Paper: arXiv 2504.16542
Authors: Simon Caspar Zeller, Paul-Niklas Ken Kandora, Daniel Kirste, Niclas Kannengießer, Steffen Rebennack, Ali Sunyaev
Abstract
Concentrated liquidity automated market makers (AMMs), such as Uniswap v3, enable liquidity providers (LPs) to earn liquidity rewards by depositing tokens into liquidity pools. However, LPs often face significant financial losses driven by poorly selected liquidity provision intervals and high costs associated with frequent liquidity reallocation. To support LPs in achieving more profitable liquidity concentration, we developed a tractable stochastic optimization problem that can be used to compute optimal liquidity provision intervals for profitable liquidity provision. The developed problem accounts for the relationships between liquidity rewards, divergence loss, and reallocation costs. By formalizing optimal liquidity provision as a tractable stochastic optimization problem, we support a better understanding of the relationship between liquidity rewards, divergence loss, and reallocation costs. Moreover, the stochastic optimization problem offers a foundation for more profitable liquidity concentration.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 7.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 6.0/10 (capped from 6.5: no out-of-sample test; see penalty flags)
- Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor (effective empirical rigor capped from 6.5)
Why this score: The paper develops a tractable stochastic optimization problem, which involves advanced mathematical modeling of liquidity rewards, divergence loss, and reallocation costs. It also demonstrates utility by applying the strategy to historical on-chain trading data from Uniswap v3 and comparing it to other strategies, indicating backtest-ready empirical validation.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal<br>Optimize Liquidity Provision<br>in Concentrated AMMs"] --> B{"Stochastic Optimization<br>Problem Formulation"}
B --> C["Data Inputs<br>Price History, Fee Tiers, Gas Costs"]
C --> D["Computational Process<br>Solve for Optimal Intervals"]
D --> E["Key Findings<br>Optimal Intervals Reduce<br>Reallocation Costs & Divergence Loss"]
E --> F["Outcome<br>Foundation for Profitable<br>Liquidity Concentration"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes a tractable stochastic optimization problem to compute optimal liquidity provision intervals for profitable liquidity concentration.
Source sentence
we developed a tractable stochastic optimization problem that can be used to compute optimal liquidity provision intervals for profitable liquidity provision.
Assumes 6
- LPs do not influence price movements and the total liquidity in the pool. market
Source sentence
We assumed that LPs do not influence price movements and the total liquidity in the pool.
- The token price follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) without drift. model
Source sentence
We assumed that the token price follows GBM without drift.
- Liquidity is reallocated only when the price exits the current interval. execution
Source sentence
we assume the LP to reallocate their liquidity at time t when the liquidity position becomes inactive: πt /∈ [πl_{t‑1}, πu_{t‑1}]
- Liquidity provision interval width α must be at least 1 + ε for numerical feasibility. model
Source sentence
+ ϵ, … We introduce ϵ > 0 together with (2g) for numerical reasons
Show 2 more
- The analysis is performed over a finite horizon with a limited number of time steps T. other
Source sentence
We analyzed a finite‑horizon problem with a limited number of time‑steps T due to runtime constraints.
- Liquidity rewards are assumed constant between t‑1 and t when the position is active. model
Source sentence
we assume constant liquidity rewards per unit of active liquidity between t‑1 and t, i.e., cf_t = cf_t.
Data
- 0.05% USDC/ETH liquidity pool on Uniswap v3 crypto-onchain public
Source sentence
0.05% USDC/ETH liquidity pool on Uniswap v3—one of the most adopted pools by trade volume [18]. We consequently set ctr to 0.05%. Our dataset spans from January 11, 2023, starting with the Ether price at approximately $1,350, to November 30, 2024, with a price of $3,725.
Costs
Modeled
Transaction costs include blockchain fees (cg) and rebalancing fees proportional to the amount exchanged; these are incorporated in the optimization constraints.
Source sentence
Transaction costs arise from fees that a blockchain system charges for transaction processing. Rebalancing costs occur when LPs rebalance their token holdings
Finds 5
- Providing liquidity in wide intervals is profitable due to large price moves, but low virtual liquidity makes rewards insufficient to offset divergence loss. theoretical
Source sentence
The demonstration suggests that providing liquidity within wide liquidity provision intervals is profitable due to the significant increase in the marginal exchange rate. Due to the low virtual liquidity associated with such interval widths, liquidity rewards are too low to offset divergence loss.
- Narrow intervals yield higher liquidity rewards but can lead to lower overall profits or negative returns because of higher reallocation costs and divergence loss. theoretical
Source sentence
Providing liquidity in narrow intervals yields significantly higher liquidity rewards than wider intervals. Despite increased rewards, these strategies tend to generate lower profits or even lead to negative returns…
- For α ≥ 1.73 the initial interval is large enough to avoid reallocation, resulting in steadily increasing profits as divergence loss declines. performance
Source sentence
is greater than the maximum price. Thus, the initial liquidity provision interval is large enough such that no reallocation is needed
- An α of 4 yields a profit of 65%, whereas a full‑range position would have yielded 71% over the same period. performance
Source sentence
Going full range would have resulted in profits of 71%, compared to 65% for α = 4.
- Liquidity provisioning was profitable in the studied period mainly because ETH price nearly tripled; a price decline could have turned results negative. performance
Source sentence
Liquidity provisioning is profitable in the analyzed period, mainly because the price of ETH nearly tripled. Conversely, a decrease in the price of ETH could have reduced profitability, potentially leading to financial losses.
Checked by others
Contradicted by
- The Term Structure of Implied Fee Rates in Liquidity Pools
Compare the findings
This paper: Providing liquidity in wide intervals is profitable due to large price moves, but low virtual liquidity makes rewards insufficient to offset divergence loss.
That paper: Tighter liquidity ranges centered near the spot price generate systematically higher implied fee returns than wider or asymmetric ranges.
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (32)
- How Automated Market Makers Approach the Thin Market Problem in Cryptoeocnomic Systems (2023) — link
- Differential Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3 and Implications for Contract Design✱ (2022) — link
- Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap V3 (2023) — link
- Stochastic dual dynamic programming and its variants (2021) — link
- On the influence of conventional and automated market makers on market quality in cryptoeconomic systems (2024) — link
- SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) Protocols (2023) — link
- Automated Market Makers (2020) — link
- Liquidity Provision by Automated Market Makers (2020) — link
and 24 more
- Automated Market Making and Loss - Versus - Rebalancing (2023) — link
- Undergirding Bonding Curves : Supply -sovereign Automated Market Makers Enabling Liquidity and Sustainable Financing (2025) — link
- Complexity- Approximation Trade - Offs in Exchange Mechanisms : AMMs vs. LOBs — → 2302.11652
- Uniswap v2 Core (2020) — link
- Uniswap v3 Core (2021) — link
- Risks and Returns of Uniswap V3 Liquidity Providers (2023) — link
- Gurobi Optimizer Reference Manual (2023) — link
- Automated market makers and decentralized exchanges: a DeFi primer (2022) — link
- A Note on Optimal Fees for Constant Function Market Makers (2021) — link
- Challenges and Common Solutions in Smart Contract Development (2021) — link
- Twenty years of linear programming based portfolio optimization (2014)
- Decentralized Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision (2024)
- Chance-constrained economic dispatch with renewable energy and storage (2018)
- Impermanent Loss in Uniswap v3 (2021) — link
- Differential Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3 and Implications for Contract Design (2022) — link
- Decentralised Finance and Automated Market Making : Execution and Speculation — → 2307.03499
- G3M Impermanent Loss Dynamics (2022) — link
- Concentrated Liquidity Analysis in Uniswap V3 (2022) — link
- Stochastic dual dynamic integer programming (2019)
- Stochastic dual dynamic programming and its variant-a review (2023)
- Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap V3 (2023) — link
- Uniswap Interface (2024) — link
- The sample average approximation method for stochastic discrete optimization (2002)
- Model building in mathematical programming (2013)
2 of 32 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.