Paper: arXiv 2507.02027

Authors: Christoph Schlegel, Quintus Kilbourn

Abstract

We derive the arbitrage gains or, equivalently, Loss Versus Rebalancing (LVR) for arbitrage between \textit{“two imperfectly liquid”} markets, extending prior work that assumes the existence of an infinitely liquid reference market. Our result highlights that the LVR depends on the relative liquidity and relative trading volume of the two markets between which arbitrage gains are extracted. Our model assumes that trading costs on at least one of the markets is quadratic. This assumption holds well in practice, with the exception of highly liquid major pairs on centralized exchanges, for which we discuss extensions to other cost functions.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 4.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper presents advanced mathematical derivations, including stochastic calculus (GBM), quadratic cost approximations, and limit analysis to derive closed-form expressions for LVR. It is theoretically dense but lacks empirical validation, backtests, or implementation details, focusing entirely on model derivation and theoretical extensions.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal: Derive arbitrage gains / LVR for<br>two imperfectly liquid markets (extending<br>reference market assumptions)"] --> B["Methodology: Quadratic Trading Cost Model<br>Assume costs quadratic on at least one market"]

  B --> C["Data/Inputs: Relative Liquidity Parameters<br>Relative Trading Volume between Markets"]

  C --> D["Computational Process: Modeling Arbitrage<br>Between Two Constrained Markets<br>Derive Closed-Form LVR Expression"]

  D --> E["Key Outcome: LVR depends on<br>Relative Liquidity & Trading Volume<br>Calibrated for Imperfect Liquidity"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes an analytical model that derives closed‑form expressions for arbitrage gains (Loss Versus Rebalancing, LVR) when both venues have bounded liquidity and at least one market incurs quadratic trading costs.

Source sentence
We derive the arbitrage gains or, equivalently, Loss Versus Rebalancing (LVR) for arbitrage between \textit{two imperfectly liquid} markets, extending prior work that assumes the existence of an infinitely liquid reference market. Our model assumes that trading costs on at least one of the markets is quadratic.

Assumes 5

  • Trading cost (slippage) on at least one of the markets is quadratic. model
    Source sentence
    Our model assumes that trading costs on at least one of the markets is quadratic. Our core assumption is that trading cost (slippage) on at least one of the markets is quadratic.
  • Both venues have bounded liquidity (finite reserves). market
    Source sentence
    2 Model and Results There are two venues where a pair of tokens A and B is traded. Trading on the first venue follows the setting of the LVR paper, where x∗(Q) denotes equilibrium reserves of the risky-asset at exchange rate Q. In contrast to the standard model, we assume that the second venue also has bounded liquidity ˜x∗(Q) and that trading on the second venue has a quadratic trading cost that depends on the
  • The equilibrium exchange rate follows a geometric Brownian motion. statistical
    Source sentence
    More specifically, the trading cost for ∆x amount of token A is C(Q, ∆x) = (∆x)2 2|˜x∗′(Q)|, i.e. selling ∆x amount of token A yields Q∆x −C(Q, ∆x) amount of token B (rather than Q∆x if there wasn’t a trading cost).1 We assume that the equilibrium market exchange rate after the market has been arbitraged to efficiency follows a GBM dQt Qt ≡σdBt for a Brownian motion Bt. This is the same price dynamics assumption as
  • Liquidity provisioning on the reference market is active while DEX liquidity providers are largely passive. market
    Source sentence
    Third, the standard analysis usually mixes two effects for the reference market, which are in reality confounded but separate: there is different liquidity in the two markets and liquidity provisioning on the reference market is active, while DEX LPs are largely passive.
Show 1 more
  • The quadratic cost function is C(Q,Δx) = (Δx)^2 / (2|˜x*'(Q)|). model
    Source sentence
    More specifically, the trading cost for ∆x amount of token A is C(Q, ∆x) = (∆x)2 2|˜x∗′(Q)|, i.e. selling ∆x amount of token A yields Q∆x −C(Q, ∆x) amount of token B (rather than Q∆x if there wasn’t a trading cost).1 We assume that the equilibrium market exchange rate after the market has been arbitraged to efficiency follows a GBM dQt Qt ≡σdBt for a Brownian motion Bt.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter.

The paper-text extraction found a cost parameter inside a model (Quadratic trading cost C(Q,Δx) = (Δx)^2 / (2|˜x*'(Q)|) is incorporated into the arbitrage gain formula.); the classifier found no reported trading result, so costs are not applicable.

Finds 3

  • LVR is determined by the relative liquidity provisioned at the margin and the relative trading volume of the two markets. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Our model predicts that LVR is determined by the relative liquidity pro-visioned at the margin around the equilibrium exchange rate and the relative trading volume.
  • The paper provides the first analytical closed‑form expressions for LVR when both venues incur trading costs. theoretical
    Source sentence
    To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analytical work that considers LVR where all venues have trading costs.
  • The quadratic cost assumption holds broadly in practice, except for highly liquid pairs on centralized exchanges where a different cost function is needed. theoretical
    Source sentence
    The notable exception is highly liquid pairs on (CEX) limit order books, as explained in the next section.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 12 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive (1 by independent authors): Partially Active Automated Market Makers (extends it)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (37)

  1. Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (2023)
  2. Bargaining and reputation (2000)
  3. Cross-Rollup MEV: Non-Atomic Arbitrage Across L2 Blockchains (2024) — link
  4. FLAIR: A Metric for Liquidity Provider Competitiveness in Automated Market Makers — → 2306.09421
  5. SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) Protocols (2023) — link
  6. Rebalancing-versus-Rebalancing: Improving the fidelity of Loss-versus-Rebalancing — → 2410.23404
  7. Arbitrageurs’ profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response (2025) — link
  8. An Overview of Uniswap v4 for Researchers (2025)
and 29 more
  1. Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity — → 2404.05803
  2. Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest — → 2507.13023
  3. Ethereum is game-changing technology, literally. (2019) — link
  4. Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing (2022)
  5. Automated market making and arbitrage profits in the presence of fees — → 2305.14604
  6. Loss-Versus-Rebalancing under Deterministic and Generalized block-times — → 2505.05113
  7. Foundations of cooperative AI (2022)
  8. Open problems in cooperative AI (2020) — link
  9. The principal-agent alignment problem in artificial intelligence (2021)
  10. Concrete problems in AI safety (2016) — link
  11. AI safety via debate (2018) — link
  12. Cooperative and uncooperative institution designs: Surprises and problems in open-source game theory (2022) — link
  13. Program equilibrium (2004)
  14. A commitment folk theorem (2010)
  15. Axioms for Constant Function Market Makers (2023) — link
  16. UNISWAP v3 core (2021) — link
  17. UniswapX (2023)
  18. Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3 (2024) — link
  19. Uniswap v2 Core (2020)
  20. The economics of Constant Function Market Makers (2025)
  21. Finding the Right Curve: Optimal Design of Constant Function Market Makers (2023) — link
  22. Optimal execution of portfolio transactions (2001)
  23. High-frequency trading in a limit order book (2008) — link
  24. Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance (2025) — link
  25. Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges (2019) — link
  26. Optimistic MEV in Ethereum Layer 2s: Why Blockspace Is Always in Demand (2025) — link
  27. Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why? (2024) — link
  28. Arbitrage on Decentralized Exchanges — → 2507.08302
  29. When does the tail wag the dog? Curvature and market making (2020) — link

7 of 37 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.