Paper: arXiv 2507.08302
Authors: Xue Dong He, Chen Yang, Yutian Zhou
Abstract
Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) are alternative venues to centralized exchanges (CEXs) for trading cryptocurrencies and have become increasingly popular. An arbitrage opportunity arises when the exchange rate of two cryptocurrencies in a DEX differs from that in a CEX. Arbitrageurs can then trade on the DEX and CEX to make a profit. Trading on the DEX incurs a gas fee, which determines the priority of the trade being executed. We study a gas-fee competition game between two arbitrageurs who maximize their expected profit from trading. We derive the unique symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium and find that (i) the arbitrageurs may choose not to trade when the arbitrage opportunity and liquidity is small; (ii) the probability of the arbitrageurs choosing a higher gas fee is lower; (iii) the arbitrageurs pay a higher gas fee and trade more when the arbitrage opportunity becomes larger and when liquidity becomes higher; (iv) the arbitrageurs’ expected profit could increase with arbitrage opportunity and liquidity. The above findings are consistent with our empirical study.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 7.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10
- Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor
Why this score: The paper develops a rigorous game-theoretic model with symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium, involving strategic gas fee competition, which requires advanced mathematical derivation. It complements this with extensive empirical validation using real blockchain data (Binance and Uniswap), backtesting implications like trade frequency, gas fee selection, and profit analysis, making it highly data- and implementation-heavy.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal"] --> B["Game Theoretic Model"]
B --> C["Data & Assumptions"]
C --> D["Solve Mixed Nash Equilibrium"]
D --> E["Computational Analysis"]
E --> F["Key Findings & Outcomes"]
subgraph C ["Data & Inputs"]
C1["Liquidity"]
C2["Gas Fee Costs"]
C3["Arbitrage Opportunity"]
end
subgraph E ["Computational Processes"]
E1["Simulate Trading Decisions"]
E2["Calculate Expected Profits"]
end
subgraph F ["Outcomes"]
F1["No trade for small opportunities"]
F2["Lower prob for higher gas fees"]
F3["Higher fees & trade for large opportunities"]
F4["Profit increases with opp & liquidity"]
end
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes the first equilibrium model of gas fee competition between two arbitrageurs across three transaction reversion settings.
Source sentence
We develop the first equilibrium model of gas fee competition between two arbitrageurs under three transaction reversion settings: no-revert, auto-revert, and selectable-revert.
Assumes 6
- Price discrepancies between DEX and CEX are public information. market
Source sentence
since price discrepancies are public information, multiple arbitrageurs are likely to compete for the same arbitrage opportunity.
- Arbitrageurs face inventory risk. model
Source sentence
confirm that arbitrageurs face positive inventory risk.
- In the auto-revert setting, reverted transactions incur a small cost (e.g., gas fee). execution
Source sentence
in the auto-revert setting we assume a small cost (e.g., gas fee) for transactions that are submitted but reverted.
- Traders can choose the transaction reversion setting (no‑revert, auto‑revert, selectable‑revert). model
Source sentence
Our goal is to analyze the arbitrageur’s strategy in the gas fee competition game in each of these settings.
Show 2 more
- Trading on a DEX incurs a proportional fee f = 0.3%. execution
Source sentence
Finally, the unit transaction fee f on Uniswap V2 is 0.3%.
- Base gas fee is calculated as base fee per gas multiplied by gas used (median 5.6 USD). data
Source sentence
We use the median of the base fee per gas in blocks with arbitrage and the mode of the gas used in our empirical study
Data
- WETH/USDT swap transactions on Uniswap V2 crypto-onchain public
Source sentence
We collect 100,000 swap transactions for the WETH/USDT pair on Uniswap V2 from October 27, 2024 to December 1, 2024.
- Blockchain block data (reserves, base fee per gas) crypto-onchain public
Source sentence
includes the block number, block generation time, WETH/USDT reserve amounts on Uniswap V2 at block generation, and the base fee per gas.
- Second‑by‑second ETH price data market-prices public
Source sentence
We collect second‑by‑second ETH price data from Binance, the largest CEX for cryptocurrency trading.
Binance The Graph (subgraphs)
Costs
Modeled
Unit transaction fee f = 0.3% on Uniswap V2 and gas fees (base fee per gas × gas used, median 5.6 USD).
Source sentence
Trading on a DEX incurs a proportional fee. Let f be the unit trading fee
Finds 5
- Pure symmetric equilibria do not exist in any of the three reversion settings; unique mixed symmetric equilibria can be characterized. theoretical
Source sentence
We show that pure symmetric equilibria do not exist, but unique mixed equilibria can be characterized.
- Under low inventory risk, the no‑revert setting yields higher arbitrageur profits, while auto‑revert and selectable‑revert improve market efficiency. theoretical
Source sentence
Comparative analysis reveals that under low inventory risk, the no-revert setting favors arbitrageurs in terms of profit, while auto-revert and selectable-revert settings enhance market efficiency.
- Under high inventory risk, the no‑revert and selectable‑revert settings dominate the auto‑revert setting in both profitability and efficiency. theoretical
Source sentence
Under high inventory risk, the no-revert and selectable-revert settings dominate the auto-revert setting in both profitability and efficiency.
- Empirically, gas fees increase with price discrepancies and liquidity, and trading amounts rise with both price discrepancies and gas fees. other
Source sentence
We empirically confirm that arbitrageurs face positive inventory risk and validate our model's implications: gas fees increase with price discrepancies and liquidity, while trading amounts rise with both price discrepancies and gas fees.
- Regression results show that relative swap amount (conditional on trading) increases with price discrepancy and gas fee, and gas fee increases with price discrepancy and liquidity. other
Source sentence
We find that the relative trading amount, conditional on trading, increases with price discrepancy and gas fee, and that the gas fee, conditional on trading, increases with price discrepancy and liquidity.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 41 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
6 papers in the archive
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (3)
- The need for fees at a dex: How increases in fees can increase dex trading volume (2026)
- The economics of constant function market makers (2025)
- Optimal trading in automated market makers (2026)
0 of 3 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.