Paper: arXiv 2403.03367
Authors: Austin Adams, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Sara Reynolds, Dan Robinson
Abstract
Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue from uninformed orderflow. The auction-managed AMM’’ works by running a censorship-resistant onchain auction for the right to temporarily act as pool manager’’ for a constant-product AMM. The pool manager sets the swap fee rate on the pool, and also receives the accrued fees from swaps. The pool manager can exclusively capture some arbitrage by trading against the pool in response to small price movements, and also can set swap fees incorporating price sensitivity of retail orderflow and adapting to changing market conditions, with the benefits from both ultimately accruing to liquidity providers. Liquidity providers can enter and exit the pool freely in response to changing rent, though they must pay a small fee on withdrawal. We prove that under certain assumptions, this AMM should have higher liquidity in equilibrium than any standard, fixed-fee AMM.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 7.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: The paper contains significant theoretical modeling and formal proofs of equilibrium properties, but lacks empirical backtesting, code, or datasets, focusing instead on theoretical mechanism design.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal<br>Optimize AMM for<br>Informed & Uninformed Flow"] --> B["Key Methodology<br>Auction-Managed AMM"]
B --> C{"Data & Inputs<br>Market Conditions & Orderflow"}
C --> D["Computational Process<br>Auction for Pool Manager Role"]
D --> E["Manager Actions<br>Set Swap Fee & Trade Arbitrage"]
E --> F["Liquidity Providers<br>Enter/Exit based on Rent"]
F --> G["Key Outcomes<br>Higher Equilibrium Liquidity"]
G --> H["Result<br>Maximize LP Revenue<br>Minimize Informed Loss"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes the auction-managed AMM (am‑AMM), a constant‑product AMM that uses an on‑chain Harberger‑lease auction to let the winning manager set dynamic swap fees and capture arbitrage profits, aiming to reduce informed order‑flow losses and maximize revenue from uninformed flow.
Source sentence
This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue from uninformed orderflow. In this paper, we propose the auction-managed AMM (am-AMM), a new AMM design that targets both LVR reduction and fee optimization with one mechanism.
Assumes 5
- The AMM is a constant‑product market maker with invariant √xy = L and a proportional trading fee f ∈ [0, fmax]. model
Source sentence
We will restrict to the case of a constant product market maker,1 with invariant √xy = L, where we denote the reserve quantities by (x, y) and the pool liquidity level by L. If the price of the risky asset is given by P, the value of the the pool reserves is given by V (L) ≜2 √ PL, as a function of the available liquidity L. We assume the pool charges a proportional trading fee f ∈[0, fmax].
- Traders can only trade on the pool at discrete block generation times. execution
Source sentence
As in Milionis et al. (2023), we assume that traders can only trade on the pool at discrete block generation times.
- Arbitrageurs are competitive, deep, and have infinite capital, so arbitrage profit scales linearly with pool value: ARB_PROFIT(f, L) = AP0(f)·V(L) with AP0 decreasing in f. market
Source sentence
We assume there is a competitive and deep market of arbitrageurs monitoring prices in the AMM and exploiting price differences between the AMM and the fundamental price. For L > 0, we assume that ARB_PROFIT(f, L) = AP0(f)V (L), where AP0(·) is a continuous, decreasing function.
- Noise‑trader demand is sub‑linear in pool value (satiated) and can be represented by H(f, L) = c0 L^α exp(−c1 f) with α∈(0,1). model
Source sentence
Part 2 implies that the noise trader is sub-linear in pool value or liquidity, i.e., noise trader demand is satiated. Example 1. Consider H(f, L) ≜c0Lα exp(−c1f), where c0, c1 > 0 and α ∈(0, 1) are parame-ters that could be estimated from transaction data, and may be time varying or may depend on 1The key property of the constant product market maker we use is that the arbitrage profits and arbitrage excess scale
Show 1 more
- The auction uses a delay parameter K so that rent and manager for block N are locked in as of block N‑K (Harberger lease). other
Source sentence
The auction uses a delay parameter K. The rules of the auction are designed so that both the rent and the pool manager for block N are locked in as of block N −K. Harberger lease. The right to be the manager of a pool is set in a special onchain auction we call a “Harberger lease” (named after the “Harberger taxes” popularized by Posner and Weyl (2018)).
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 2
- Under certain assumptions, the am‑AMM should have higher liquidity in equilibrium than any standard fixed‑fee AMM. theoretical
Source sentence
We prove that under certain assumptions, this AMM should have higher liquidity in equilibrium than any standard, fixed-fee AMM.
- The am‑AMM is a provably incentive‑compatible dynamic‑fee design that should always attract more liquidity than any fixed‑fee AMM. theoretical
Source sentence
The am-AMM is a first attempt at a provably incentive-compatible dynamic fee, where the fee is set by the market in a way that should always attract more liquidity than any fixed-fee AMM. 2.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 6 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
11 papers in the archive : How Much Screening Buys a Second? Speed, Selection, and the … ; Optimal Design of Automated Market Makers on Decentralized …
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.