maker’s prices. We derive the differential equation that an optimal adaptive curve should follow to minimize arbitrage losses while remaining competitive. Solutions to this optimality equation are obtained for standard Gaussian and Lognormal price models using Kalman filtering. A key feature of our method is its ability to estimate the external market price without relying on price or loss oracles. We also provide an equivalent differential equation for the implied dynamics of canonical static bonding curves and establish conditions for their optimality. Our algorithms demonstrate robustness to changing market conditions and adversarial perturbations, and we offer an on-chain implementation using Uniswap v4 alongside off-chain AI co-processors.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 8.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 6.5/10
- Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor
Why this score: The paper employs advanced mathematical techniques like differential equations, stochastic models, and Kalman filtering, which is dense and complex. However, it includes robust theoretical comparisons, on-chain implementation with Uniswap v4, and adversarial robustness analysis, making it highly data/implementation-focused.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD A["Research Goal"] -->|"Formulate"| B["Adaptive Bonding Curves"] B -->|"Methodology"| C["Market Microstructure Model<br>Glosten-Milgrom"] C -->|"Core Condition"| D["Zero-Profit Condition"] D -->|"Mathematical Form"| E["Optimality Differential Equation"] E -->|"Solve Using"| F["Computational Process<br>Kalman Filtering"] F -->|"Data Inputs"| G["Off-chain AI Co-processors<br>No Price Oracles"] G -->|"Implementation"| H["On-chain: Uniswap v4"] H -->|"Key Outcomes"| I["Minimized Arbitrage Loss &<br>Adaptive Liquidity"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes optimal adaptive bonding curves for AMMs by deriving a differential equation for the demand curve that minimizes arbitrage losses, and provides exact solutions for Gaussian and Lognormal price models using Kalman filtering, as well as an adaptive Kalman filter for unknown market c
Source sentence
This issue is tackled by adapting market maker bonding curves to trader behavior, based on the classical market microstructure model of Glosten and Milgrom. Our approach ensures a zero-profit condition for the market maker's prices.
Assumes 6
- Trader and price behavior follow known Gaussian or Lognormal statistics. statistical
Source sentence
When the statistics governing trader and price behavior are known and Gaussian/Lognormal, we show that this differential equation can be solved exactly using a dynamic bonding curve that changes its operating point using the Kalman Filter (Theorem 2 and Theorem 3).
- The external market price follows a Glosten‑Milgrom microstructure model that is continuously changing. model
Source sentence
Optimal market making: The trader behavior model we employ is derived from the Glosten-Milgrom model [26], which is widely used in market microstructure literature.
- No price oracle is used; the market maker relies only on trading history. execution
Source sentence
To circumvent these issues, our framework explicitly excludes the use of oracles.
- Parameters σ and η controlling price jump and noise variances are known for the static optimal curve derivation. statistical
Source sentence
5.2 Adaptive Kalman Filter algorithm for unknown market parameters Need for more adaptivity: A major assumption while solving for the optimal demand curve in the Gaussian/Lognormal model was that the market parameters σ, η that control the variances of the price jump and noise were known to the AMM.
Show 2 more
- Adversarial traders constitute less than 50% of all trading interactions for robustness guarantees. market
Source sentence
(Section 5.2) Robustness to adversarial manipulation In presence of irrational traders that seek to make the price of the market maker deviate from the external market, we present a robust version of the adaptive curve algorithm that tolerates upto 50% of trader population being adversarial.
- Static CFMMs can only be optimally efficient when inter‑block time vanishes, the CFMM has more liquidity than the external market, and trader/price behavior is severely constrained. model
Source sentence
We show that these CFMMs can only be optimally efficient in a model where inter-block time for the underlying blockhchain vanishes, the CFMM has more liquidity than the external market, and that the trader and price behaviour is severely constrained.
Data
Synthetic data only.
Costs
Partial
Arbitrage losses are intended to be offset by transaction fees, but no specific fee levels are quantified.
Source sentence
These losses are intended to be offset by transaction fees, contrasting with centralized exchanges which benefit from higher liquidity and trading volumes but impose lower fees.
Finds 5
- Both the optimal adaptive curve (using known statistics) and the adaptive Kalman filter (for unknown statistics) achieve significantly lower arbitrage losses compared to a static CFMM. performance
Source sentence
We empirically show that both these approaches suffer significantly lower arbitrage losses compared to a static CFMM.
- The adaptive curve algorithm remains robust when up to 50% of the trader population behaves adversarially. theoretical
Source sentence
(Section 5.2) Robustness to adversarial manipulation In presence of irrational traders that seek to make the price of the market maker deviate from the external market, we present a robust version of the adaptive curve algorithm that tolerates upto 50% of trader population being adversarial.
- The error of the adaptive AMM price, viewed as an oracle, decays with more trades, whereas the error of a static curve remains unchanged. theoretical
Source sentence
(Section 5.3) Comparisons with static curves (Section 6) We provide theoretical comparisons of static and the proposed adaptive curve models by showing that the error in the adaptive AMM price, when viewed as an oracle, decays with more trades, while that of a static curve remains unchanged (Theorem 4).
- The proposed market making algorithms can be made robust to manipulation attacks as long as the proportion of adversarial traders is less than half of all interactions. theoretical
Source sentence
Although any protocol using an AMM as a price oracle usually takes necessary precautions, such as ensuring a diverse portfolio of price signals, using outlier-robust statistics such as medians rather than means, etc. we show that our market making algorithms can be made robust to such market adversaries, when the proportion of such adversarial is less than half of all trading interactions.
- Static CFMMs are only optimally efficient under restrictive conditions: zero inter‑block time, higher liquidity than the external market, and severely constrained trader and price behavior. theoretical
Source sentence
We show that these CFMMs can only be optimally efficient in a model where inter-block time for the underlying blockhchain vanishes, the CFMM has more liquidity than the external market, and that the trader and price behaviour is severely constrained.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 12 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
3 papers in the archive
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
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4 of 90 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.